Case Library / Pretexting & Impersonation / Roger Roger's Costa Rica Sweepstakes Call Center: VOIP-Spoofed Government Impersonation Bilks Hundreds of Elderly Victims of $4M+

Roger Roger's Costa Rica Sweepstakes Call Center: VOIP-Spoofed Government Impersonation Bilks Hundreds of Elderly Victims of $4M+

Costa Rica-based telemarketing ringleader Roger Roger used VOIP-spoofed Washington D.C. caller ID and fake government-official personas to convince hundreds of mostly elderly U.S. victims they had won sweepstakes prizes, bilking them of over $4 million before advance-fee "taxes and fees" demands. He was convicted at trial in 2024 and sentenced to over 15 years in 2025.

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Reviewed by the Social Engineering Examples team.

What Happened

Roger Roger led a fraudulent telemarketing scheme run out of a call center in Costa Rica that, over a period of years (indictment unsealed October 2, 2018), defrauded hundreds of victims across the United States, most of them elderly, out of more than $4 million. Co-conspirators impersonated U.S. government officials over the phone, falsely telling victims they had won a substantial sweepstakes prize, then demanded a series of up-front payments (framed as taxes, customs duties, and fees) before victims could supposedly collect. Calls were routed through VOIP technology to spoof caller ID so they appeared to originate from Washington, D.C. and other U.S. locations, concealing the Costa Rica origin. Roger was arrested and extradited from Costa Rica in February 2023. A federal jury in the Western District of North Carolina convicted him on September 20, 2024 on fraud and international money-laundering conspiracy charges. He was sentenced on July 15, 2025 to more than 15 years in prison, with more than $3.3 million in restitution and more than $4.2 million in forfeiture ordered.

How the Attack Worked

Roger Roger operated a telemarketing fraud call center in Costa Rica. Co-conspirators falsely posed as U.S. government officials and called victims in the U.S. to tell them they had won a substantial "sweepstakes" prize. To conceal their true identities and location, the conspirators used Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) technology to spoof caller ID so calls appeared to originate from Washington, D.C. and other U.S. locations rather than Costa Rica. Roger personally called victims using fake names and fabricated documents to reinforce the sweepstakes-winner pretext. After convincing victims, many of them elderly, that they stood to receive a large financial reward, the callers told victims they first had to make a series of up-front payments, characterized as taxes, customs duties, insurance, and other fees, before the "prize" could be released. Once a victim paid, conspirators (acting as "loaders") would re-contact them claiming a problem had arisen or the prize was even larger, prompting additional rounds of payment. Payments were extracted via wire transfers, Western Union/MoneyGram transfers, and blank money orders shipped by courier; some victims who refused to send funds directly overseas were directed to send money to U.S.-based co-conspirators who then forwarded it to Costa Rica. Roger recruited and trained other co-conspirators to run this script and to move victim payments from the U.S. to Costa Rica. No prize ever existed.

The Lure & the Tell

Lure: an unsolicited phone call from someone claiming to be a U.S. government official informing the victim they had won a substantial cash "sweepstakes" prize, using a spoofed VOIP caller ID displaying a Washington, D.C. (or other U.S.) number, plus fake names and fabricated official-looking documents, to make the claim of government authority credible. Tell (fraud escalation): after an initial upfront payment (framed as taxes, customs duties, fees, or insurance) was sent, "loaders" would call back saying a mistake occurred or the prize was actually larger, demanding further payments, a repeating cycle designed to keep victims paying rather than realizing no prize existed.

Outcome

Roger Roger, 40, of Costa Rica, was convicted by a federal jury on September 20, 2024 of one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, four counts of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit international money laundering, and two counts of international money laundering. Because the jury found the telemarketing scheme victimized at least 10 people over age 55, he faced enhanced maximum penalties (25 years per fraud/conspiracy-to-fraud count, 20 years per money laundering count). On July 15, 2025, Roger, then 41, was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison and ordered to pay more than $3.3 million in restitution and forfeit more than $4.2 million. He had been arrested and extradited from Costa Rica in February 2023 with assistance from DOJ's Office of International Affairs and Costa Rican law enforcement. Six other individuals (Paul Andy Stiep, Manuel Mauro Chavez, David Michael Nigh, Mark Raymond Oman, Cole Anthony Parks, and Nicholas Richer) were named as co-defendants in the underlying indictment for roles including U.S.-based fund collection/forwarding ("runners") and phone solicitation ("openers"/"loaders").

