Case Library / Pretexting & Impersonation / iSpoof Caller-ID Spoofing (2022): How a £150-a-Month Website Fueled £43 Million in UK Fraud
Pretexting & