iSpoof was a UK-run, Bitcoin-paid website that let fraudsters display a real bank's number and capture the codes victims keyed in. In the UK alone, prosecutors traced £43 million in fraud to the site. The judge put the worldwide figure nearer £100 million. Police took the server down on November 8, 2022. Six months later its administrator, Tejay Fletcher, got 13 years and 4 months.
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iSpoof.cc was a subscription website that sold fraud tools as a service. The Metropolitan Police date its creation to December 2020. Subscribers paid in Bitcoin, from £150 a month up to £5,000 for power users, and the site held 59,000 registered user accounts when it closed.
The Court of Appeal listed what the software did. It made calls appear to come from trusted sources such as a bank or HMRC, the UK tax authority. It also recorded calls, captured data entered on the victim's keypad, and diverted call recipients to numbers or websites the fraudsters ran.
In court, prosecuting counsel John Ojakovoh described an interactive voice response (IVR) feature, meaning automated phone prompts, and a PIN-capture facility. He said one tool let subscribers "intercept OTP (one-time password) which banks ironically introduced to try and improve security." A second tool claimed the victim's card details were out of date and asked them to key in new ones.
The site carried tutorials, and a Telegram channel called "iSpoof club" handled marketing and technical support. Tejay Fletcher co-founded the site with another man and ran it alone once that co-founder was removed in mid-2021. The Court of Appeal records that registered users then grew from 6,433 to 44,459.
The frauds ran to a script, and it had five steps. iSpoof handled steps 2 and 3. Everything else, from the script to moving the money, was down to the subscriber. The pattern is vishing (voice phishing) built on bank-impersonation pretexting.
The capture step is the detail most write-ups miss. The platform did not intercept a text message from the bank. It recorded what victims typed into their own handsets during the call.
Around 10 million calls went through iSpoof worldwide in the 12 months to August 2022, and 3.5 million of them were in the UK. Those are Metropolitan Police figures, as quoted by Sophos. The police described almost 20 people a minute being contacted.
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Nov 30, 2020 | Start of the indictment period Fletcher was charged over | BBC News |
| Dec 2020 | iSpoof.cc created, per the Metropolitan Police | Police Professional |
| Jun 2021 | The Met's Cyber Crime Unit opens Operation Elaborate | Computer Weekly |
| Mid-2021 | Co-founder removed; Fletcher runs the site alone | Court of Appeal |
| Oct 2021 | Case opened at Eurojust at the request of UK authorities | Eurojust |
| Aug 2021 to Aug 2022 | About 10 million calls made through iSpoof worldwide | Eurojust |
| Nov 6, 2022 | Fletcher arrested at an address in east London | Eurojust |
| Nov 8, 2022 | US and Ukrainian authorities seize the server, by then hosted in Kyiv, and take the site offline | Eurojust |
| Nov 24, 2022 | 142 arrests announced worldwide, 120 of them in the UK | Police Professional |
| Apr 20, 2023 | Fletcher pleads guilty to four offenses, about a month before trial | Court of Appeal |
| May 19, 2023 | Sentenced to 13 years and 4 months at Southwark Crown Court; arrests reach 169 | CPS, Sky News |
| Aug 4, 2023 | Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal against sentence | Court of Appeal |
| May 18, 2026 | Confiscation order of £404,331 made against Fletcher | Daily Mail court report |
iSpoof's figures measure different things, so they should not be added together. The table separates losses to victims, income to the platform, and money recovered.
| Figure | Meaning | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| £43 million | UK frauds the prosecution identified as carried out through iSpoof | Measured; a floor |
| About £100 million | Global losses to victims | Judge's estimate, called conservative |
| £10,000 | Average loss among the 4,785 people who reported being targeted to Action Fraud | Reported |
| 112.6 BTC | Subscription income over about 16 months, approximately £3.2 million per the CPS | CPS figure; the Court of Appeal says over £3 million |
| £1.7 million to £1.9 million | Fletcher's own share, the figure the sentence was built on | Court finding; the CPS gives at least £1.3 million |
| Over £360,000 | A Lamborghini, two Range Rovers, and a Rolex found by police | Combined value, against no known legitimate income |
| £404,331 | Confiscation order, the amount investigators could trace | Court order; not money returned to victims |
Eurojust gives the platform's income as over EUR 3.7 million. That is its own figure, not a conversion of the sterling total, so the two should not be compared. Sources: Court of Appeal, CPS, BBC News, and Daily Mail.