Why It Matters

This case is a documented, DOJ-prosecuted example of how caller-ID spoofing via commodity VOIP technology can manufacture the appearance of government authority (a Washington D.C. area code) to lend false legitimacy to an advance-fee fraud at scale: hundreds of victims, over $4 million stolen, across a years-long operation before law enforcement made an arrest. It illustrates that (1) caller ID is not a trust signal once VOIP spoofing is in play, (2) legitimate government agencies and legitimate sweepstakes never require upfront payment to release winnings, and (3) elderly victims were deliberately targeted and re-victimized through repeated "loader" calls demanding additional fees, a pattern DOJ's elder-fraud enforcement and hotline infrastructure now explicitly targets. It's a clean pretexting case study distinct from BEC/vendor-fraud incidents: pure voice-channel authority impersonation with no email or corporate-network component.

Defenses

DOJ/USPIS/IRS-CI/FBI cross-border investigation with Costa Rican law enforcement and DOJ's Office of International Affairs secured Roger's February 2023 extradition; case built via years-long evidence gathering culminating in jury trial (not caught pre-loss; this is a law-enforcement takedown, not a technical control). For consumers/families: the case underpins DOJ's standing guidance: government agencies never demand upfront "taxes," "customs duties," or "fees" via wire transfer/money order/gift cards to release a prize; caller-ID showing a Washington D.C. or U.S. number is not proof of legitimacy since VOIP lets callers spoof any number; unsolicited sweepstakes/lottery notifications by phone are categorically fraudulent since legitimate sweepstakes do not require advance payment. DOJ's National Elder Fraud Hotline (1-833-FRAUD-11) is cited in both releases as the reporting/support channel for victims aged 60+.

