Case Library / Phishing / RED Wheeling's $30,750 solar panel invoice fraud (2024)
Phishing Documented incident

RED Wheeling's $30,750 solar panel invoice fraud (2024)

A compromised email sent a Wheeling, WV nonprofit a fake solar panel invoice. It paid $30,750 to an Oklahoma man's account, who later admitted wire fraud.

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Social Engineering Examples·4 sources

A small-town nonprofit BEC case: in October 2024, the Regional Economic Development Partnership (RED) in Wheeling, West Virginia, got an email asking for payment for solar panels installed on the former Horne's Department Store building. The email came from a compromised account. The routing number it gave belonged to Terry Pierce, 48, of Muskogee, Oklahoma. RED paid $30,750. Two days later, Pierce moved the money to another account he controlled and emptied it. In July 2026 he admitted wire fraud. Status: Guilty plea; sentence pending.

Key takeaways

  • The request named a real building and a real project. That's what made it believable.
  • The sender used a compromised email account, not a lookalike domain.
  • Pierce was the account holder, the "mule" layer. Whoever sent the email hasn't been identified.
  • Investigators tied Pierce to about $220,000 more in actual or intended losses from other fraud.

How it worked

Step What happened
Hijack An unknown person gets control of a legitimate email account
Ask They email RED requesting payment for solar panels on the old Horne's building, and supply a routing number
Pay RED sends $30,750 to that account. It's Pierce's
Move Two days on, Pierce shifts the money to another account of his and drains it

Nothing exotic here. A plausible invoice for work everyone knew was happening, and nobody rang the vendor on a known number to check the bank details. That one call would have ended it.

Tip: treat any payment going to a new bank account as unverified until someone has confirmed it by phone, using a number you already had.

The case

Date Event
October 2024 RED pays $30,750 on the fraudulent request
14 July 2026 US Attorney Matthew L. Harvey announces that Pierce has admitted to wire fraud in the Northern District of West Virginia. Magistrate Judge James P. Mazzone presides. West Virginia State Police investigated

Pierce faces up to 20 years. A federal district judge will set the sentence. The $220,000 in other fraud linked to him isn't split between actual and intended loss in the reporting. RED is the Ohio Valley Industrial & Business Development Corporation, a private nonprofit.

Who sent the email? The reporting doesn't say, and doesn't identify the sender as Pierce.

What stops it

  • Call back on a known number before paying to any new or changed bank account.
  • Two approvals and an out-of-band check for wires on capital projects.
  • Vendors: MFA and login alerts on email. This started in a real mailbox.
  • Finance staff at nonprofits: expect fraudsters to know about your current projects.
  • Banks: rapid in, rapid out, account emptied. That pattern is what exposed the receiving account here.

See also invoice fraud, business email compromise and the Dickinson Public Schools case.

Common questions

What happened to RED in Wheeling?

In October 2024 it paid $30,750 for solar panel work after a request from a compromised email account. The money went to an Oklahoma man's account and was drained within two days.

Who was charged?

Terry Pierce of Muskogee, Oklahoma, who held the receiving account, admitted wire fraud in July 2026. The person who sent the email hasn't been identified.

How much was lost?

$30,750 in this payment. Investigators linked Pierce to roughly $220,000 more in actual or intended losses elsewhere.

Was RED's email hacked?

The reporting says the request came from a compromised email address, but doesn't say whose.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “RED Wheeling's $30,750 solar panel invoice fraud (2024)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/red-wheeling-bec-solar-panel-vendor-fraud-2024

Attack Chain & Defense
1Pretext selection
What happened

an unknown sender used a compromised email address to request payment for solar panels installed on the former Horne's Department Store building in Wheeling.

The control that would have stopped it

A nonprofit's active capital projects are hard to keep fully private since they typically surface in board minutes, grant announcements, or local coverage. The realistic control is to assume project details are knowable to outsiders and require verification on any payment request tied to a known project, rather than trying to suppress the information.

2Compromised-address use
What happened

the perpetrator sent the request using a compromised email address. The cited reporting does not identify how that address was compromised or used.

The control that would have stopped it

Vendor and partner email-account hardening, including mandatory MFA, conditional access policies, and login-anomaly alerting, reduces the odds that an outside party can take over or convincingly use a legitimate mailbox to originate fraudulent requests.

3Receiving-account setup
What happened

the unknown sender provided the routing number for Terry Pierce's checking account as the destination for the requested payment.

The control that would have stopped it

Bank account-opening and know-your-customer checks can catch some mule accounts early, but recruitment of willing or coerced mules is difficult to prevent upstream. The more reliable control sits downstream at Stage 6, where transaction-pattern monitoring can flag mule behavior after the account is already in use.

4Pretext invoice request
What happened

using the compromised email address, the sender asked RED to pay for solar panels installed on the former Horne's Department Store building and provided Pierce's checking account routing number to receive the payment.

The control that would have stopped it

Staff training for finance-office personnel on BEC red flags, specifically treating any request to introduce or change payment or banking details as suspicious regardless of how plausible the surrounding project context is, would have flagged this message before payment was processed.

5Payment execution
What happened

RED sent $30,750 to Pierce's checking account in response to the request.

The control that would have stopped it

Mandatory call-back verification of any new or changed banking instructions, using an independently sourced phone number for the vendor rather than any contact information in the email itself, combined with dual-approval for wire transfers, would likely have caught the mismatch between the purported vendor and Pierce's personal account before the money moved.

6Fund movement
What happened

two days after receiving the funds, Pierce transferred them into another account he controlled and depleted the balance.

The control that would have stopped it

Bank-side transaction monitoring for classic mule patterns, a rapid large inbound transfer followed quickly by an outbound sweep that empties the account, can flag and potentially freeze funds before they are fully dispersed, and is what ultimately helped expose Pierce's role here.

7Additional activity identified
What happened

the investigation linked Pierce to additional fraudulent activity resulting in approximately $220,000 in actual or intended loss. The reporting does not divide that figure between actual and intended loss.

The control that would have stopped it

Once funds are dispersed and a mule's account is tied to multiple schemes, the realistic control shifts from prevention to detection and prosecution. Cross-case fraud-pattern investigation by law enforcement, as the West Virginia State Police carried out here, is what identifies a repeat mule before further victims are hit.

Quick Facts
Victim
Ohio Valley Industrial & Business Development Corporation, doing business as Regional Economic Development Partnership
(RED), a private nonprofit economic development corporation based in Wheeling, West Virginia
Location
Wheeling, West Virginia, USA (Northern District of West Virginia); defendant resided in Muskogee, Oklahoma
Date
October 2024
(fraudulent payment); Pierce's admission to wire fraud was announced July 14, 2026, when reporting said a federal judge would determine any sentence
Impact
$30,750 paid to Pierce's account following the fraudulent solar-panel payment request
BasismeasuredThe $30,750 payment was an actual transfer. Reporting separately described approximately $220,000 from additional fraudulent activity as actual or intended loss without dividing those categories.
; investigators separately linked Pierce to additional fraudulent activity resulting in approximately $220,000 in actual or intended loss
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Critical Infrastructure, Energy & Utilities, Nonprofit & NGO
Threat Actor
unknown
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