Several pages, including Wikipedia's entry, describe 200,000 UK victims. The Metropolitan Police figure came from the 350,000 UK calls that lasted longer than a minute, which reached about 200,000 people, as iNews reported.
That number measures contact, not loss. Action Fraud received reports from 4,785 people who said they had been targeted.
Eurojust's press release says May 18, 2023, and a few later reports copied that date. The CPS, the BBC, and the Court of Appeal judgment all say May 19.
The CPS press release says Fletcher pleaded guilty early. The Court of Appeal records that he first pleaded not guilty. He changed his plea about a month before the trial date, which earned him credit of 18 percent.
The control that failed was trust in caller ID. A displayed number proved nothing, because iSpoof let any subscriber rent a bank's real number.
The usual advice to hang up and call back needed a qualification. iSpoof could divert call recipients to numbers the fraudsters operated. Hitting redial from the call log, or ringing a number the scammer read out, could put the victim straight back through to the fraudsters.
Calling back works only if you take the number from the back of the card, a statement, or the bank's app.
| Stage | Control that would have broken it |
|---|---|
| Pretext: spoofed bank number | Carrier-level caller authentication (the STIR/SHAKEN approach), so a borrowed bank number fails the check |
| Capture: keyed-in PINs and passcodes | A bank rule, stated plainly to customers, that it never asks for a full PIN or passcode on a call it placed |
| Access: immediate login | In-app approval instead of codes read out or keyed in over the phone |
| Cash-out: fast transfer | Step-up checks on new payees, plus monitoring that flags a login followed at once by a large transfer |
| Supply: the platform itself | Takedown of the service and arrests of its users, which is what ended iSpoof |
The same caller-ID trust failure drives the Phantom Hacker bank impersonation case, where the caller's number matched the one printed on the victim's card. For a step-by-step guide, see how to prevent vishing.
Other bank fraud-team impersonation calls in this library include the RBS impersonation against Hamilton Academical FC and the Barclays impersonation of a UK jeweller.
Police and prosecutors have published arrest counts for iSpoof's users, but no conviction count was found in the sources reviewed. An arrest count is not a conviction count.
Reports of the May 2026 confiscation hearing also disagree on how much Fletcher benefited. This page therefore uses the Court of Appeal's finding of £1.7 million to £1.9 million.
iSpoof was a caller-ID spoofing website, run from the UK, that fraudsters paid to use from December 2020 until police shut it down in November 2022. It also sold tools for capturing codes. Subscribers used it to call people while displaying a real bank's number. UK authorities described the investigation behind its takedown, Operation Elaborate, as the country's largest-ever fraud investigation.
Tejay Fletcher, the site's main administrator, pleaded guilty in April 2023 to four offenses, including making or supplying articles for use in fraud. Southwark Crown Court jailed him for 13 years and 4 months on May 19, 2023. The judge started from 16 years and 6 months before the reduction for his plea, and the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.
The coordinated action announced on November 24, 2022, produced 142 arrests worldwide, 120 of them in the UK and 103 in London. By May 2023 the Met's Cyber Crime Unit put the total at 169. Police first focused on UK users who had paid at least £100 in Bitcoin, working from 70 million rows of data on the seized server.
No source connects them: this case concerns iSpoof.cc, the caller-ID spoofing website that sold bank-impersonation tools to fraudsters and was taken offline on November 8, 2022. Searches for "iSpoof" also return unrelated location-spoofing apps used with mobile games. None of the court, police, or prosecutor sources for this case mention those apps.
Yes. iSpoof subscribers made calls that showed the genuine names and numbers of banks including Barclays, HSBC, NatWest, Santander, Lloyds, Halifax, First Direct, Nationwide, and TSB. A matching number is not proof of identity. End the call and dial the number printed on your card or shown in your bank's app, never one the caller gives you.
Not through the criminal case against Fletcher. The confiscation order of £404,331, made on May 18, 2026, is the amount investigators could trace, payable within three months with 12 months' imprisonment in default. A confiscation order recovers money from the offender; it is not compensation paid to the victims of the frauds.
