Impersonators posing as Tecnimont's CEO, executives and a Swiss lawyer talked the India head into wiring $18.6M to Hong Kong over one week in November 2018.
Social Engineering Examples·6 sources
In November 2018 the head of Tecnimont's Indian subsidiary got an email from what looked like the group CEO in Milan. There was a confidential acquisition in China. Very secret, very sensitive. Then, according to the complaint Tecnimont later filed with Mumbai police, came the conference calls: the "CEO", other "senior executives" and a Swiss lawyer called "Luigi Corradi" all on the line, talking him through it. The money couldn't go from Italy, they said, regulatory problems, so India would have to wire it. Over about a week he sent $5.6 million, then $9.4 million, then $3.6 million to accounts in Hong Kong. $18.6 million, roughly Rs 130 crore. Each tranche was withdrawn within minutes. A fourth transfer was stopped when the fraud came to light. The lawyer, it turned out, had been dead since 1921. Status: $18.6M transferred; about $5M reportedly blocked in China, return undocumented; India CMD and finance head dismissed; Milan prosecutors sought trial of three men in 2025, no conviction in this case.
| Step | What the police complaint and press reports describe |
|---|---|
| The email | Around 13 November 2018, per Corriere della Sera, a message from an address closely mimicking group CEO Pierroberto Folgiero's lands with the India head. Subject: a secretive China acquisition. Commentators suspected the writing style had been studied first |
| The calls | Per the Mumbai complaint as reported by the Economic Times, a series of conference calls with people playing the CEO, other executives and a Swiss lawyer, "Luigi Corradi". The Milan judicial reconstruction in Corriere describes no calls, only email and landline contact with a fictitious Geneva lawyer. The two accounts don't agree |
| The excuse | Funds couldn't leave Italy because of regulatory issues. The Indian unit would have to pay |
| The transfers | Three wires over about a week: $5.6M, $9.4M, $3.6M, to Hong Kong accounts opened with fake documents. Cash out within minutes of each |
| The fourth | Attempted, stopped once the fraud was discovered |
| Discovery | Economic Times and Reuters say it surfaced when chairman Franco Ghiringhelli visited India in December 2018. Corriere puts it about nine days after the first email, so late November. Sources conflict |
Nobody cloned a voice. No source in a position to know says any attempt was made to sound like a specific person. What the India head got was a cast: several different people, each with a role, each confirming the others. That's the thing a lone phishing email can't do. The confidentiality demand cut him off from the one check that would have worked, a call to Milan. And "Luigi Corradi" was a real name, belonging to an Italian engineer and teacher who died in 1921.
Tip: the more people on the call vouching for each other, the less it proves. Identity is confirmed on a channel you open yourself, to a number you already have. Not on a call someone else set up.
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Transferred, three tranches | $18.6 million (about Rs 130 crore), per Economic Times and CARE Ratings. Reuters: about $18.45-18.5 million from 1.3 billion rupees |
| Blocked by Chinese authorities | Roughly $5 million, per Corriere della Sera. Whether it came back to Tecnimont isn't documented. A Milan prosecutor's application to secure it was refused for lack of jurisdiction |
| Fourth transfer | Stopped |
| Net loss | Not confirmed. CARE Ratings' March 2019 note says the impact was only "partially mitigated" by cash reserves, which reads as largely absorbed rather than recovered |
Tecnimont brought in Kroll for the forensics, plus a Mumbai law firm and MZM Legal. The investigation found every participant on the calls had used a false identity and the Hong Kong accounts had been opened on forged paperwork. The company dismissed the Indian subsidiary's chairman and managing director and its head of accounts and finance, and reconstituted the Indian board. The complaint to the Mumbai Police cybercrime unit named six entities, including purported Hong Kong and Taizhou companies and the fictional lawyer. CARE Ratings confirmed the transaction and the CMD's departure in March 2019 and left the credit rating where it was.
Press at the time called the culprits "Chinese hackers". That has since been overtaken. In February 2025 the Milan public prosecutor's office sought committal for trial of three Italian-Israeli men over this and related CEO frauds; two of them had already been extradited from Israel to Norway and sentenced at first instance to six years for an equivalent scheme there. The Chinese part was the mule accounts and shell companies, not the operators. None of the three is named here: these are allegations, there's no conviction in this case, and the presumption of innocence applies. No arrest or charge has been reported in India, Hong Kong or China.
See also CEO fraud, business email compromise and the Pathé case, the same "confidential acquisition" script run on a Dutch subsidiary the same year.
In November 2018 the head of Tecnimont's Indian subsidiary wired $18.6 million to Hong Kong accounts after spoofed emails and, per the police complaint, staged conference calls from people impersonating the group CEO, other executives and a Swiss lawyer about a confidential China acquisition.
