Case library

Social Engineering Examples: 172 Real Attacks and Types

Social engineering examples are real attacks where criminals trick people into handing over access, data, or money, usually by pretending to be someone the victim trusts. This library documents 172 of them. Every case names who was targeted, how the attacker got in, what it cost, and where the facts come from.

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Key takeaways

172real cases, each with sources
42%involve phishing, the most common type (72 cases)
23%came by phone call or text message (39 cases)
17%involve deepfakes or AI agents (30 cases)
$2.6Mmedian disclosed loss (43 cases with a figure)

151 documented incidents, 14 corroborated research or advisory records, 7 reported or alleged · 68 cases from 2024 or later · Reviewed by SEE Team · Last reviewed 20 Oct 2026 · How we source cases

13 famous social engineering examples, grouped by how they worked

Every one of these is a documented case, and its sources are on the case page. They’re grouped by the trick that got the attacker in, since that’s the part a defender can actually change.

Help desk and IT support

MGM Resorts (2023)

Documented incidentVishing (Voice Phishing)

One phone call to the IT help desk, pretending to be an MGM employee, was enough. Scattered Spider got MFA reset, took over identity systems, and set off an outage.

Cost: About $100M negative impact to third-quarter Adjusted Property EBITDAR, a profit measure, as disclosed by MGM.
Lesson: A help desk that resets MFA on a phone call is an open door. Prove identity before any reset.

Help desk and IT support

Caesars Entertainment (2023)

Documented incidentHelp-Desk & MFA Manipulation

Attackers, later tied to Scattered Spider, talked their way past Caesars’ outsourced IT support.

Cost: A ransom of about $15M, as widely reported by Bloomberg, WSJ, and Reuters.
Lesson: Your vendors' help desks are part of your attack surface.

Help desk and IT support

Twitter (2020)

Documented incidentPhishing, Vishing (Voice Phishing)

Attackers rang Twitter staff pretending to be the IT help desk and collected VPN logins. Then they used internal admin tools to hijack 130 high-profile accounts for a "double your bitcoin" scam.

Cost: Over $118,000 in bitcoin taken from the public.
Lesson: A call from "IT" is not proof that it is IT. Call back on a number you already hold.

Help desk and IT support

Uber (2022)

Documented incidentPhishing, Vishing (Voice Phishing)

An attacker had a contractor’s stolen password. They flooded the contractor with MFA push prompts, then posed as tech support to get one approved.

Cost: About $3M.
Lesson: Push-approval MFA can be worn down. Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) cannot.

Executive or supplier

Arup (2024)

Documented incidentDeepfake & Synthetic Media

A finance worker in Arup’s Hong Kong office joined a video call where, according to Hong Kong Police, everyone else on screen was a deepfake. The employee then made 15 transfers.

Cost: HK$200M gross, about US$25.6M.
Lesson: Seeing and hearing someone on a call is not identity evidence. Verify payments on a channel the requester did not choose.

Executive or supplier

Ubiquiti Networks (2015)

Documented incidentPhishing

Fraudsters posing as Ubiquiti’s CEO and a partner at an outside law firm got its principal financial officer and controller to wire $46.7M from the Hong Kong subsidiary’s account, in 14 transfers over two weeks.

Cost: $46,703,232 in 14 wires, gross, per Ubiquiti's response to the SEC.
Lesson: Require two people to approve unusual transfers, however senior the requester appears.

Executive or supplier

Google and Facebook (2013 to 2015)

Documented incidentPhishing

A Lithuanian fraud ring pretended to be a real hardware supplier, Quanta Computer. With spoofed emails and forged invoices, it got both companies to pay into accounts it controlled.

Cost: About $122.13M wired to attacker accounts.
Lesson: Confirm any change to a supplier's bank details by phone, on a number already on file.

Phishing email

Target (2013)

Documented incidentPhishing

It started with a phishing email at a small HVAC contractor. That stole the contractor’s login for Target’s vendor systems, and the attackers used it to reach Target’s network.

