Case Library / Phishing / Ubiquiti's $46.7M business email compromise (2015)
Phishing Documented incident

Ubiquiti's $46.7M business email compromise (2015)

In 2015, fake emails from Ubiquiti's CEO and a real London lawyer got its finance chief to wire $46.7M. How it happened, the tells, and what was recovered.

Share:

Social Engineering Examples·7 sources

The Ubiquiti business email compromise cost the networking company $46.7 million in 2015. Over two weeks, emails pretending to come from its CEO and from a real London lawyer at Latham & Watkins talked its own finance chief into sending 14 wires out of its Hong Kong subsidiary. No system was hacked. Ubiquiti got $16.7 million back and never recovered the remaining $30 million. Status: Documented incident.

Key takeaways

  • The story was a secret acquisition. Secrecy is what stopped the officer from checking with anyone.
  • The "lawyer" wrote from a generic @consultant.com address, not a Latham & Watkins one. That was the clearest tell.
  • Ubiquiti only found out when the FBI emailed its CEO.
  • Its audit committee found no insider involvement and no network intrusion, but the company reported three material weaknesses in its financial controls.

How the Ubiquiti scam happened

  1. 19 May 2015: an email that looked like it came from a senior Ubiquiti executive told the officer serving as principal financial officer and controller about a confidential acquisition. Payments would be handled under the direction of a named partner in Latham & Watkins' London office.
  2. The second persona. Follow-up emails carried that partner's signature and the firm's details. The partner is real. He was impersonated too.
  3. Urgency. The first payment was wanted the same day.
  4. It looked routine. International wires from the Hong Kong account were normal business, and this officer had authority to send them.
  5. 14 wires, 20 May to 5 June, totalling $46,703,232 from the subsidiary's HSBC Hong Kong account to accounts held by several entities in places including Russia, Hong Kong, China, Hungary and Poland.

None of this needed malware. According to Ubiquiti's letters to the SEC, the scammers spoofed identities rather than taking over the executive's real mailbox.

The tells that were there

  • A Latham & Watkins partner writing from an @consultant.com address.
  • A "deal" nobody else in the company seemed to know about.
  • Payees Ubiquiti had never dealt with.
  • Pressure to pay fast and keep quiet.

Tip: treat "this is confidential, don't tell anyone" as a reason to verify, not a reason to skip it. A real acquisition survives a phone call to the CEO.

What it cost Ubiquiti

Item Amount Source
Taken in 14 wires $46,703,232 Letter to SEC staff
Recovered by 30 June 2015 $8.1 million FY2015 10-K
Charge taken in Q4 FY2015 $39.1 million (net of the $8.1M, plus professional fees) FY2015 10-K
Court-ordered recovery in fiscal 2016 $8.6 million 10-Q, Dec 2015
Total recovered $16.7 million FY2018 10-K
Still outstanding, called "likely remote" $30.0 million FY2018 10-K

Beyond the money, the officer who held wire authority resigned, FTI Consulting supplied an interim chief accounting officer, and Ubiquiti tightened its controls. No one was publicly identified or charged in its filings.

Timeline

Date Event
19 May 2015 First fake executive email about a secret acquisition
20 May to 5 June 2015 14 wires go out from the Hong Kong subsidiary
5 June 2015 The FBI's San Francisco office warns the CEO; fraud discovered
6 August 2015 Ubiquiti discloses it in an 8-K filing
Fiscal 2016 $8.6 million recovered under a court order; nothing more after that

What would have stopped it

  • A callback on a known number for any new, large or urgent wire, whoever seems to be asking.
  • Two people to approve international transfers, with limits per payment.
  • Checking the sender's domain. A law firm doesn't email from a free-webmail-style address.
  • Email authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) and look-alike domain monitoring.
  • A no-blame way to pause. Staff need to know they won't be punished for delaying a "CEO" request to check it.

Related: CEO fraud, business email compromise, and how to prevent CEO fraud.

Common questions

How much did Ubiquiti lose to the BEC scam?

$46.7 million was wired out in 2015. Ubiquiti recovered $16.7 million in total, leaving about $30 million it described as likely unrecoverable.

Was Ubiquiti hacked?

No. Its audit committee found no evidence of a network intrusion or of employee complicity. It was impersonation by email.

Who was impersonated?

A senior Ubiquiti executive and a real partner at the law firm Latham & Watkins in London. The lawyer was a victim of the impersonation, not part of the scam.

How was the fraud discovered?

The FBI's San Francisco office emailed Ubiquiti's CEO on 5 June 2015 to warn that money may have been taken from the Hong Kong account.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “Ubiquiti's $46.7M business email compromise (2015)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/ubiquiti-networks-bec-2015

Attack Chain & Defense
1Reconnaissance and target mapping
What happened

the fraud ring likely identified Ubiquiti's Hong Kong subsidiary, the officer who held wire authority over its bank account (the company's principal financial officer and controller), and the CEO's identity through OSINT sources such as corporate filings, the company website, and professional-networking profiles, consistent with how BEC operators typically map finance-department roles and reporting lines before contact.

