Case Library / Phishing / WhatsApp pig butchering scam: SEC v. NanoBit (2023 to 2026)
PhishingSmishing (SMS Phishing) Documented incident

WhatsApp pig butchering scam: SEC v. NanoBit (2023 to 2026)

Fake finance "directors" in WhatsApp groups steered 18+ US investors to NanoBit, a crypto platform that never traded. The SEC won a $5.5M default judgment.

Share:

Social Engineering Examples·6 sources

This WhatsApp pig butchering scam ran through at least seven investment chat groups, where fake "directors" posing as real finance professionals talked members into a crypto platform called NanoBit. It never made a single real trade. From about late 2023 to June 2024, at least 18 US retail investors lost around $967,835, the SEC alleged. The SEC sued in September 2024, in one of its first cases aimed squarely at pig butchering. On 16 June 2026 a New York federal court entered a $5,518,902 default judgment. Status: Default judgment, no collection reported.

Key takeaways

  • The "community" was staged. Fake assistants and planted members made the groups feel busy and successful.
  • NanoBit claimed an SEC-registered broker affiliate. It wasn't registered.
  • Withdrawals hit surprise "miner's fees". Push back, and you got removed from the group.
  • $5.5 million was ordered. The judgment doesn't say any of it has been paid.

How the WhatsApp groups worked

Stage What the SEC alleged
Groups At least seven WhatsApp groups, with names like "VIP8012" and "VIP34"
Experts Two lead personas, "Pseudo-Director A" and "Pseudo-Director B" in the complaint, each impersonating a real senior investment professional
Crowd Fake assistants and planted members who cheered the trades along
Pitch NanoBit, a crypto trading platform (once at NanoBitUS.com), plus fake coin offerings called "Cosmic Energy" and "VTrade" with counterfeit whitepapers
Cover A claim that affiliate "NanobitUS Securities" was an SEC-registered broker-dealer
Reality No trades ever executed. The trading screen was fake

Why does this work on careful people? Because nobody pitches you directly at first. You watch others "win" for a while. By the time the director mentions a platform, it feels like your idea.

Tip: before trusting any broker, look it up yourself on Investor.gov. A chat group saying "SEC-registered" means nothing.

The tells

  • Fees at the exit. One investor was told he owed $10,692 in "Ghana miners fees" before he could withdraw.
  • Stories of others cashing out, but only after they paid up.
  • Getting kicked out. One investor was removed from "VIP8012" on 11 March 2024 after calling it a fraud.
  • Strangers adding you to investment chats in the first place. Real brokers don't recruit that way.

The money

Figure What it is
About $967,835 Combined crypto and cash lost by at least 18 investors, as alleged
More than $2 million Wired to Hong Kong bank accounts by Radiant Horizons, as alleged (for example $145,690 on 17 January 2024 and $127,638 the next day)
About $725,335 Crypto received by three unhosted wallet addresses
$242,500 Received by the alleged money mules and their entities
$5,518,902 Total disgorgement, interest and penalties ordered on 16 June 2026

These are separate measures. The $2 million in wires is bigger than the $967,835 in investor losses, and the complaint treats them as different numbers, so don't add them up. Sweet Karma Fashion Inc. and Zhao Tropical Deli Inc., two small businesses with no obvious link to finance, served as cash conduits.

The SEC case

Date Event
About September or October 2023 Scheme begins (the SEC's two releases give slightly different start dates)
June 2024 Scheme ends
17 September 2024 SEC files suit in the Eastern District of New York (No. 2:24-cv-06517) against four companies and three individuals
18 September 2025 SEC drops its case against one individual, with prejudice
16 June 2026 Default judgment against the other six defendants: NanoBit Limited, Radiant Horizons Limited, Sweet Karma Fashion Inc., Zhao Tropical Deli Inc. and two individuals
29 June 2026 SEC announces it (Litigation Release No. 26576)

NanoBit owes $532,649 in disgorgement, a $1,182,251 penalty and $81,957 in interest. Radiant Horizons, Sweet Karma and Zhao Tropical Deli each owe a $1,182,251 penalty. The two individuals owe smaller sums and may now trade only in their own accounts. The people who actually ran the WhatsApp personas weren't named in the case.

What stops it

The SEC published an investor alert with this case, alongside the CFTC, FINRA and NASAA:

  • Don't invest on the strength of a group chat.
  • Check registration yourself on Investor.gov or SEC EDGAR.
  • Be wary of being added to investment groups by strangers on WhatsApp or Telegram.
  • A fee to withdraw is a hard stop, not a hurdle.
  • Removed from a group for asking questions? That's the answer to your question.

See also pig butchering and the Austin DAIQ case.

Common questions

What was the NanoBit WhatsApp scam?

A pig butchering scheme in which fake finance professionals in WhatsApp groups steered US investors to NanoBit, a crypto platform that made no real trades.

How much did investors lose?

The SEC alleged at least 18 investors lost about $967,835 combined.

What did the court order?

A default judgment on 16 June 2026 ordering $5,518,902 in disgorgement, interest and penalties against six defendants. No collection has been reported.

How can you spot a fake investment group?

Strangers add you, "experts" vouch for a platform, the broker isn't on Investor.gov, and withdrawals suddenly need fees.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “WhatsApp pig butchering scam: SEC v. NanoBit (2023 to 2026)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/whatsapp-pig-butchering-nanobit-sec-2024

Attack Chain & Defense
1Infrastructure setup
What happened

Scheme participants likely registered shell companies (e.g. Sweet Karma Fashion Inc., Zhao Tropical Deli Inc.) to serve as fiat mule accounts, stood up the fake NanoBit trading platform and dashboard, prepared counterfeit ICO whitepapers, and sourced WhatsApp numbers, consistent with the infrastructure named in the SEC complaint.