Cost: About 40M payment card accounts and up to 70M customer records exposed.
Lesson: A supplier's login should never reach the systems that hold customer data.

Phishing email

RSA Security (2011)

Documented incidentPhishing

A spear-phishing email titled "2011 Recruitment Plan," carried a booby-trapped Excel file. It got attackers into RSA and exposed SecurID data.

Cost: A $66.3M charge recorded by RSA's parent EMC in Q2 2011.
Lesson: A well-targeted attachment gets opened, even at a security company. Isolate attachments before they run.

Phishing email

Sony Pictures (2014)

Documented incidentPhishing

North Korean operators sent Sony staff fake Apple ID "verify your account" emails and collected reused passwords. Later they set off wiper malware that crippled the studio.

Cost: About $41M (4.9 billion yen) in costs reported by Sony, mainly investigation and remediation.
Lesson: A password reused across personal and work accounts turns one phish into a breach.

Text message

Retool (2023)

Documented incidentPhishing, Vishing (Voice Phishing), Smishing (SMS Phishing)

A text, then a phone call from a fake IT colleague, was all it took for a Retool employee to hand over one-time codes.

Cost: A Retool customer, Fortress Trust, later put its crypto loss at $12M to $15M.
Lesson: Never read a one-time code to anyone. No real IT team needs it.

Fake job candidate

KnowBe4 (2024)

Documented incidentDeepfake & Synthetic Media

KnowBe4 hired a North Korean operative as a software engineer. He’d passed four video interviews, using an AI-enhanced stock photo.

Cost: Not disclosed.
Lesson: Verify a new hire's identity in person or through a trusted check before granting access.

Physical baiting

Operation Buckshot Yankee (2008)

Documented incidentPhishing, Physical Social Engineering (Tailgating & Baiting)

An infected USB flash drive went into a U.S. military laptop, and the agent.btz worm spread from there into classified networks.

Cost: No authoritative public dollar figure.
Lesson: Block unknown removable media by policy, not by trust.

146 full case pages are published so far, and the rest follow in stages. Linked names open the full case.

What are the main types of social engineering attacks?

The ten main types are phishing, vishing, smishing, quishing, pretexting, physical social engineering, deepfakes, help-desk and MFA manipulation, ClickFix and SEO poisoning, and attacks run by AI agents. Below, they’re ranked by how often each one turns up in real cases. Some attacks crossed channels, so the counts overlap.

Phishing

72 cases

An email that pretends to come from someone you trust, to steal a password or get a payment sent.

Also: Spear phishingAlso: WhalingAlso: BEC

A phone call from someone posing as IT, your bank, or the boss, who talks you out of your doubts in real time.

Getting into a building, or planting a bad device, by following an employee through the door or posing as a contractor.

Also: BaitingAlso: Tailgating

A made-up but believable story that explains why the attacker is asking, set up before any request comes.

Also: Quid pro quoAlso: Honeytrap

AI that researches the target, writes the lure, and keeps the conversation going, so one person can run lots of tailored attacks at once.

A cloned voice or face on a call or video, so you think you’re talking to someone you know.

The same con by text or messaging app, where there’s no sender address to check.

A QR code hiding the bad link, which moves the click onto your own phone, outside company filters.

A rigged search result or fake error message tells you to paste in a command, and you end up installing the malware yourself.

Also: Watering hole

Help-desk and MFA manipulation

3 cases

Calling the service desk as a locked-out employee to get MFA reset. Account recovery becomes the way in.

What are the top 5 social engineering attacks?

Ranked by how many cases in this library involve each one. Some attacks used more than one channel, so they overlap.