Social Engineering Examples. “iSpoof Caller-ID Spoofing (2022): How a £150-a-Month Website Fueled £43 Million in UK Fraud”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/ispoof-caller-id-spoofing-fletcher-2022
Fletcher co-founded iSpoof.cc with another man in December 2020 and ran it alone once that co-founder was removed in mid-2021, building it as a self-service website. Per the Court of Appeal the software let subscribers make calls that appeared to come from trusted sources such as a bank or HMRC, record calls, intercept passwords and other sensitive data entered via the keypad of the victim's phone, and divert call recipients to fraudulent websites or telephone numbers operated by the fraudsters; the site also carried tutorials on getting the most out of the tools. All of it was packaged as a monthly Bitcoin-paid subscription, a pattern consistent with a commercial crime-as-a-service model rather than a one-off tool built for personal use.
Building and hosting spoofing and keypad-capture tooling happens entirely outside any single victim organization's visibility; the realistic control is legal and infrastructure-level, meaning law enforcement and hosting/domain takedown action against the platform itself, which is what ultimately ended iSpoof rather than any bank-side defense.
iSpoof was promoted openly through a Telegram channel called 'iSpoof club,' which per the Court of Appeal served to resolve technical issues as well as to market the service. The site reached 59,000 registered user accounts by the time it closed, with subscriptions running from £150 to £5,000 a month, showing how a closed messaging app was used as a low-friction storefront and help desk for criminal customers at scale.
Platform marketing via closed channels like Telegram is hard for outsiders to police proactively, but messaging platforms and payment processors can monitor for known crime-as-a-service marketing patterns and cooperate with law enforcement takedown requests once identified, as happened here.
Subscriber-fraudsters worked at volume rather than researching individuals, calling people at random per the BBC's account of the method, consistent with mass, opportunistic vishing rather than the individualized OSINT profiling seen in targeted business email compromise or executive-impersonation schemes.
Mass volume-dialed targeting cannot be prevented by any single potential victim; the realistic control shifts to Stage 4, where the actual contact with a real person can be authenticated or challenged.
Using the platform, a subscriber placed a call that displayed the genuine name and number of a real bank, tax authority, or retailer, then opened with a fabricated urgent security alert while posing as fraud-department or government staff, relying on the victim's trust in caller ID as a legitimate identity signal.
Because caller ID can be spoofed, it should never be treated as proof of identity. Banks and telecoms can adopt caller-authentication standards such as STIR/SHAKEN, and customers can be trained to call the institution back rather than trusting the displayed name or number. That advice needs one qualification this case supplies: iSpoof could divert call recipients to telephone numbers and websites the fraudsters operated, so hanging up is not by itself proof that the next voice on the line is the bank. The number has to come from an independent source, a bank card, a statement, or the bank's own app, never from the call log, a number the caller reads out, or a redial on the same connection.
The caller talked the victim through a bogus 'security verification' process. Prosecuting counsel described the tooling as interactive voice response prompts plus a telephone PIN-capture facility, one that let subscribers intercept the one-time passwords banks had introduced to improve security; the Court of Appeal described capture of passwords and other sensitive data entered via the keypad of the victim's phone. A further tool tricked victims into entering new card details on the pretext that the details a trusted organization held were out of date. The victim keyed their own codes into their own handset while believing they were confirming their account's safety.
No legitimate bank, tax authority, or retailer will ever ask a customer to read out or key in a full PIN or one-time passcode on a call it placed to them; consumer education and in-app fraud warnings that state this plainly, plus bank staff scripts that reinforce it, directly counter the live social-engineering step.
The captured credentials and passcodes were used immediately to log into the victim's real online banking session and transfer or withdraw funds, completing the theft before most victims realized the original call had been fraudulent.
Banks can add out-of-band transaction confirmation (e.g., in-app push approval rather than a code read or keyed over the phone), step-up authentication for new payees, and behavioral/velocity fraud monitoring that flags a login and immediate large transfer following a passcode entry as high risk.
Subscription fees flowed back to the platform in Bitcoin, 112.6 BTC in total, with Fletcher taking the largest share, between £1.7 million and £1.9 million on the Court of Appeal's figure, which he spent on luxury vehicles and watches, illustrating the platform's own profit motive layered on top of each individual subscriber's fraud proceeds.
Removing the financial incentive requires proceeds-of-crime and confiscation action against platform operators, which the CPS pursued against Fletcher to a confiscation order of £404,331 in May 2026, combined with arresting the subscriber base itself, 142 arrests in the November 2022 action and 169 by the time of sentencing in May 2023, so that demand for the service, not only its supply, is disrupted.
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