The control that would have stopped it

Shell-company formation and fake trading-platform builds are hard to intercept pre-launch; the realistic control sits with banks screening newly formed small-business accounts for mule-like deposit/withdrawal patterns once money starts moving, addressed at Stage 7.

2Target/persona research
What happened

Per the SEC complaint, at least one persona ('Pseudo-Director A') borrowed the name and title of a real managing director at a legitimate global investment firm, indicating some OSINT on real financial-industry professionals to make the impersonation credible.

The control that would have stopped it

Public professional profiles used for persona-borrowing are difficult to lock down at scale; the more effective control is verifying any individual's registration and firm affiliation directly on Investor.gov/SEC EDGAR rather than trusting the name and title as presented in a chat.

3Initial contact
What happened

Scheme participants added or drew targets into private WhatsApp 'VIP' investment groups, with the SEC noting some investors were first solicited via other social media apps before being funneled into the groups.

The control that would have stopped it

Treat unsolicited additions to investment-themed WhatsApp/Telegram groups by strangers as a default red flag, and decline to engage rather than waiting to see where the group leads.

4Trust-building ('fattening')
What happened

Impersonated senior professionals, backed by planted fake assistants and other fabricated group members, gave real-sounding investment commentary over an extended period to build rapport and the appearance of a thriving trading community before ever discussing money.

The control that would have stopped it

Recognize patient, no-pitch rapport-building in an investment-themed group chat as a known pig-butchering pattern in itself, per the SEC's investor alert, and avoid making investment decisions based on group-chat relationships regardless of how genuine they feel.

5False legitimacy pitch
What happened

The group steered members toward the NanoBit platform, falsely claiming its affiliate 'NanobitUS Securities' was an SEC-registered broker-dealer tied to reputable firms, to defeat the skepticism a cold pitch would normally trigger.

The control that would have stopped it

Independently verify any broker-dealer's registration status on Investor.gov/SEC EDGAR before funding an account; this single check would have exposed NanobitUS Securities as unregistered.

6Escalation via fake ICOs
What happened

In-group 'professionals' touted fake initial coin offerings (named in reporting as 'Cosmic Energy' and 'VTrade'), backed by counterfeit whitepapers, to induce larger investments beyond the initial deposit.

The control that would have stopped it

Apply the same registration/legitimacy check to any touted ICO or token before investing further, and treat a slick whitepaper alone as no substitute for verifiable registration or an independently confirmed trading history.

7Fund extraction
What happened

Victims wired fiat and transferred crypto into the scheme; funds were routed through the shell 'mule' entities to bank accounts in Hong Kong and into unhosted crypto wallets rather than any real trading activity.

The control that would have stopped it

Banks and crypto platforms can flag newly opened small-business accounts receiving many unrelated incoming wires followed quickly by large outbound transfers to overseas accounts, a recognizable mule-account signature.

8Withdrawal stalling
What happened

When victims tried to cash out, they were charged undisclosed fees invented on the spot (e.g. one investor was told he owed $10,692 in 'Ghana miners fees') and told other members had only succeeded after paying similar fees.

The control that would have stopped it

Treat any new or undisclosed fee demanded to unlock a withdrawal as a hard stop rather than a cost of doing business, per SEC/CFTC/FINRA/NASAA guidance issued alongside this case.

9Victim silencing and payout completion
What happened

Investors who pushed back or called the platform fraudulent were removed from the WhatsApp group, cutting off further contact. The complaint alleges that diverted funds were spent in the United States or wired to Hong Kong.

The control that would have stopped it

Being removed from a group chat for questioning legitimacy is itself a fraud indicator that should trigger an immediate report to the SEC, FINRA, or state regulators; the complaint alleges transfers to Hong Kong accounts and unhosted wallets, while the judgment establishes payment obligations without reporting a recovery amount.

Quick Facts
Victim
At least 18 U.S. retail investors solicited and defrauded through WhatsApp investment groups
Location
Victims: at least 18 U.S. retail investors.
Funds routed to bank accounts in Hong Kong. Case litigated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Date
Scheme ran ~September/October 2023 to June 2024
(the SEC's two litigation releases give slightly different start-date estimates); SEC complaint filed September 17, 2024; default judgment entered June 16, 2026 (SEC announced June 29, 2026)
Impact
The SEC complaint alleged at least 18 investors lost approximately $967,835 in combined crypto assets and fiat currency.
BasisallegedInvestor losses and transfer amounts were alleged in the SEC complaint; the judgment amounts are court-ordered disgorgement, civil penalties, and prejudgment interest, not reported recovery.
It separately alleged that more than $2 million was wired to Hong Kong, that three unhosted addresses received approximately $725,335 in crypto assets, and that the Money Mule Defendants and entities they controlled received $242,500. The June 16, 2026 order required NanoBit to pay $532,649 in disgorgement, a $1,182,251 penalty, and $81,957 in prejudgment interest; Radiant Horizons, Zhao Tropical Deli, and Sweet Karma each owed a $1,182,251 penalty; Liu owed $60,603 in disgorgement, a $50,000 penalty, and $9,485 in prejudgment interest; and Zhao owed $4,500 in disgorgement, a $50,000 penalty, and $704 in prejudgment interest. The total court-ordered amount was $5,518,902. These are distinct alleged losses and transfers, and court-ordered disgorgement, penalties, and interest. The judgment does not state that any amount was collected.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Cryptocurrency & Digital Assets, Financial Services & Insurance, Retail & E-commerce
Threat Actor
Organized Crime
Explore more

Related Cases

Browse by what this case has in common with others in the library.