  1. Phishing · 72
  2. Vishing (voice phishing) · 27
  3. Physical social engineering · 22
  4. Pretexting and impersonation · 22
  5. Agentic AI attacks · 17

Other names you will see, and where they fit

NameWhat it meansClosest type here
Spear phishingPhishing written for one person or team, after some homeworkPhishing
WhalingSpear phishing that goes after a senior executivePhishing
Business email compromise (BEC)Fake emails from a boss or supplier that send payments the wrong wayPhishing
BaitingLeaving an infected device, or a tempting download, where the victim will find itPhysical social engineering
Tailgating or piggybackingSlipping through a secure door behind an employeePhysical social engineering
Quid pro quoOffering help, usually fake IT support, in return for accessPretexting
HoneytrapA fake romance or friendship used to get money or accessPretexting
Watering holeInfecting a website the target group visits a lotClickFix and SEO poisoning
MFA fatigueBombarding someone with push prompts until they approve oneHelp-desk and MFA manipulation

Recent social engineering examples

68 of the 172 cases happened in 2024 or later. Here are the newest ones.

Documented incident2026

USPS and UPS package smishing kit exposed through DNS data (2026)

Censys traced a USPS 'package awaiting action' smishing kit to 682 lookalike sites that streamed card numbers as victims typed. How it worked and how to tell.

Documented incident2026

Standard Bank teen loses R438,900 education fund to a ‘safe account’ call (2026)

A caller posing as Standard Bank got an 18-year-old to move her R438,900 education fund to a 'safe' account in 20 minutes. What happened and what's disputed.

Documented incident2026

JADEPUFFER: the first documented agentic ransomware attack (2026)

Sysdig says an AI agent ran the JADEPUFFER ransomware attack end to end: unpatched Langflow, stolen secrets, 1,342 configs destroyed. What happened.

Documented incident2026

Singapore PM deepfake Zoom scam: businessman loses S$4.9M (2026)

A Singapore businessman sent at least S$4.9M after a fake Zoom "government meeting" built from real footage of PM Lawrence Wong and other officials.

Documented incident2026

Dubai scam compound takedown: 276 arrests, six charged in San Diego (2026)

Dubai Police raided nine pig butchering centres and arrested 275, and San Diego charged six alleged scam-compound managers and recruiters. What is known.

Documented incident2026

Pune CFO loses Rs 56 lakh to a Microsoft Teams boss scam (2026)

A Pune CFO sent Rs 56 lakh after a Microsoft Teams message from a fake CEO profile. A second Rs 1.5 crore request made her call the real CEO. What happened.

How does a social engineering attack work?

Most attacks go through five stages. Here’s how they played out in the 2024 Arup case, and what would break each one.

1

Research

The attackers gathered public video and audio of the company’s UK-based CFO and other staff. Hong Kong Police said it came from YouTube.

What breaks itAssume public footage exists and harden the later steps.
2

Pretext

A message, supposedly from the CFO, mentioned a confidential deal and a reason to keep it quiet.

What breaks itTreat any demand for secrecy around a payment as a trigger for review.
3

Contact

The employee joined a video call where, police said, everyone else was a pre-recorded deepfake.

What breaks itDo not accept faces or voices on a call as proof of identity.
4

Action

Reassured, the employee made 15 transfers to five Hong Kong bank accounts over roughly a week.

What breaks itVerify payments on a channel the requester did not choose.
5

Cash-out

Spreading HK$200 million across several accounts made it harder to freeze. Nobody noticed until the employee checked with headquarters.

What breaks itRequire two-person approval for new payees and large transfers.

How do you spot a social engineering attack?

Every warning sign below turned up in a real case here.

Unexpected urgency

Your account is being drained, move the money now

A request for secrecy

Keep this transaction confidential
Real case: Arup (2024)

A request for a code or approval

Read me the code we just sent you
Real case: Retool (2023)

A change of payment details

New bank account for a known supplier

A move to another channel

From email to a call, or from a call to a chat app
Real case: Arup (2024)

A caller you cannot call back

"IT support" on a number you have never seen
Real case: Twitter (2020)

Why does social engineering work?

