Case Library / Phishing / Evaldas Rimasauskas: the $122M Google and Facebook invoice scam (2013 to 2015)
Phishing Documented incident

Evaldas Rimasauskas: the $122M Google and Facebook invoice scam (2013 to 2015)

Evaldas Rimasauskas posed as supplier Quanta Computer to get Google and Facebook to wire about $122M. How the fake-invoice scam worked and what came back.

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Social Engineering Examples·9 sources

Evaldas Rimasauskas, a Lithuanian, ran one of the biggest business email compromise scams on record. Between 2013 and 2015, his ring pretended to be Quanta Computer, a real Taiwanese hardware supplier, and talked Google and Facebook into wiring about $122 million to bank accounts in Latvia and Cyprus. No systems were hacked to move the money. Finance staff paid what looked like normal supplier invoices. Status: Documented incident.

Key takeaways

  • The trick was a look-alike company. Rimasauskas registered a firm in Latvia with the same name as Quanta and opened bank accounts in that name.
  • Google got all of its roughly $23.3 million back. Facebook recovered most of its $98.9 million, but about $26.5 million was still outstanding at sentencing.
  • The court papers never name Google or Facebook. The companies confirmed it themselves to NPR in 2019.
  • Rimasauskas pleaded guilty to wire fraud and got five years in prison in December 2019.

How the Google and Facebook scam worked

  1. Homework, for about two years. The FBI says the ring rang customer-service lines to collect names of key staff, and sent phishing emails to get a look inside email systems.
  2. A twin company. Rimasauskas set up a company in Latvia with the same name as Quanta Computer, which Google and Facebook really did buy from. He opened accounts for it at banks in Latvia and Cyprus.
  3. The ask. Emails built to look like they came from Quanta staff told finance teams to send money they already owed Quanta to the new accounts. Nothing new was being bought. Only the bank details changed.
  4. Paperwork for the banks. Here's the clever bit. The forged invoices, contracts and letters carried Google's and Facebook's own fake signatures and stamps, and went to the receiving banks. That made nine-figure deposits into a fresh shell company look like ordinary business.
  5. Cash out. As soon as money landed, it was wired on through accounts in several countries to make it harder to claw back.

One detail is disputed. The FBI's account says a fraudster also phoned the companies to ask for the bank change. The indictment and both DOJ press releases only mention emails. This page records the conflict rather than picking a side.

What the court records say, and what the press added

Detail Source Status
Same-name Latvian shell, Latvia and Cyprus accounts, 2013 to 2015 Indictment Confirmed
$23.26 million from Victim-1, $98.87 million from Victim-2 Sentencing transcript Confirmed
Victim-1 is Google, Victim-2 is Facebook NPR, from the companies Confirmed by the companies, not the court
Quanta Computer was the supplier being copied Reuters Confirmed by Quanta
Recon by phone and phishing over two years FBI FBI account

The money: wired, recovered, lost

About $122.13 million went out in total. Google's share, roughly $23.26 million, came back after a civil fraud case in Latvia. "We recouped the funds," a Google spokesperson told CNBC. Facebook said it "recovered the bulk of the funds shortly after the incident", since much of its $98.87 million was frozen when the wires were spotted.

What wasn't recovered: $26,479,079.24, all of it Facebook's, which the judge ordered Rimasauskas to repay as restitution. Prosecutors told the court most of that was gone, with about $5 million frozen. He also agreed to forfeit $49,738,559.41. That's a separate order, roughly what Reuters says he personally pocketed. Adding the two together would double count.

Tip: "over $100 million" and "$120 million" both appear in headlines. The exact court figure is $122.13 million wired, and the final loss was far lower.

Timeline

Date Event
2013 to 2015 The ring sends fake Quanta payment requests; Google and Facebook wire about $122 million
March 2017 Rimasauskas is arrested in Lithuania
August 2017 Extradition to New York
20 March 2019 Guilty plea, one count of wire fraud (DOJ)
19 December 2019 Five years inside, two more supervised (DOJ)

What would have stopped it

  • A phone call. Any change to a supplier's bank details gets checked by ringing a number you already had, never one from the email.
  • A geography check. A Taiwanese supplier suddenly paid in Latvia and Cyprus should trip an alert, however good the paperwork looks.
  • A second pair of eyes, plus a day or two's hold, before money goes to a new or changed payee.
  • Spotting the twin. If a "Quanta" turns up in your vendor records registered in Latvia, someone should ask why.
  • Reporting fast. Quick calls to banks and the FBI are why so much of the money was frozen.

More on this: invoice fraud, the wider BEC picture, and checking a wire before it goes.

Common questions

Who is Evaldas Rimasauskas?

The Lithuanian behind the fake-Quanta scam. Google and Facebook sent his ring about $122 million between 2013 and 2015. He admitted it in 2019 and got five years.

How much did Google and Facebook lose?

Google got its roughly $23.3 million back. Facebook recovered most of its $98.9 million; about $26.5 million was still outstanding at sentencing.

Was this phishing or BEC?

Both words get used. It's business email compromise, specifically invoice fraud: fake supplier emails asking for payment to new bank details. Phishing was also used earlier to gather inside information.