Sources
  • Leader of $4M International Telemarketing Scheme Convicted. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (Press Release 24-1189) Primary. Confirms Sept. 20, 2024 conviction on all six counts, Roger's age (40) at conviction, the $4M+ loss figure, VOIP caller-ID spoofing, and the 25-year/20-year enhanced maximum penalties. Verified live 2026-07-29.
  • Costa Rica Resident Sentenced for Orchestrating Multimillion-Dollar International Telemarketing Scheme. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (Press Release 25-737) Primary. Confirms the July 15, 2025 sentence of more than 15 years, Roger's age (41) at sentencing, more than $3.3M restitution and $4.2M forfeiture, and the February 2023 extradition from Costa Rica. Verified live 2026-07-29.
  • United States v. Roger (sealed indictment PDF). U.S. Department of Justice Primary. The original Sept. 19, 2018 grand jury indictment; confirms the conspiracy window (January 2014 to November 2017), the opener/loader/runner roles, all six named co-defendants, the VOIP/false-verification mechanics, the fake $450,000 and $4,500,000 prize claims, IRS impersonation, and the Western Union/MoneyGram/blank-money-order/FedEx-UPS payment methods. Verified live 2026-07-29.
  • United States v. Roger, 3:18-cr-00311-MOC-DCK. docket page. CourtListener Primary. Confirms the case number, W.D.N.C. Charlotte Division venue, the Sept. 19, 2018 sealed filing, and the Oct. 2, 2018 unsealing order. Verified live 2026-07-29.
Attack Chain & Defense
The sequence the attacker ran
How it could have been stopped
1
Lead sourcing: Advance-fee sweepstakes rings of this kind typically work from lead lists of older U.S. consumers, likely compiled from prior sweepstakes/lottery mailing lists, cold-call databases, or lists that circulate among fraud crews, giving the callers a pool of plausible targets skewed toward elderly victims before any call was placed.
Countering Stage 1: Which specific consumers end up on a sweepstakes-fraud lead list is largely outside any single victim's or company's control; the realistic control sits downstream, at the point of contact, rather than at list formation.
2
Caller-ID spoofing infrastructure: Per the indictment's "manner and means" section, Roger and his co-conspirators set up Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) calling capability using numbers with area codes tied to Washington, D.C. and other U.S. cities, so outbound calls from Costa Rica displayed as domestic U.S. numbers.
Countering Stage 2: Carrier-level STIR/SHAKEN caller-ID authentication and robocall/spoofed-number filtering are the direct technical countermeasure to VOIP caller-ID spoofing, though cross-border VOIP routing can still evade some of this filtering.
3
Government-impersonation pretext and script build: The conspirators adopted aliases and fabricated documents, and scripted a false claim of being agents or representatives of a U.S. government agency, including the IRS, to lend the sweepstakes claim official-sounding legitimacy, per the indictment.
Countering Stage 3: Standing DOJ/FTC consumer guidance that legitimate government agencies never call to announce a prize or demand payment to release one is the countermeasure; treating any such call as fraudulent by default removes the pretext's power regardless of how convincing the script or documents are.
4
Initial contact (opener): An "opener" called the victim, falsely claimed they had won a large sweepstakes prize (the indictment cites a stated $450,000 prize), and told them a fee, tax, or duty had to be paid before the prize could be released.
Countering Stage 4: Consumer and caregiver education, of the kind DOJ's National Elder Fraud Hotline provides, that no legitimate sweepstakes ever requires an up-front fee, plus encouraging elderly consumers to consult a trusted family member before acting on any unsolicited prize call.
5
False verification loop: Victims who tried to verify the call were given a callback number that also rang into the same Costa Rica call center over VOIP, so the conspirators could supply false confirmation and defeat a victim's own skepticism check.
Countering Stage 5: Advise verifying any such claim only through an independently looked-up official number, never a callback number supplied by the caller, since a self-provided verification channel proves nothing.
6
Payment extraction and money-mule network: Victims were directed to send funds via Western Union or MoneyGram, by mailing blank money orders (including Postal Money Orders) via FedEx or UPS, or by wiring money directly to accounts the conspirators controlled; victims wary of sending funds abroad were routed to U.S.-based co-conspirators who collected the money domestically and forwarded it to Costa Rica.
Countering Stage 6: This is the strongest real-world chokepoint. Money Service Businesses like Western Union and MoneyGram, along with the U.S. Postal Service, can flag and delay money-order and wire transactions matching known sweepstakes-fraud indicators, and bank or retail staff trained to question elderly customers making large money-order or wire purchases can interrupt the payment before it leaves the country.
7
Escalation (loader) re-contact: After an initial payment, a "loader" called the same victim back claiming a clerical error or a larger prize (the indictment cites claims of $4,500,000 or more), demanding further fee payments, and repeating this cycle until the victim ran out of money or realized the fraud.
Countering Stage 7: The same money-transfer chokepoint controls as Stage 6 apply, reinforced by repeat-transaction monitoring, since multiple sweepstakes-related transfers from the same sender in a short window is a known red-flag pattern for MSBs and fraud investigators.
8
Proceeds consolidation: Domestic collectors retained a cut and forwarded the remainder to Costa Rica, where it funded call-center operations and was split among Roger and his co-conspirators, completing the objective of ongoing, repeat extraction from the same victims.
Countering Stage 8: Once funds reach Costa Rica this becomes a law-enforcement and international-cooperation problem rather than a consumer or corporate control; DOJ's Office of International Affairs working with Costa Rican authorities to investigate, extradite, and prosecute (as happened here) is the applicable response at this stage.
Quick Facts
Victim
Hundreds of U.S. victims, predominantly elderly (at least 10 confirmed victims over age 55, per jury finding)
Location
Costa Rica (call center origin) targeting victims across the United States; case prosecuted in the Western District of North Carolina, Charlotte Division
Date
Scheme active January 2014 to November 2017 per the indictment; sealed indictment filed Sept. 19, 2018 and unsealed Oct. 2, 2018; trial conviction Sept. 20, 2024; sentencing July 15, 2025
Impact
Over $4 million stolen from hundreds of victims (per trial evidence); Roger ordered at sentencing to pay more than $3.3 million in restitution and to forfeit more than $4.2 million.
Status
Confirmed
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Consumer / General Public, Professional & Business Services
Threat Actor
Organized Crime
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