Attackers don’t need a software bug. They work on ordinary human reactions, and each one below drove a real case.

Authority

People do what the CEO or a lawyer asks. Ubiquiti’s finance staff wired $46.7M after emails that seemed to come from the CEO and an outside law firm.

Fear and urgency

A caller claiming to be Bank of America told a Chicago hairstylist that a hacker was draining her account. She wired $20,000 to the scammers.

Helpfulness

Help desks are there to get people unstuck. MGM’s reset MFA for a caller who was only pretending to be an employee.

Social proof

One fake voice is easy to doubt. A room of familiar faces is not. Arup's employee saw several "colleagues" on the call.

Fatigue

Send enough push prompts and eventually someone taps approve. That’s how the attacker got into Uber, through a contractor’s account.

How do you prevent social engineering attacks?

Each control breaks one stage of an attack. The case next to it shows the kind of attack it’s built to stop.

ControlStage it breaksExample case
Check payment requests on a channel the requester didn’t pick, using a number you already have.ActionArup (2024)
Make the help desk confirm who’s calling before it resets a password or MFA.ContactMGM Resorts (2023)
Switch to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys) instead of codes or push approvals.ActionUber (2022)
Have two people sign off on new payees and any change to bank details.Cash-outUbiquiti (2015)
Train staff on phone and text lures, not just email.PretextRetool (2023)
Keep supplier logins well away from systems that hold customer data.ActionTarget (2013)

How much do social engineering attacks cost?

$2.6M

The median disclosed loss, across the 43 cases that state a loss figure. We give a median, not a total. The library mixes losses from single victims, campaign-wide figures, and estimates, and you can’t add those together. Each case page says what its own figure measures.

Social engineering examples are real incidents where attackers got what they wanted by fooling a person instead of breaking software: a phone call to a help desk, a fake invoice, a cloned voice, a sticker on a parking meter. This library documents 172 sourced cases, and phishing is the way in for 72 of them. The rest of this guide walks through the cases that teach the most, sorted by how the attack actually reached its victim.

Key takeaways

  • Most of the biggest losses involved no hacking at all. Staff were persuaded to pay, reset a password, or read out a code.
  • Across the 43 cases that disclose a US-dollar loss, the median is $2.6M. The largest is $540M, from a fake job offer.
  • Multi-factor authentication failed again and again when the person was tricked into approving the prompt or handing over the code.
  • The same few pressures show up everywhere: urgency, secrecy, authority, and a believable routine.
  • Calling back on a number you already have stops a surprising share of these attacks.

The 10 most instructive social engineering examples

These social engineering attack examples aren't simply the largest. Each one shows a different lever being pulled, and each has a full, sourced case page.

CaseYearAttack typeWhat happenedLoss
Axie Infinity Ronin Bridge2022Spear phishing (fake job)Engineer opened a spyware-laden "offer" after fake interviewsAbout $540M in crypto
Google and Facebook (Rimasauskas)2013 to 2015BEC, fake supplierInvoices from a look-alike "Quanta Computer"About $122M wired, most recovered
MGM Resorts2023Help-desk vishingCaller posing as an employee got access resetAbout $100M EBITDAR impact (estimate)
Ubiquiti Networks2015CEO fraudFake CEO and lawyer emails drove 14 wires$46.7M sent, $30M not recovered
Arup2024Deepfake video callEvery other face on the call was fakeAbout US$25.6M
Target2013Supplier phishingHVAC contractor's stolen login led to card theftAbout 40M cards exposed
RSA SecurID2011Spear phishing"2011 Recruitment Plan" spreadsheet installed a trojan$66.3M charge (parent EMC)
Twitter2020Vishing plus fake VPN pageStaff phoned by fake IT, 130 accounts targetedOver $118,000 taken from the public
UK energy firm2019AI voice clone"German parent CEO" demanded an urgent payment€220,000 (about $243,000)
Stuxnet at Natanz2007 to 2010USB, insidersPeople carried the worm across an air gapAbout 1,000 centrifuges wrecked