Why didn't Google's and Facebook's security catch it?

Nothing technical was broken. Staff paid what looked like a real, expected supplier invoice. The weak point was the payment process, not the software.

Sources
  • Lithuanian Man Pleads Guilty To Wire Fraud For Theft Of Over $100 Million In Fraudulent Business Email Compromise Scheme. U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York (primary). DOJ press release, 2019-03-20, announcing the wire-fraud guilty plea. Live fetch blocked by Akamai bot protection; verified against three independent full-text republications of the release, which agree word for word. It confirms the guilty plea and the over $100 million figure. Note that $100 million is the only dollar amount anywhere in this release: the forfeiture and restitution amounts come from the December 2019 sentencing release, not this one.
  • Lithuanian Man Sentenced To 5 Years In Prison For Theft Of Over $120 Million In Fraudulent Business Email Compromise Scheme. U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York (primary). DOJ press release, 2019-12-19. Live fetch blocked by Akamai bot protection; verified via Wayback Machine archive capture. Confirms the 60-month sentence, two years of supervised release, forfeiture of $49,738,559.41 and restitution of $26,479,079.24 as two separate judgments, the laundering destinations, and that the forged documents bore the victim companies' own executive signatures and corporate stamps and were submitted to banks. The release does not mention the judicial order of removal; that is in the sentencing transcript.
  • United States v. Evaldas Rimasauskas. Sealed Indictment (16 CR 841, S.D.N.Y.). U.S. Department of Justice / SDNY (grand jury indictment) (primary). Fetched successfully. Charging document confirms the BEC mechanics: same-name Latvian shell (Company-2), emails sent from accounts "designed to create the false appearance" of coming from the Asian vendor (Company-1), Latvia/Cyprus accounts, 2013 to 2015 timeframe. It describes Company-1 only as "an Asian-based manufacturer of computer hardware" that provided goods and services to technology companies; it does not describe what Quanta specifically built for the victims.
  • United States v. Rimasauskas. Sentencing Transcript, Dec. 19, 2019 (16 CR 841, GBD). U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y. (via CourtListener/RECAP) (primary). Fetched successfully. Court transcript confirms exact figures: $120M intended loss (stated in court), $23.26M (Victim-1) and $98.87M (Victim-2), $26,479,079.24 outstanding restitution of which "approximately $5 million" was frozen and the majority lost, Victim-1's funds returned after the Latvian civil fraud proceeding, the 60-month sentence, funds frozen in Cyprus, and the judicial order of removal. The transcript never names Google or Facebook; it says only Victim-1 and Victim-2.
  • Sentence in BEC Scheme. Leader of Fraud Ring Sentenced. Federal Bureau of Investigation (primary). Fetched successfully. FBI first-party account, 2020-01-28, confirms the two-year recon effort (customer-service phone pretexting, phishing for email access), the forged paper trail, that investigators "froze some of the funds," and the IC3 figure of more than $10B in reported BEC losses from 2013 to 2019. This account conflicts with the charging documents on one point: the FBI says "one of the fraudsters simply called the companies pretending to be a vendor" and "told each company to change their bank account information," where the indictment and both DOJ releases describe the ask arriving only by email. The case page names the conflict rather than resolving it.
  • Lithuanian pleads guilty in U.S. to massive fraud against Google, Facebook. Reuters (secondary). Fetched successfully. Confirms victim identities (Google/Facebook), the $49.7M forfeiture, and (per Exa search excerpt) that Quanta confirmed its name was used and a 2017 Lithuanian court order identified Google and Facebook as the victims, since the DOJ documents themselves left both unnamed.
  • Man Pleads Guilty To Phishing Scheme That Fleeced Facebook, Google Of $100 Million. NPR (secondary). Fetched successfully. 2019-03-25. The source of the victim mapping the court record omits: "The indictment does not identify Google and Facebook by name, but the two tech giants confirmed to NPR they are Victim-1 and Victim-2, respectively." Also reports that both companies said they recouped all or most of the money. Its per-company dollar split is attributed to Bloomberg and "a person familiar with the case," a single anonymous source, so this page takes the split from the sentencing transcript instead.
  • Phishing email scam stole $100 million from Facebook and Google. CNBC (secondary). Fetched successfully. 2019-03-27. Carries the on-record recovery statements from both victims: a Google spokesperson, "We detected this fraud and promptly alerted the authorities. We recouped the funds and we're pleased this matter is resolved," and a Facebook spokesperson, "Facebook recovered the bulk of the funds shortly after the incident." The same quotes appear in Gizmodo, Fortune and the NZ Herald, so they are corroborated rather than single-sourced. CNBC also independently describes the forgeries as aimed at the banks.
  • He Tried to Bilk Google and Facebook Out of $100 Million With Fake Invoices. The New York Times (secondary). Fetched (partially, paywalled beyond preview); visible content and byline/date confirm it is a genuine NYT piece corroborating the fake-invoice method, Quanta Computer impersonation, and Rimasauskas's guilty plea.
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “Evaldas Rimasauskas: the $122M Google and Facebook invoice scam (2013 to 2015)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/rimasauskas-google-facebook-bec-2019

Attack Chain & Defense
1Reconnaissance
What happened

per the FBI's own account of the case, the ring spent roughly two years researching the target companies, including calling the victims' customer-service lines to harvest names and contact details of key employees, consistent with typical pretexting-driven OSINT gathering.