Corriere della Sera reports Chinese authorities blocked about $5 million. Whether it was returned isn't documented, and a Milan prosecutor's bid to secure it was refused for jurisdiction. The rest was withdrawn within minutes of arrival.
Early reports blamed Chinese fraudsters. In 2025 Milan prosecutors sought trial of three Italian-Israeli men over this and related CEO frauds. They are not named here; no conviction exists in this case.
The Mumbai police complaint, as reported by the Economic Times, describes a series of calls with multiple impersonators. The Milan judicial reconstruction reported by Corriere della Sera describes only email and landline contact with a fictitious lawyer. The accounts conflict and both are given here.
Social Engineering Examples. “Tecnimont SpA (India) $18.6M BEC / CEO Fraud with Staged Fake Conference Calls”. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/tecnimont-spa-bec-fake-conference-call-fraud-2018
The attackers likely used public corporate filings, press coverage, and org-chart/LinkedIn-style research to identify Tecnimont's group CEO Pierroberto Folgiero, the Indian subsidiary's leadership, and the reporting relationship between the Italian parent and its India unit, enough to know who could plausibly order a large cross-border wire and who would receive that order.
Public information about corporate leadership and reporting lines (CEO names, subsidiary structure) is effectively unremovable at a listed multinational; the realistic control assumes attackers can find this and instead hardens the payment-approval process that this knowledge later gets used against, per Stage 7/8.
Security commentators quoted in Economic Times reporting speculated the attackers may have used malware or other unauthorized access to monitor internal email traffic beforehand, learning the group CEO's actual writing style and vocabulary so the spoofed messages would read as authentic; this is described as likely rather than confirmed by any forensic disclosure.
Standard email-security hygiene, endpoint monitoring for unauthorized mailbox access, anomalous-login alerting, and periodic auditing of who has read or forwarded executive correspondence reduce the odds that an attacker can silently study a real executive's writing style before impersonating it.
look-alike domain and account registration: The attackers registered or obtained an email address closely mimicking the group CEO's real address, and separately arranged bank accounts in Hong Kong (with some reporting of intermediate accounts in Shanghai and Taizhou, China) opened using falsified identity documents, pre-positioning a withdrawal path before the fraud began.
Domain-monitoring and anti-spoofing controls (SPF/DKIM/DMARC enforcement, look-alike-domain registration monitoring) would flag a near-identical CEO email address before it reaches an inbox; on the banking side, beneficiary and KYC diligence by the receiving banks on newly opened Hong Kong accounts is the analogous control, though it sits outside the victim company's own reach.
Multiple conspirators prepared to voice distinct fake identities for the live phase of the scheme, including the group CEO, other senior executives, and a wholly invented Swiss lawyer, "Luigi Corradi" (the real name of an Italian engineer and teacher who died in 1921), so the fraud could survive a multi-person phone conversation rather than a single written message.
There is no practical way for a victim organization to detect that a persona has been fabricated before contact occurs; the realistic control is at Stage 6, verifying any claimed identity independently rather than trusting it once it appears.
A message from the look-alike CEO address reached the India head, raising a "secretive" and "highly confidential" acquisition opportunity in China and setting up confidentiality and urgency as the frame for everything that followed.
Treating "highly confidential, don't loop in others" as a red flag rather than a legitimate instruction, and routing any large or unusual funding request through a second reviewer regardless of secrecy framing, blunts the initial email's core manipulation.
Rather than relying on the email alone, the attackers held a series of scheduled conference calls in which different conspirators impersonated the CEO, other executives, and the fictitious lawyer simultaneously, manufacturing corroborating "social proof" that a single spoofed email could not provide.
Out-of-band verification through a phone number the company already has on file (never one supplied in the email or call), plus a policy that a live-sounding voice on a conference call is not itself proof of identity, would have exposed the fabricated participants before money moved.
The impersonators told the India head that regulatory issues prevented the acquisition funds from being sent directly from Italy, redirecting the actual payment obligation onto the Indian subsidiary, the entity with weaker verification controls for a transaction of this size.
Dual-authorization and maker-checker controls on large international wires, with no single-executive override, and independent verification of any outside lawyer's credentials before relying on their instructions, directly counter a pretext designed to move the transaction to the weakest-verification path.
The India head authorized three wire transfers over about a week ($5.6 million, $9.4 million, and $3.6 million, totaling roughly $18.6 million) to the pre-arranged Hong Kong accounts; each tranche was withdrawn within minutes of arrival, and a fourth attempted transfer was stopped only because the fraud was discovered first.
A mandatory callback to a previously verified executive contact, plus a cooling-off or hold period on first-time large cross-border wires to newly introduced accounts, would have caught the fraud before funds were withdrawn within minutes of each transfer landing.
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