Axie Infinity Ronin Bridge (2022)

The largest disclosed loss in the library started with a recruiter on LinkedIn. A senior engineer at Sky Mavis, which ran the Ronin bridge, sat through several rounds of interviews for a job at a company that didn't exist. Then came a generous offer, delivered as a document. Opening it installed spyware. North Korea's Lazarus Group went on to take 173,600 ETH and 25.5 million USDC, roughly $540 million at the time, and nobody noticed for six days. No smart-contract bug was needed. The attackers needed five of nine validator signatures and got four from Sky Mavis alone. Read the Ronin Bridge case.

Google and Facebook, the Rimasauskas scheme (2013 to 2015)

Evaldas Rimasauskas didn't hack anyone. He registered a company in Latvia with the same name as Quanta Computer, a real Taiwanese supplier, opened bank accounts in that name and sent invoices that looked like every other invoice. Finance teams at two of the most technical companies on earth paid about $122 million into accounts in Latvia and Cyprus. Google got its roughly $23.3 million back. Facebook recovered most of its $98.9 million. The lesson is dull and important: a payment process that trusts a name on an invoice can be beaten by anyone who copies the name. Read the Rimasauskas case.

MGM Resorts (2023)

In September 2023, attackers reportedly rang MGM's IT help desk, claimed to be an employee and got that employee's access reset. Containing the intrusion disrupted MGM properties for about ten days. MGM estimated a hit of around $100 million to third-quarter Adjusted Property EBITDAR, which is a profit measure rather than cash stolen, plus under $10 million in one-time costs. It didn't pay a ransom. The famous details, a LinkedIn lookup and a ten-minute call, come from the attackers themselves. MGM's own filings never say how they got in. Read the MGM case.

Ubiquiti Networks (2015)

Over two weeks, emails that seemed to come from Ubiquiti's CEO and from a real London lawyer at Latham & Watkins talked the company's own finance chief into sending 14 wires out of its Hong Kong subsidiary. The cover story was a secret acquisition, and secrecy is exactly what stopped anyone checking. The "lawyer" wrote from a generic @consultant.com address. That was the tell. Ubiquiti lost $46.7 million, clawed back $16.7 million and never saw the remaining $30 million. It found out only when the FBI emailed its CEO. Read the Ubiquiti case.

Arup (2024)

A finance employee in Arup's Hong Kong office suspected the first message was phishing. Fair enough. Then came a video conference with what looked like the UK chief financial officer and several colleagues, and the doubt went away. Hong Kong police say everyone on the call except the employee was a deepfake built from public video, and the clips were pre-recorded rather than live conversation. The employee made 15 transfers totaling HK$200 million, about US$25.6 million, to five local bank accounts. No recovery has been publicly reported. Read the Arup case.

Target (2013)

Target's breach began at Fazio Mechanical Services, a small refrigeration and HVAC contractor in Pennsylvania. A malware-laden email at the contractor stole its login to Target's vendor systems. With that legitimate credential, the attackers looked like a trusted partner, moved into Target's network and planted card-stealing malware on checkout terminals. Between 27 November and 15 December 2013, about 40 million payment cards were exposed, along with personal details for up to 70 million customers. The weak point was a supplier with far less security than the retailer it served. Read the Target case.

RSA SecurID (2011)

A security company, beaten by a spreadsheet. In March 2011, RSA staff got an email titled "2011 Recruitment Plan". At least one copy landed in a junk folder, and an employee pulled it out and opened the Excel attachment anyway. An unpatched Flash flaw installed a remote-access trojan, and the attackers worked their way to systems holding SecurID data. RSA later said the stolen information was used in an attempted attack on Lockheed Martin. Its parent, EMC, took a $66.3 million charge. The targets weren't executives. They were ordinary staff. Read the RSA case.