The control that would have stopped it

customer-service scripts and org-chart/personal-detail exposure are hard to lock down completely at enterprise scale; the realistic control is limiting how much internal personnel detail customer-service staff can disclose to unverified callers, and treating this stage as something attackers likely already have rather than something that can be fully prevented.

2Initial email-system foothold
What happened

the same FBI account describes the ring also sending phishing emails to gain access to the victim companies' email systems, giving them a larger trove of internal detail to work from before the fraud began.

The control that would have stopped it

phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and continuous monitoring for anomalous mailbox access would blunt the email-system foothold this scheme relied on for deeper internal detail.

3Shell company and banking infrastructure setup
What happened

per the DOJ indictment, Rimasauskas registered and incorporated a company in Latvia bearing the same name as the real vendor, Quanta Computer, and opened bank accounts for it in Latvia and Cyprus, so incoming payments would land in accounts he controlled while appearing to reach the genuine supplier.

The control that would have stopped it

look-alike company-name and domain monitoring for a real vendor's brand, plus vendor master-data governance, so a newly registered entity or account under a supplier's name cannot silently become an approved payment destination.

4Impersonation contact
What happened

per the DOJ indictment, fraudulent emails sent from accounts built to create the false appearance of coming from real Quanta employees reached finance and accounts-payable staff at the victim companies, directing that money already owed to Quanta be sent to the Latvia and Cyprus account details. The sources disagree on the channel of the ask: the FBI's account says one of the fraudsters simply telephoned each company and told it to change bank account information for an upcoming payment, while the indictment and both DOJ releases describe only emails.

The control that would have stopped it

mandatory out-of-band verification of any vendor bank-detail change, made to a known, pre-existing phone number and never to a number or contact supplied in the request itself.

5Documentary legitimization
What happened

per the DOJ's sentencing announcement, the ring produced forged invoices, contracts, and letters that falsely appeared to have been executed and signed by executives and agents of the victim companies, and which bore false corporate stamps embossed with the victim companies' own names. These were submitted to banks, not to accounts payable, to support the large volume of funds moving through the shell company's accounts.

The control that would have stopped it

payment-anomaly checks that flag a destination bank or country inconsistent with the vendor's established accounts (here, a Taiwan-based vendor suddenly paid via Latvia and Cyprus), regardless of how convincing the accompanying paperwork looks.

6Fraudulent wire transfer
What happened

accounts-payable staff at Google and Facebook, believing they were settling a real, already-owed obligation to a known supplier, approved and executed wire transfers totaling over $120 million.

The control that would have stopped it

dual approval and a hold period on any new or changed high-value wire to a vendor, giving a second reviewer a chance to catch the anomaly before funds leave the company.

7Payout and laundering
What happened

once funds landed in the Latvia and Cyprus accounts, Rimasauskas rapidly moved them onward into accounts in additional countries, per the DOJ, including Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Hong Kong, to frustrate tracing and recovery.

The control that would have stopped it

rapid fraud detection paired with immediate reporting to banks and law enforcement (FBI/IC3) to trigger wire recall and account freezes; fast reporting here is what allowed investigators to freeze and return a substantial share of Facebook's transferred funds.

Quick Facts
Victim
Google (Alphabet), "Victim-1", ~$23.26M wired; and Facebook (Meta), "Victim-2", ~$98.87M wired.
The court record names only Victim-1 and Victim-2; both companies confirmed their identities to NPR in March 2019, and a 2017 Lithuanian court order named them (Reuters, 2019). The real vendor impersonated was Quanta Computer Inc. of Taiwan.
Company
Facebook, Google
Location
Victims headquartered in the United States
(California); attacker operated from Lithuania; fraudulent bank accounts in Latvia and Cyprus, with laundered funds moved through multiple countries; prosecuted in the U.S. Southern District of New York.
Date
2013 to 2015 (scheme); indictment unsealed 2017; guilty plea 2019-03; sentenced 2019-12
Impact
~$122.13M wired to attacker accounts.
BasismeasuredExact per-victim figures in the sentencing transcript
The sentencing transcript gives the exact figures as $23.26M for Victim-1 and $98.87M for Victim-2 (SDNY, 2019); the Victim-1 to Google and Victim-2 to Facebook mapping comes from the companies' own confirmations to NPR (2019), not from the court record. DOJ and press commonly cite the total as "over $120M" or "over $100M". Recovery differed by victim: Google said it recouped its funds and Facebook said it recovered the bulk of its funds (CNBC, 2019). The loss still outstanding at sentencing was $26,479,079.24, which the court ordered as restitution; the government told the court that the majority of that amount was unrecovered, with about $5M frozen. The court separately ordered forfeiture of $49,738,559.41 (DOJ SDNY, 2019).
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Manufacturing & Industrial, Technology & Software
Threat Actor
Organized Crime
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