In 2015, fake emails from Ubiquiti's CEO and a real London lawyer got its finance chief to wire $46.7M. How it happened, the tells, and what was recovered.
Social Engineering Examples·7 sources
The Ubiquiti business email compromise cost the networking company $46.7 million in 2015. Over two weeks, emails pretending to come from its CEO and from a real London lawyer at Latham & Watkins talked its own finance chief into sending 14 wires out of its Hong Kong subsidiary. No system was hacked. Ubiquiti got $16.7 million back and never recovered the remaining $30 million. Status: Documented incident.
None of this needed malware. According to Ubiquiti's letters to the SEC, the scammers spoofed identities rather than taking over the executive's real mailbox.
Tip: treat "this is confidential, don't tell anyone" as a reason to verify, not a reason to skip it. A real acquisition survives a phone call to the CEO.
| Item | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Taken in 14 wires | $46,703,232 | Letter to SEC staff |
| Recovered by 30 June 2015 | $8.1 million | FY2015 10-K |
| Charge taken in Q4 FY2015 | $39.1 million (net of the $8.1M, plus professional fees) | FY2015 10-K |
| Court-ordered recovery in fiscal 2016 | $8.6 million | 10-Q, Dec 2015 |
| Total recovered | $16.7 million | FY2018 10-K |
| Still outstanding, called "likely remote" | $30.0 million | FY2018 10-K |
Beyond the money, the officer who held wire authority resigned, FTI Consulting supplied an interim chief accounting officer, and Ubiquiti tightened its controls. No one was publicly identified or charged in its filings.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 19 May 2015 | First fake executive email about a secret acquisition |
| 20 May to 5 June 2015 | 14 wires go out from the Hong Kong subsidiary |
| 5 June 2015 | The FBI's San Francisco office warns the CEO; fraud discovered |
| 6 August 2015 | Ubiquiti discloses it in an 8-K filing |
| Fiscal 2016 | $8.6 million recovered under a court order; nothing more after that |
Related: CEO fraud, business email compromise, and how to prevent CEO fraud.
$46.7 million was wired out in 2015. Ubiquiti recovered $16.7 million in total, leaving about $30 million it described as likely unrecoverable.
No. Its audit committee found no evidence of a network intrusion or of employee complicity. It was impersonation by email.
A senior Ubiquiti executive and a real partner at the law firm Latham & Watkins in London. The lawyer was a victim of the impersonation, not part of the scam.
The FBI's San Francisco office emailed Ubiquiti's CEO on 5 June 2015 to warn that money may have been taken from the Hong Kong account.
Social Engineering Examples. “Ubiquiti's $46.7M business email compromise (2015)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/ubiquiti-networks-bec-2015
the fraud ring likely identified Ubiquiti's Hong Kong subsidiary, the officer who held wire authority over its bank account (the company's principal financial officer and controller), and the CEO's identity through OSINT sources such as corporate filings, the company website, and professional-networking profiles, consistent with how BEC operators typically map finance-department roles and reporting lines before contact.
the OSINT footprint that reveals which named employee holds wire authority is very hard to eliminate at enterprise scale; the realistic control assumes attackers can identify the controller and CEO by name and instead hardens the verification process used at Stages 3 and 5, rather than trying to hide organizational roles.
the actor likely prepared a corporate-look-alike sender identity for the CEO and a separate throwaway @consultant.com account from which to send correspondence carrying the signature and firm details of a real Latham & Watkins partner in the firm's London office, consistent with commodity BEC tradecraft (spoofed or look-alike sender addresses, borrowed branding) rather than any network intrusion, which the audit committee's investigation confirmed did not occur.
sender-domain scrutiny and email authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) plus anti-spoofing and look-alike-domain monitoring can catch the mismatch between a claimed law firm and an @consultant.com sending address before any instruction is acted on.
the fraudster emailed the principal financial officer from what appeared to be the CEO's genuine corporate address on May 19, 2015, announcing a confidential acquisition and directing that a named outside party would issue payment instructions, establishing authority and secrecy in the same message.
require mandatory out-of-band verification, a callback to a pre-established phone number for the purported sender, for any instruction claiming executive authority, regardless of how urgent or routine the request appears.
a fraudster posing as a real Latham & Watkins partner then emailed the same officer directly, with correspondence bearing that partner's signature, the firm's details and banking instructions, corroborating the CEO's instruction through an apparently independent, high-credibility source.
independently verify any newly introduced third party (law firm, advisor, counterparty) through that firm's published contact channels rather than the contact information supplied within the email itself.
the pretext demanded an immediate same-day payment, pressuring the controller to act before seeking independent verification, and exploited the fact that international wires from the Hong Kong account were routine business practice rather than an anomaly.
enforce dual authorization and a mandatory hold or cooling-off period on large or first-time international wire requests, explicitly overriding claimed urgency as a justification to skip the check.
with disbursement authorization policies that the FY2015 10-K later described as not updated timely for changes in personnel and positions, and whose authorization requirements were not clearly stated for non-routine transactions, the attacker directed 13 additional wire transfers between May 20 and June 5, 2015, continuing to invoke confidentiality to suppress any internal verification of the recurring large payments.
transaction-pattern monitoring for a rapid sequence of large wires to new counterparties, combined with escalating re-verification requirements after the first unusual transfer rather than treating repeat requests as already-approved and routine.
the $46,703,232 was routed to accounts held by several entities in several jurisdictions, including Russia, Hong Kong, China, Hungary and Poland, consistent with rapid layering intended to frustrate tracing and recovery, completing the fraud before it was flagged externally by an FBI agent's tip to the CEO.
fast-response fund-freeze and recall procedures through banking relationships, plus prompt law-enforcement engagement (as occurred here via the FBI and multi-jurisdiction legal injunctions), can claw back a portion of dispersed funds; this is a post-loss recovery control, not a preventive one, so the real leverage remains further upstream at Stages 3 and 5.
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