Twitter (2020)

In July 2020, callers posing as Twitter's IT help desk told employees there was a VPN problem and steered them to a fake login page. Staff typed in passwords and approval codes, and the attackers climbed into internal admin tools. They went after 130 high-profile accounts, including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Elon Musk, and Apple, and posted a "double your bitcoin" scam that took over $118,000 from the public. No software flaw was used. App-based MFA didn't help either, because staff approved the prompts themselves. Read the Twitter case.

UK energy firm voice clone (2019)

A Friday afternoon in March 2019. The head of a UK energy company takes a call from his boss, the chief executive of the German parent. The accent is right, the rhythm is right. €220,000, about $243,000, has to reach a Hungarian supplier within the hour. He pays. Then a second call asks for another payment, claiming the first was already reimbursed. It wasn't, and the follow-up call came from an Austrian number. This is one of the earliest reported cases of AI voice cloning used for CEO fraud. Read the voice clone case.

Stuxnet at Natanz (2007 to 2010)

Iran's Natanz enrichment plant was air-gapped. The gap held. People simply walked across it. Stuxnet reached the plant on USB drives, carried first by a recruited insider posing as a mechanic and later by contractors who had no idea what they were holding. It went on to wreck about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges. The attack is widely attributed to a joint US and Israeli program called "Olympic Games", though neither government has confirmed it, so treat the attribution as alleged. Read the Stuxnet case.

Phishing: social engineering examples by email

Email and fake login pages remain the most common way in. What changes is the bait. Sometimes it's an account warning, sometimes a document someone is expecting.

  • Sony Pictures (2014): fake Apple ID "verify your account" emails gave attackers the FBI tied to North Korea a way into Sony's network. Reused passwords did the rest. Sony put its costs at about $41 million.
  • 0ktapus (2022): text messages posing as IT linked to perfect copies of company Okta pages. Group-IB counted 9,931 credentials and 5,441 MFA codes collected across 136 corporate domains.

More cases on the phishing hub.

Spear phishing and business email compromise examples

Business email compromise rarely involves malware. It involves a plausible email, a payment request and someone who doesn't want to slow down a boss. The numbers get large fast.

  • FACC (2016): the Austrian aerospace supplier's accounting team received emails using the CEO's name about a confidential acquisition. Audited figures: €52.8 million sent, €10.9 million frozen, €41.9 million gone.
  • Toyota Boshoku Europe (2019): "fraudulent payment directions from a malicious third party" led to an expected loss of up to about 4 billion yen, roughly $37.5 million at the time.
  • Orion S.A. (2024): one employee was manipulated into sending wires worth about $60 million. Orion says no systems were breached. About $46.5 million has not come back.

See also business email compromise and spear phishing, plus the phishing hub.

Vishing: social engineering examples by phone

A phone call carries tone, urgency and a live person who can answer objections. That's why help desks and bank customers keep getting hit.

  • Wells Fargo customer (2022): thirteen minutes after a real call with her banker, a Los Angeles customer got a call showing the same 800 number. She read back a code. According to her lawsuit, $100,000 went to a payee called "Savage Car Wash".
  • Jaguar Land Rover (2025): production stopped for about five weeks. Early reports blamed help-desk vishing, but JLR's then-CISO later said no social engineering was involved. A useful reminder that a claim of responsibility isn't proof of method.

The MGM and Twitter cases above belong here too. More on the vishing hub.

Smishing: social engineering examples by text

Texts are short, so the scam has to be short. Unpaid toll. Missed parcel. IT needs you to log in.

  • Toll road texts (2024 to 2025): messages with E-ZPass, SunPass, and other local logos led to fake payment pages. By April 2024 the FBI had logged more than 2,000 complaints in roughly five weeks.
  • Retool (2023): a text about a payroll sync, then a phone call from "IT" for a second code. Cloud-synced authenticator codes let one account open many others, and 27 crypto customers' accounts were taken over.
  • USPS and UPS package kit (2026): Censys traced 682 lookalike addresses from one reported link. The fake site sent card details as victims typed, before they pressed submit.

