Case Library / Vishing (Voice Phishing) / Los Cyber: Colombian bank-impersonation vishing ring (2026)
Vishing (Voice Phishing) Documented incident

Los Cyber: Colombian bank-impersonation vishing ring (2026)

Colombian police say 'Los Cyber' posed as bank fraud staff, got victims to share their phone screens and took COP 1.685 billion from 94 people. 16 charged.

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Social Engineering Examples·10 sources

Between June 2025 and March 2026, a Colombian network called "Los Cyber" allegedly phoned and messaged bank customers while posing as fraud-prevention staff, then talked them into sharing their phone screens. Prosecutors say it took more than COP 1.685 billion from 94 people across 10 departments, most of them over 50. In July 2026, police and prosecutors arrested 16 alleged members. Status: Alleged, charges filed.

Key takeaways

  • The trick was screen sharing. Once victims shared their screens, the callers could see what they typed into banking apps.
  • The pitch was protective: a "preventive block" because the victim might be facing identity theft.
  • All 16 have been charged, but none has been convicted. Everything here is an allegation.
  • Police say the real number of victims and the total loss may be higher.

How the scam worked

Step What happened, according to prosecutors and police
Contact A call or WhatsApp message from someone claiming to be the bank's fraud or customer-service team
Fear A warning about a suspicious transaction or possible identity theft
Fix An offer to apply a "preventive block" right away, during the call
Screen share The victim is persuaded to share their phone screen, exposing what they enter in their banking app
Cash out Money is moved to accounts the network controls, then withdrawn as cash

El Tiempo quoted a recorded call in which an operator says that, for security, they need to carry out a preventive block because the customer may be a victim of identity theft. It's the same "we're protecting you" line used in vishing scams worldwide.

Tip: screen sharing with a stranger hands them everything you can see. No bank needs to watch your screen.

The arrests

On 9 and 10 July 2026, Colombia's Fiscalía, the National Police and the CTI raided sites in Bogotá, Soacha, Bucaramanga, Ibagué and Filandia. One outlet, El Diario, dated the captures to 7 July; most reports give 9 to 10 July.

Seized Count
Bank cards 35
Mobile phones 22
Laptops 4
USB drives 6
SIM cards 5
Cash About COP 7 million

By 17 July, all 16 had been charged with criminal conspiracy, illicit enrichment, computer theft, unauthorised access to an information system and personal data offences, and a judge had confirmed the arrests as lawful. Later coverage profiled one detainee, a former professional footballer, whom an investigator said had supplied a bank account to receive stolen money. He was one of the original 16, not a new arrest, and the claim is unproven.

The red flags

  • An unsolicited call or WhatsApp from "the bank".
  • Urgency: your account is at risk right now.
  • A request to share your screen, read out a password or give a one-time code.
  • A switch from a text message to a voice or video call you didn't ask for.

What stops it

  • Never share your screen with someone who contacted you, whoever they say they are.
  • Hang up and call the bank on the number from its app or your card.
  • Never read out codes or passwords. Banks don't ask for them.
  • Talk to older relatives about this script. Most victims here were over 50.

See also how to prevent vishing and tech support scams, which use screen sharing the same way.

Common questions

What is Los Cyber?

An alleged 16-member Colombian network accused of posing as bank fraud staff to steal from customers between June 2025 and March 2026.

How much did Los Cyber allegedly steal?

More than COP 1.685 billion from 94 victims, according to Colombian authorities, who say the total may grow.

Why did the scammers ask victims to share their screens?

So they could see banking details and codes as victims typed them, without needing malware.

Have they been convicted?

Not as of July 2026. All 16 were charged and their arrests were upheld by a judge.

Sources

Provenance. The July 10, 2026 Policia Nacional release directly supports the arrest count, affected-person count, alleged peso total, screen-sharing method, and seized-item inventory. Additional details and detainee reporting come from the secondary sources listed above; the release is an investigative account, not a conviction.

Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “Los Cyber: Colombian bank-impersonation vishing ring (2026)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/los-cyber-bank-impersonation-vishing-colombia-2026

Attack Chain & Defense
1Mule-account and cash-out infrastructure
What happened

Before contacting victims, the ring needed a standing network of bank accounts, cards and cash-out points to receive and launder stolen funds quickly. Per the case, this included recruiting individuals such as a former professional footballer alleged to have provided his own bank account for this purpose, alongside the broader mule layer implied by the 35 bank cards investigators seized.

The control that would have stopped it

Consumer-level exposure to leaked personal data or purchased contact lists is very hard for any single bank to prevent. The realistic control sits upstream, in breach-notification laws and data-broker regulation, and in banks assuming attackers already have a customer's phone number and basic details rather than treating a caller's accurate personal information as proof of legitimacy.

2Caller-ID and identity spoofing setup
What happened

Authorities described the group's core technique as spoofing. The specific caller-ID, number-spoofing, and WhatsApp tooling was not reported in the supplied sources.

