27 real vishing cases from this library, from the MGM Resorts and Carnival help-desk calls to fake bank fraud teams and police impersonators. For each one: who the caller claimed to be, what it cost, and what would have stopped it.
Vishing, or voice phishing, is a scam run over the phone. The caller says they're from your bank's fraud team, IT support, the tax office or the police, and talks you into handing over a code, a password, or money. A confident voice on the phone is harder to doubt than an email, and that's the whole trick.
Key takeaways
In the Standard Bank case, that whole chain took about 20 minutes. An 18-year-old moved R438,900 from her education fund in three transfers, and by the time anyone flagged it the receiving account held R406.
The most common pattern here. "We've spotted fraud on your account, let's move your money somewhere safe." Hamilton Academical FC's banking employee moved about £989,000 into 26 new accounts this way in 2017. A Surrey solicitor moved £734,000 of client money after calls from fake NatWest security staff.
Either the attacker calls the help desk pretending to be an employee, or calls an employee pretending to be the help desk. One call at MGM Resorts led to an outage MGM valued at about $100 million. A call claiming to be Carnival's own IT security team led to the theft of data on nearly 6 million people. See help-desk and MFA manipulation.
Fear does the work. Canada's CRA phone scam, run from call centers in India, threatened people with arrest or deportation over fake tax debts, and the RCMP linked it to over $16.8 million in reported losses from 2014 to 2019. In Singapore, a finance professional lost S$1.2 million after callers posing as the Anti-Scam Centre and then a police inspector told her she was tied to money laundering.
A "grandchild" in trouble, then a fake lawyer or officer. In a Saskatchewan case, the judge concluded AI had been used, though investigators couldn't confirm voice cloning. The earliest widely reported AI voice case here is from 2019, when a UK energy firm's CEO wired €220,000 after hearing what sounded like his parent company's boss. See voice cloning.
Here you make the call. A pop-up, an email or a fake invoice gives you a number, and the "support agent" takes it from there. In one 2026 campaign, attackers used Microsoft's own alert system to send a fake $459.90 billing notice with their callback numbers in it. See callback phishing.
Who called, who they said they were, what they wanted, and what it cost. Some losses are estimates, allegations, or figures pleaded in a lawsuit, and the table labels them that way.
| Case | Year | Caller posed as | What they asked for | Loss |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MGM Resorts | 2023 | An employee calling the IT help desk (per the attackers) | An access reset | About $100M hit to quarterly Adjusted Property EBITDAR (MGM estimate) |
| Caesars Entertainment | 2023 | An employee calling an outsourced help desk | A password reset | About $15M ransom, reported but not in its 8-K |
| Clorox | 2023 | Two Clorox employees | Password and MFA resets | About $380M claimed in a lawsuit, not awarded |
| 2020 | Twitter IT, fixing a VPN problem | Logins on a fake VPN page | Over $118,000 in bitcoin taken from the public | |
| Retool | 2023 | Retool IT | An MFA code over the phone | Roughly $15M in crypto from Fortress Trust customers (estimate) |
| Wells Fargo customer | 2022 | Wells Fargo, with its real number spoofed | A 2FA code read back | $100,000 wired, $99,950 net (alleged) |
| Barclays jeweler | 2024 | Barclays' fraud team | A banking login and AnyDesk installed | £48,451.78 reported stolen |
| PNC gold conversion | 2024 | PayPal support (after a fake Norton bill), then PNC staff | Wires to a coin dealer, gold handed to couriers | $390,000 (alleged) |
| India IRS/USCIS call centers | 2012 to 2016 | IRS agents or USCIS officers | Prepaid card numbers, wires, money orders | Hundreds of millions alleged by ICE, from 15,000+ victims who paid |
| CRA tax scam | 2014 to 2020 | CRA or RCMP officers | Gift cards, Bitcoin ATM deposits, wires | Over $34M reported, including related scripts |
| UK energy firm | 2019 | The German parent company's CEO (AI-cloned voice, per the insurer) | An urgent wire to a supplier | €220,000 (about $243,000) |
| Saskatchewan grandparent scam | 2025 | A grandchild, then police and a lawyer | Bail cash left for a courier | $46,350 in restitution, the amount the Crown said was never recovered |
The corporate calls are boring on purpose. A locked account, a VPN that won't connect. The caller says they're an employee, or says they're IT ringing an employee, and asks for access. Money comes up later, usually in a ransom note.
The attackers say they rang MGM's IT help desk in September 2023, claimed to be an employee, and walked away with that employee's access reset. MGM's SEC filings never explain how the intruders got in, but they are clear on the bill: an estimated $100 million hit to third-quarter Adjusted Property EBITDAR (a profit measure, not revenue) and under $10 million in one-time costs. Properties were disrupted for roughly ten days. No ransom was paid. A $45 million class settlement, which also covers a 2019 breach, won final approval in June 2025. Full case: MGM Resorts help-desk vishing.