More on the smishing hub.

Quishing: social engineering examples with QR codes

A QR code hides the link and moves the click to a phone, which usually has weaker protection than a work laptop.

  • UK council car parks (2024 to 2026): of 373 councils that answered a freedom of information request, 123 said their car parks had been targeted with fake QR stickers in a single year.
  • Orlando parking meters (2025): about 200 fake stickers were pulled off downtown meters. The fakes were white; the real ParkMobile codes underneath were green.

More on the quishing hub.

Deepfake and voice cloning: AI social engineering examples

Synthetic media makes an old trick, pretending to be the boss, much harder to dismiss. Several of the best cases are ones that failed, and they show why.

  • WPP (2024): a WhatsApp account using the CEO's public photo set up a Teams meeting with a cloned executive voice over old YouTube footage. The agency head targeted didn't bite.
  • LastPass (2024): an employee got WhatsApp calls, texts, and an AI voice note from the "CEO". WhatsApp wasn't a business channel there, it was outside working hours, and the employee reported it instead of replying.
  • White House chief of staff (2025): contacts from her personal phone were texted and called, some with a voice officials believed was AI-generated. The FBI investigated.

Arup and the UK energy firm, above, are the two costliest examples. Browse the deepfake hub or the voice cloning page.

Pretexting and impersonation examples

Pretexting is the story itself. A believable role, a reason to act, and enough detail to make questions feel rude.

  • New Jersey beneficiary scam (2020 to 2021): a caller posing as a benefits office told recently bereaved elderly people that a late spouse's policy was "in arrears". At least 17 victims paid more than $100,000 in prepaid card codes. She pleaded guilty in November 2023.
  • KnowBe4 fake IT worker (2024): a North Korean operative used a real but stolen US identity and an AI-enhanced photo to pass four interviews and a background check. His company Mac began loading malware, and the security team contained it in about 25 minutes.

More on the pretexting hub.

Physical social engineering examples: baiting, USB and tailgating

Doors, badges and free gifts. Physical social engineering is old, cheap and still works.

  • University of Illinois USB drop (2015): researchers scattered 297 harmless drives across campus. The first was plugged in less than six minutes after it was dropped, and 135 were connected in the end.
  • Rapid7 badge test (2018): an authorized tester got in with a homemade badge and held doors, then an employee badged him onto a restricted floor. No crime, no loss, but a clear map of the gaps.
  • FIN7 BadUSB parcels (2020): packages with a forged Best Buy gift card letter held a USB device that typed commands like a keyboard. The recipient of the one recovered parcel got suspicious and never plugged it in.

Stuxnet, above, is the most consequential USB case on record. More on the physical social engineering hub.

ClickFix and SEO poisoning: newer social engineering examples

Here the victim runs the attacker's code themselves, believing it's a fix or a security check. Or they find the bait through a search engine.

  • UAC-0050 fake CAPTCHA (2024): a "Verify You Are Human" box asked Ukrainian targets to paste a PowerShell command. It downloaded an infostealer. Vendor research with assessed attribution.
  • Lampion and the fake tax authority (2025): a lookalike of Portugal's tax site told visitors to paste a command into the Run box to "enable file preview". No losses were confirmed.
  • GootLoader and law firms (2021): staff searching for specific legal agreements clicked a top result, downloaded a ZIP named after their search, and in some cases ended up with ransomware.

More on the ClickFix hub.

Agentic AI attack examples

The newest cases flip the script. Sometimes the AI is the attacker's assistant. Sometimes the AI is the one being conned.