The control that would have stopped it

Banks and regulators can apply money-mule detection controls, such as flagging newly opened or low-activity accounts that suddenly receive many small third-party inbound transfers followed by rapid cash withdrawal, and can require enhanced onboarding checks that make recruiting and using a mule account slower and more visible.

3Mass initial contact
What happened

Bulk SMS and WhatsApp messages, typically sent through bulk-messaging services, cast a wide net across the targeted departments to identify which numbers were live and responsive before investing operator time in a live call.

The control that would have stopped it

Telecom-level caller-ID authentication standards, such as STIR/SHAKEN-style call-origin verification, and carrier-level spoofed-number blocking reduce, though do not eliminate, a caller's ability to convincingly impersonate a bank's outbound number. Banks can reinforce this by publicly stating they never demand urgent account action on an inbound, unsolicited call.

4Live vishing pretext call
What happened

A scripted operator called or WhatsApp-called responding victims posing as bank fraud-prevention or customer-service staff, warning of a suspicious transaction or identity-theft attempt and offering a same-call 'preventive block,' consistent with the captured audio quoted by El Tiempo.

The control that would have stopped it

Telecom and platform providers can use bulk-messaging detection, filtering, and sender verification to reduce fraudulent outreach. Public warnings against unsolicited bank messages may also reduce responses.

5Induced screen-sharing
What happened

Having built enough trust and urgency, the operator talked the victim through opening their banking app and activating phone screen-sharing, in some cases via a WhatsApp video call, the single action that gave the operator a live view of the victim's own device.

The control that would have stopped it

The single most effective control is customer education, repeated by Colombian police in this case, that a legitimate bank will never ask a customer to act urgently in response to an inbound, unsolicited call or WhatsApp message. Training customers to hang up and call the bank back on an official number breaks the pretext at its most critical point.

6Live credential and OTP capture with unauthorized transfer
What happened

With the screen shared, the operator watched in real time as the victim entered usernames, passwords and SMS one-time codes, in some cases reportedly guiding the victim step by step, then used that visibility to initiate transfers directly out of the account.

The control that would have stopped it

Device and app-level warnings when screen-sharing is activated during an active call, plus explicit bank guidance that it will never ask a customer to share their phone screen, directly target the single action that gave operators full visibility into the victim's banking session.

7Layering through mule accounts
What happened

Stolen funds were rapidly moved through multiple intermediary and mule accounts, the kind pre-arranged in stage 2, to break the audit trail before banks or authorities could freeze them.

The control that would have stopped it

Banks can require secondary out-of-band transaction verification, such as a callback or app-based confirmation on a channel the fraudster cannot see or influence, before executing high-value transfers, so a password or OTP visible to a screen-sharing observer is not sufficient on its own to move money.

8Cash-out and objective completion
What happened

Reporting described withdrawals through various channels.

The control that would have stopped it

Real-time transaction-velocity and mule-network fraud analytics that flag rapid multi-hop transfers between newly linked accounts can interrupt layering before funds are fully dispersed, which is faster and more effective than after-the-fact investigation.

Quick Facts
Victim
94 documented victims
(bank customers of unnamed Colombian financial institutions), the large majority adults over 50, spread across 10 Colombian departments (Risaralda, Bogota, La Guajira, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Atlantico, Narino, Quindio, Meta, Bolivar per the most-repeated list; some outlets substitute Cesar/Cundinamarca/Tolima for a few of these)
Location
Colombia, victims mostly in Risaralda, Bogota, La Guajira, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Atlantico, Narino, Quindio, Meta and Bolivar
(10 departments; a few outlets substitute Cesar, Cundinamarca or Tolima in place of some of these, so the exact 10-department list varies slightly by source); ring members arrested in Bogota, Soacha (Cundinamarca), Bucaramanga (Santander), Ibague (Tolima) and Filandia (Quindio).
Date
Fraud scheme active June 2025 to March 2026; coordinated raids captured all 16 alleged members on July 9-10, 2026, per the Fiscalia/Policia press conference and the majority of contemporaneous outlets (El Tiempo, Infobae, El Pais, Caracol Radio), with coverage published/announced July 9-11, 2026.
One of the original 16 detainees was individually profiled in a later wave of coverage on July 22-24, 2026; this was a profile piece about an existing detainee, not a separate or 17th arrest. One outlet, El Diario (published Jul 10, 2026), instead states the physical captures occurred "el martes 7 de julio" (Tuesday, July 7, 2026), a minor cross-source date discrepancy, possibly reflecting a gap between the raid-execution date and the public press-conference/announcement date.
Impact
More than COP 1,685,000,000 (reported by Fiscalia/Policia as "mas de $1.685 millones de pesos").
BasisallegedMore than COP 1.685 billion alleged in the July 10, 2026 police release; no currency conversion
Some early wire reports rounded the peso figure down to "more than COP 1.600 millones." Authorities stated the true total could be higher as the investigation continues and additional victims are identified.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Consumer / General Public, Financial Services & Insurance
Threat Actor
Organized Crime
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