The control that would have stopped it

the OSINT footprint that reveals which named employee holds wire authority is very hard to eliminate at enterprise scale; the realistic control assumes attackers can identify the controller and CEO by name and instead hardens the verification process used at Stages 3 and 5, rather than trying to hide organizational roles.

2Impersonation infrastructure setup
What happened

the actor likely prepared a corporate-look-alike sender identity for the CEO and a separate throwaway @consultant.com account from which to send correspondence carrying the signature and firm details of a real Latham & Watkins partner in the firm's London office, consistent with commodity BEC tradecraft (spoofed or look-alike sender addresses, borrowed branding) rather than any network intrusion, which the audit committee's investigation confirmed did not occur.

The control that would have stopped it

sender-domain scrutiny and email authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) plus anti-spoofing and look-alike-domain monitoring can catch the mismatch between a claimed law firm and an @consultant.com sending address before any instruction is acted on.

3Initial pretext contact
What happened

the fraudster emailed the principal financial officer from what appeared to be the CEO's genuine corporate address on May 19, 2015, announcing a confidential acquisition and directing that a named outside party would issue payment instructions, establishing authority and secrecy in the same message.

The control that would have stopped it

require mandatory out-of-band verification, a callback to a pre-established phone number for the purported sender, for any instruction claiming executive authority, regardless of how urgent or routine the request appears.

4Authority escalation via a second impersonation
What happened

a fraudster posing as a real Latham & Watkins partner then emailed the same officer directly, with correspondence bearing that partner's signature, the firm's details and banking instructions, corroborating the CEO's instruction through an apparently independent, high-credibility source.

The control that would have stopped it

independently verify any newly introduced third party (law firm, advisor, counterparty) through that firm's published contact channels rather than the contact information supplied within the email itself.

5Urgency-driven first transfer
What happened

the pretext demanded an immediate same-day payment, pressuring the controller to act before seeking independent verification, and exploited the fact that international wires from the Hong Kong account were routine business practice rather than an anomaly.

The control that would have stopped it

enforce dual authorization and a mandatory hold or cooling-off period on large or first-time international wire requests, explicitly overriding claimed urgency as a justification to skip the check.

6Sustained exploitation over two weeks
What happened

with disbursement authorization policies that the FY2015 10-K later described as not updated timely for changes in personnel and positions, and whose authorization requirements were not clearly stated for non-routine transactions, the attacker directed 13 additional wire transfers between May 20 and June 5, 2015, continuing to invoke confidentiality to suppress any internal verification of the recurring large payments.

The control that would have stopped it

transaction-pattern monitoring for a rapid sequence of large wires to new counterparties, combined with escalating re-verification requirements after the first unusual transfer rather than treating repeat requests as already-approved and routine.

7Fund dispersal and objective completion
What happened

the $46,703,232 was routed to accounts held by several entities in several jurisdictions, including Russia, Hong Kong, China, Hungary and Poland, consistent with rapid layering intended to frustrate tracing and recovery, completing the fraud before it was flagged externally by an FBI agent's tip to the CEO.

The control that would have stopped it

fast-response fund-freeze and recall procedures through banking relationships, plus prompt law-enforcement engagement (as occurred here via the FBI and multi-jurisdiction legal injunctions), can claw back a portion of dispersed funds; this is a post-loss recovery control, not a preventive one, so the real leverage remains further upstream at Stages 3 and 5.

Quick Facts
Victim
Ubiquiti Networks, Inc.
(San Jose, CA; NASDAQ: UBNT) via its indirect wholly-owned Hong Kong subsidiary, Ubiquiti Networks International Limited
Company
Ubiquiti Networks, Inc.
Location
Hong Kong subsidiary of a US-headquartered company; funds sent to accounts in several jurisdictions, including Russia, Hong Kong, China
(PRC), Hungary and Poland
Date
2015-05-19 to 2015-06-05
(first fraudulent email 2015-05-19; the 14 wires ran 2015-05-20 to 2015-06-05; discovered 2015-06-05; disclosed 2015-08-06)
Impact
Gross amount taken: $46,703,232 in 14 wires (Ubiquiti response to SEC staff comment letter, November 9, 2015).
BasismeasuredStated to the dollar in the company's response to an SEC staff comment letter
Recovered: $8.1M by June 30, 2015, plus a single court-ordered recovery of $8.6M in fiscal 2016, $16.7M in total, with no further recoveries after fiscal 2016 (FY2018 Form 10-K, August 24, 2018). Ubiquiti recorded a $39.1M charge in Q4 FY2015, which nets the $8.1M recovery and includes additional expenses consisting of professional service fees, and was still pursuing the remaining $30.0M, which it said was likely remote.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Technology & Software
Threat Actor
unknown
Explore more

Related Cases

Browse by what this case has in common with others in the library.