Caesars was hit weeks earlier, through a help desk it had outsourced to a vendor. According to the complaint, a caller claiming to be a Caesars employee got a password reset with MFA bypassed. The attackers then spent five days inside before copying the loyalty database, which held driver's license or Social Security numbers for a significant number of members. Caesars reportedly paid about $15 million in cryptocurrency against a $30 million demand. Its 8-K doesn't mention that figure. The casinos stayed open. Read the Caesars vendor help-desk case.
One agent read a password aloud. It started with "Welcome."
That detail is from Clorox's own lawsuit against Cognizant, which ran its outsourced help desk. Clorox says a caller phoned in August 2023 pretending to be two different employees, and agents reset passwords and MFA and changed the phone number used for SMS codes without checking identity. Net sales fell 20% year over year that quarter. Clorox claims about $380 million, over $49 million of it remedial costs, though that is a pleaded figure and nothing has been awarded. In March 2026 a court threw out one claim and let three go ahead. See the Clorox help-desk case.
Twitter ran the other way around: fake IT calling real staff about a VPN problem and pointing them to a fake VPN login page. Four employees handed over credentials, and some approved MFA prompts too. From there the attackers went after 130 accounts, reset 45 passwords, and posted a bitcoin scam that pulled over $118,000 from the public. Graham Ivan Clark pleaded guilty to 30 felony counts. Joseph O'Connor was extradited and got five years. The Twitter 2020 vishing takeover page has the full timeline.
A text first, then a call. A Retool employee typed a password and code into a fake Okta page, and the caller, posing as IT, phoned to ask for one more code. With it the attacker added a device. Google Authenticator was syncing codes to the cloud, so the rest were exposed as well, and 27 crypto customer accounts were taken over. Fortress Trust, reported to be a Retool customer, put the loss to four of its own customers at $12 million to $15 million in crypto. That was their loss, not Retool's. Retool said the voice was deepfaked. Nobody has verified it. Case page: Retool smishing and vishing breach.
Still happening. In April 2026 a caller claiming to be from Carnival's IT security team got one employee's login, and 5,995,277 people were later notified. Carnival gave no dollar figure. See Carnival's 2026 vishing breach.
On the consumer side, the caller is "the bank." The number on the screen can match the one printed on the back of the card. Something is wrong with the account, they say, and they can fix it if the customer reads out a code, installs an app, or moves the money somewhere safe.
Minutes after a real call from her banker in October 2022, a woman got another call that showed Wells Fargo's genuine 800 number. She read back a 2FA code. According to her complaint, the fraudster reset her password, enrolled her account in wires, and sent $100,000 to a car wash business in Miami. On a recorded call, a bank representative said the amount needed a second review and then released it anyway. She was told the wire had been recalled. It hadn't been. Her complaint puts the net loss at $99,950 after a $50 courtesy credit. The case went to private arbitration. Details: Wells Fargo spoofed-call wire fraud.
The hold music was real. The callers, "Andrew" and then "Charlie Adams" from Barclays' fraud team, were not. They told a jeweler in his 70s about a suspicious £18,123 payment, then had him confirm his overdraft limit, log in to business banking, and install AnyDesk. His two business accounts lost £48,451.78. Barclays first returned £30.21 and offered £100 in goodwill. His solicitors later recovered £25,650, leaving about £22,800 still missing. Read the Barclays AnyDesk case.
Two days, three borrowed names. After a fake Norton invoice, "Jason Green," posing as PayPal, got remote access to a 76-year-old New Jersey retiree's computer and used a doctored screen to turn a $300 refund into a $300,000 "deposit." A "PNC helpline" number on that same screen led to "Edward Cullen," posing as bank staff. The retiree wired $300,000 and then $90,000 to a coin dealer, bought gold, and handed it to couriers at his door. The civil complaint alleges a $390,000 loss, about half his life savings. Police announced an arrest in October 2024, and in June 2026 a court denied PNC's motion to dismiss the civil suit. Full case: PNC gold conversion scam.
A woman in New Zealand was told the codes she read back would "cancel" transactions. They approved a NZ$30,000 credit card purchase. The Banking Ombudsman recommended full reimbursement (NZ spoofed callback case).
Here the caller doesn't offer help. They threaten. Back taxes, an arrest warrant, a deportation order, and a payment method that can't be clawed back.
Five call centers in Ahmedabad, staff reading from scripts as IRS agents chasing back taxes or USCIS officers with "defective paperwork." Pay or be arrested, pay or be deported, and pay with prepaid or iTunes cards, wires, or money orders. ICE alleged losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars and counted more than 15,000 US victims who paid. A separate count by the Treasury inspector general, covering IRS-impersonation reports in general, reached about 12,027 victims and more than $60.7 million by September 2017. Sixty-one parties were charged in 2016, all 24 US defendants pleaded guilty, and the HGlobal owner was extradited from Singapore and sentenced to 20 years. See the India IRS call-center takedown.
Canada got the same script with the Canada Revenue Agency's name on it, sometimes the RCMP's. Callers wanted gift cards, Bitcoin ATM deposits, wires, or cash, and one Toronto man reportedly fed $110,000 into Bitcoin ATMs. Project OCTAVIA, launched in October 2018, helped Indian police raid roughly 39 to 40 call centers, and reported CRA-scam losses dropped from $6.4 million in 2018 to $1.4 million in 2019. The networks switched scripts and kept dialing. Reported losses passed $34 million by October 2020, counting related scripts run by the same networks. Canadian money mules were charged, but the public record shows no conviction. Read the CRA scam and Project OCTAVIA.
Malaysia's version is called the "Macau scam." In 2026 a retired bank manager in Johor Baru was handed from a fake insurance agent to a fake police officer to a fake prosecutor and lost a reported RM936,000 (Johor Baru Macau scam).
People used to trust a voice they knew. Cloning takes that away. The proof that a clone was used is thin in some of these cases, and the case pages flag it.
The CEO of a UK energy company heard what sounded like his boss at the German parent in March 2019, telling him to pay a Hungarian supplier within the hour. He sent €220,000, about $243,000. The "boss" rang back to say the money had been reimbursed and to ask for a second payment. The reimbursement never arrived, the next call came from an Austrian number, and he grew suspicious. The insurer said the voice was AI-cloned. The money moved on through accounts including one in Mexico, no arrests followed, and neither company was ever named. Case page: UK energy firm voice clone.
A crying grandchild, then a police officer, then a lawyer, all between late November and early December 2025. Bail cash was to go in a box on the doorstep, and a "gag order" meant nobody could be told. One target broke the case open by calling the real lawyer whose name the scammers had borrowed. The two Quebec residents who collected the cash were arrested and sentenced, with restitution of $46,350, the amount the Crown said victims never got back. A judge called it "AI-driven fraud." Police said they couldn't confirm any voice cloning. See the Saskatchewan grandparent scam.
Some fail. A LastPass employee in 2024 got missed WhatsApp calls, texts, and a voicemail in an AI-cloned version of the CEO's voice, outside working hours, on an app LastPass doesn't use for business. The employee ignored them and reported it (LastPass voice clone attempt).
Caller ID spoofing does a lot of the heavy lifting in the vishing examples above. The iSpoof website let paying users show the real numbers of Barclays, HSBC, and HMRC on a victim's phone, and victims typed in PINs and one-time passcodes during a fake security check. Prosecutors traced £43 million in UK fraud to the site. Its administrator got 13 years and 4 months (iSpoof caller ID spoofing).
The other tool is the victim's own phone, hijacked by a SIM swap or turned against them through codes read aloud. SABRIC, South Africa's banking risk center, reported R2,406,728,972 in client claims for digital banking crime in 2025, up 29.2%. Not all of that is vishing, but fake "fraud department" calls and SIM swaps are in there (SABRIC banking fraud figures).
Take the logos off and the calls start to sound the same.
At MGM, Caesars, and Clorox, the reported weak point was a help-desk reset granted with little or no identity check. No software exploit was reported.
| Stage | What helps | Case it would have broken |
|---|---|---|
| The call | Hang up and call back on a number you look up yourself | Wells Fargo, Barclays jeweller |
| The ask for a code | A firm rule: nobody legitimate asks for codes by phone. Phishing-resistant MFA for staff | Twitter, Retool |
| The help-desk reset | Verify identity with something a caller can't research before any reset | MGM, Carnival |
| The transfer | Banks pausing large first-time transfers to new accounts and calling back | Hamilton Academical, Standard Bank |
| The secrecy | Tell family and staff: any caller who says "don't tell anyone" is the scam | Singapore, Johor Baru |
Same trick, different channel. Phishing is email, smishing is a text or chat message, and vishing is a voice call. Attackers mix them. Retool's attacker texted first and then called, and fake billing emails in the callback scams exist mainly to get you on the phone. For the detail, see vishing vs phishing and vishing vs smishing.
Vishing is voice phishing: a scam carried out over a phone call. The caller poses as someone you'd trust, like a bank, IT support or the police, and pushes you to share codes or passwords, install software or move money. The word combines "voice" and "phishing."
In September 2023, an attacker called MGM Resorts' IT help desk pretending to be an employee and got MFA reset. That one call led to an outage MGM valued at about $100 million. The often-repeated claim that it took just ten minutes comes from the attackers and was never independently confirmed.
Yes. Caller ID spoofing is cheap and common. In the Wells Fargo case, the scammer showed the bank's real 800 number nine minutes after a genuine call from the customer's advisor. If a call worries you, hang up and dial the number on your card.
Call your bank on the number you already have and ask them to stop or recall any transfer. Change any password you shared and sign out other sessions. Report it to the police and, in the US, to the FBI's IC3. Speed matters: in the Standard Bank case, the money was gone within a day.
By making identity checks impossible to talk around. Call back a number already on file, get a manager to confirm, or use a video check before resetting a password or MFA. Questions with answers that can be looked up, like an employee ID, don't protect much.
Counts on this page come from the 27 cases tagged vishing in this library on 21 Oct 2026. The library statistics page has the wider picture. Reviewed by SEE Team. Last reviewed 21 Oct 2026. See the methodology, or who publishes this library.
A spoofed call asked a Wells Fargo customer to read back a 2FA code. $100,000 left her account. The bank's own rep flagged the wire, then released it.
VIIn 2019 a UK energy CEO wired €220,000 after a call that sounded like his German boss. Insurer Euler Hermes blamed AI: the first reported voice-clone fraud.
VIA caller posing as Standard Bank got an 18-year-old to move her R438,900 education fund to a 'safe' account in 20 minutes. What happened and what's disputed.
VIFake Anti-Scam Centre and police officers convinced a Singapore finance worker she was a suspect, then took S$1.2M through transfers and cash handoffs.
VISABRIC recorded R2.4bn in South African digital banking fraud claims in 2025, driven by phishing, fake bank calls and SIM swaps. What the numbers mean.
VIA judge called it an AI-driven fraud, but police couldn't confirm voice cloning. How the Saskatchewan grandparent scam worked and how a lawyer's call cracked it.
VIA fake IT text and phone call got a Retool employee's MFA codes in 2023. Google Authenticator sync did the rest: 27 crypto accounts hijacked. What happened.
VICallers posing as Optus or TPG staff talked customers into reading out SMS one-time PINs, then ordered phones on their accounts. 100+ victims, AUD $1M seized.
VIA caller spoofed a NZ bank's real number and got a customer to read out codes that approved a $30,000 purchase. The Banking Ombudsman backed the customer.
VIAn Atlantic City woman called grieving widows posing as a life insurer, demanding gift cards to clear policy "arrears". 17+ victims, $100,000+. How it worked.
VIFake Microsoft and Apple pop-ups sent victims to an India call centre selling $99 to $499 "support". FTC judgment, criminal sentence, little money back.
VIColombian police say 'Los Cyber' posed as bank fraud staff, got victims to share their phone screens and took COP 1.685 billion from 94 people. 16 charged.
VIMGM Resorts, September 2023. A caller reportedly talked the IT help desk into resetting an employee's access, and the shutdown that followed knocked about $100 million off quarterly property profit. No ransom was paid. Below: what MGM's filings confirm, and what only the attackers said. A documented incident.
VIA retired bank manager in Johor Baru lost RM936,000 after callers posing as an insurer, police and a prosecutor had her move her savings. How Macau scams work.
VIA caller posing as NatWest security talked a Surrey solicitor into moving £734,000 of client funds. £512,000 gone, certificate suspended, bankruptcy.
VIA fake Norton bill, a fake PayPal refund and a fake PNC banker led a 76-year-old to wire $390,000 for gold coins handed to couriers. Now PNC is being sued.
VIFive Ahmedabad call centres posed as the IRS and USCIS, threatened arrest or deportation and took prepaid cards from 15,000+ Americans. DOJ charged 61.
VIJLR's 2025 cyber attack halted production for five weeks. Early reports blamed help-desk vishing; JLR's CISO later denied it. What's claimed vs what's known.
VIProsecutors say a grandparent scam run from call centers in the Dominican Republic hit hundreds of elderly Americans and took millions of dollars. One caller played a grandchild under arrest. Then a fake lawyer, police officer, or court clerk took over, and couriers in the US picked up the cash. Sixteen people were charged in 2024. Nothing's been proven in court, and there's no itemized loss total anywhere.
VIA caller posing as Carnival's IT security team got an employee's login in April 2026. The attacker copied data on nearly 6 million people. What was taken.
VICall centres in India posed as the CRA and RCMP, threatened arrest and demanded gift cards. $16.8M+ lost to the CRA script. What Project OCTAVIA did.
VIFraudsters spoofed Barclays' number and hold music, then talked a UK jeweller into installing AnyDesk. £48,451 drained; £25,650 later recovered. How it worked.
VIAttackers made Microsoft's own Azure Monitor send a fake $459.90 Windows Defender bill that passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC. A reviewer cleared it. How it worked.
VIIn July 2020, callers posing as Twitter IT stole staff logins and hit 130 accounts, from Obama to Musk, with a bitcoin scam. How it worked and how it ended.