  • GTG-1002 (2025): Anthropic says a group it ties with high confidence to the Chinese state told Claude Code it worked for a legitimate security firm, then aimed it at about 30 targets. A handful of break-ins worked. A vendor report, and the degree of autonomy is disputed.
  • ForcedLeak (2025): researchers hid instructions in a web form so Salesforce's Agentforce leaked lead emails to a domain bought for about $5. A lab demo, fixed on 8 September 2025.

More on the agentic AI hub.

What these social engineering examples have in common

Read enough real social engineering examples and the same shapes repeat. The statistics page counts them across the whole library.

  • Phishing dominates, but phones are catching up. Phishing is the entry channel in 72 of 172 cases, vishing in 27, physical and pretexting in 22 each. One case can use several channels, so the counts overlap.
  • Money people are the target. Financial services and insurance is the sector hit most, in 46 cases, followed by government in 41.
  • Losses are lumpy and often unknown. Only 43 cases give a US-dollar loss. Of those, 13 sit between $10M and $100M and two are above $100M. Most victims never put a figure on it.
  • The codes didn't save anyone. Twitter, 0ktapus, Retool and the Wells Fargo customer all had MFA. The attacker simply asked for the code, live.
  • Secrecy is a red flag in itself. Ubiquiti and FACC both hinged on a confidential acquisition. "Don't tell anyone" is how the check gets skipped.
  • The weak link is often someone else. Target fell through an HVAC contractor. Rimasauskas copied a supplier's name.

How to spot and stop social engineering

  • Call back on a number you already have. Not the one in the email, text, or caller ID. Caller ID can be faked, as the Wells Fargo case shows.
  • Never read a code to anyone. A real bank or IT team doesn't need the one-time code it just sent you.
  • Make bank-detail changes slow on purpose. Require a second person and a call-back for any new or changed payee.
  • Treat secrecy and urgency as reasons to pause. If a request says "today" and "keep this quiet", verify it twice.
  • Lock down help-desk resets. Ask for verification the caller can't find on LinkedIn, or require a manager to approve in person.
  • Use phishing-resistant MFA such as hardware security keys, which won't work on a lookalike site.
  • Check QR codes before paying. Look for stickers on top of stickers and type the payment site in yourself.
  • Never paste commands a web page asks for. No real CAPTCHA asks you to open the Run box.
  • Agree an off-channel check for executives. A code word or a known number beats trying to judge whether a voice is real.
  • Report fast. LastPass and FIN7's parcel recipient stopped attacks just by telling security.

Common questions about social engineering

What is a real-life example of social engineering?

In 2024, a finance employee at Arup in Hong Kong joined a video call with what looked like the company’s CFO and colleagues. According to Hong Kong Police, every other person on the call was a deepfake. The employee made 15 transfers totaling HK$200 million, about US$25.6 million, before checking with headquarters.

What are the four types of social engineering?

The four most common in this library are phishing (72 cases), vishing (27), physical social engineering (22), and pretexting (22). Phishing uses email, vishing uses phone calls, physical attacks happen in person, and pretexting builds a false story before any request.

What is the most common form of social engineering?

Phishing. It appears in 72 of the 172 cases here (42%), more than any other type. Email is still the main channel, but 39 cases in this library involved a phone call or a text message.

What are common social engineering scenarios?

Scenarios that recur in this library include a fake IT support call asking for a password or MFA reset, a fake executive or supplier asking for an urgent payment, a text message with a link to a fake login page, and a fake bank calling about fraud on your account.

How is social engineering different from hacking?

Hacking exploits a flaw in software. Social engineering exploits a person, so there is no patch for it. That is why a convincing call to the help desk can get an attacker an MFA reset at an organization whose systems are fully up to date.

How are these cases sourced?

Every case cites its sources, with primary documents such as court filings, regulator notices, and company disclosures listed first. Each case is labeled as a documented incident, a reported or alleged incident, or research. The methodology page explains the rules.

Search the full library

172 cases, each showing who was hit, how the attacker got in, what it cost, and the sources. Search by company, attack type, or year.