Evaldas Rimasauskas posed as supplier Quanta Computer to get Google and Facebook to wire about $122M. How the fake-invoice scam worked and what came back.
Social Engineering Examples·9 sources
Evaldas Rimasauskas, a Lithuanian, ran one of the biggest business email compromise scams on record. Between 2013 and 2015, his ring pretended to be Quanta Computer, a real Taiwanese hardware supplier, and talked Google and Facebook into wiring about $122 million to bank accounts in Latvia and Cyprus. No systems were hacked to move the money. Finance staff paid what looked like normal supplier invoices. Status: Documented incident.
One detail is disputed. The FBI's account says a fraudster also phoned the companies to ask for the bank change. The indictment and both DOJ press releases only mention emails. This page records the conflict rather than picking a side.
| Detail | Source | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Same-name Latvian shell, Latvia and Cyprus accounts, 2013 to 2015 | Indictment | Confirmed |
| $23.26 million from Victim-1, $98.87 million from Victim-2 | Sentencing transcript | Confirmed |
| Victim-1 is Google, Victim-2 is Facebook | NPR, from the companies | Confirmed by the companies, not the court |
| Quanta Computer was the supplier being copied | Reuters | Confirmed by Quanta |
| Recon by phone and phishing over two years | FBI | FBI account |
About $122.13 million went out in total. Google's share, roughly $23.26 million, came back after a civil fraud case in Latvia. "We recouped the funds," a Google spokesperson told CNBC. Facebook said it "recovered the bulk of the funds shortly after the incident", since much of its $98.87 million was frozen when the wires were spotted.
What wasn't recovered: $26,479,079.24, all of it Facebook's, which the judge ordered Rimasauskas to repay as restitution. Prosecutors told the court most of that was gone, with about $5 million frozen. He also agreed to forfeit $49,738,559.41. That's a separate order, roughly what Reuters says he personally pocketed. Adding the two together would double count.
Tip: "over $100 million" and "$120 million" both appear in headlines. The exact court figure is $122.13 million wired, and the final loss was far lower.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2013 to 2015 | The ring sends fake Quanta payment requests; Google and Facebook wire about $122 million |
| March 2017 | Rimasauskas is arrested in Lithuania |
| August 2017 | Extradition to New York |
| 20 March 2019 | Guilty plea, one count of wire fraud (DOJ) |
| 19 December 2019 | Five years inside, two more supervised (DOJ) |
More on this: invoice fraud, the wider BEC picture, and checking a wire before it goes.
The Lithuanian behind the fake-Quanta scam. Google and Facebook sent his ring about $122 million between 2013 and 2015. He admitted it in 2019 and got five years.
Google got its roughly $23.3 million back. Facebook recovered most of its $98.9 million; about $26.5 million was still outstanding at sentencing.
Both words get used. It's business email compromise, specifically invoice fraud: fake supplier emails asking for payment to new bank details. Phishing was also used earlier to gather inside information.
Nothing technical was broken. Staff paid what looked like a real, expected supplier invoice. The weak point was the payment process, not the software.
Social Engineering Examples. “Evaldas Rimasauskas: the $122M Google and Facebook invoice scam (2013 to 2015)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/rimasauskas-google-facebook-bec-2019
per the FBI's own account of the case, the ring spent roughly two years researching the target companies, including calling the victims' customer-service lines to harvest names and contact details of key employees, consistent with typical pretexting-driven OSINT gathering.
customer-service scripts and org-chart/personal-detail exposure are hard to lock down completely at enterprise scale; the realistic control is limiting how much internal personnel detail customer-service staff can disclose to unverified callers, and treating this stage as something attackers likely already have rather than something that can be fully prevented.
the same FBI account describes the ring also sending phishing emails to gain access to the victim companies' email systems, giving them a larger trove of internal detail to work from before the fraud began.
phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication and continuous monitoring for anomalous mailbox access would blunt the email-system foothold this scheme relied on for deeper internal detail.
per the DOJ indictment, Rimasauskas registered and incorporated a company in Latvia bearing the same name as the real vendor, Quanta Computer, and opened bank accounts for it in Latvia and Cyprus, so incoming payments would land in accounts he controlled while appearing to reach the genuine supplier.
look-alike company-name and domain monitoring for a real vendor's brand, plus vendor master-data governance, so a newly registered entity or account under a supplier's name cannot silently become an approved payment destination.
per the DOJ indictment, fraudulent emails sent from accounts built to create the false appearance of coming from real Quanta employees reached finance and accounts-payable staff at the victim companies, directing that money already owed to Quanta be sent to the Latvia and Cyprus account details. The sources disagree on the channel of the ask: the FBI's account says one of the fraudsters simply telephoned each company and told it to change bank account information for an upcoming payment, while the indictment and both DOJ releases describe only emails.
mandatory out-of-band verification of any vendor bank-detail change, made to a known, pre-existing phone number and never to a number or contact supplied in the request itself.
per the DOJ's sentencing announcement, the ring produced forged invoices, contracts, and letters that falsely appeared to have been executed and signed by executives and agents of the victim companies, and which bore false corporate stamps embossed with the victim companies' own names. These were submitted to banks, not to accounts payable, to support the large volume of funds moving through the shell company's accounts.
payment-anomaly checks that flag a destination bank or country inconsistent with the vendor's established accounts (here, a Taiwan-based vendor suddenly paid via Latvia and Cyprus), regardless of how convincing the accompanying paperwork looks.
accounts-payable staff at Google and Facebook, believing they were settling a real, already-owed obligation to a known supplier, approved and executed wire transfers totaling over $120 million.
dual approval and a hold period on any new or changed high-value wire to a vendor, giving a second reviewer a chance to catch the anomaly before funds leave the company.
once funds landed in the Latvia and Cyprus accounts, Rimasauskas rapidly moved them onward into accounts in additional countries, per the DOJ, including Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Hong Kong, to frustrate tracing and recovery.
rapid fraud detection paired with immediate reporting to banks and law enforcement (FBI/IC3) to trigger wire recall and account freezes; fast reporting here is what allowed investigators to freeze and return a substantial share of Facebook's transferred funds.
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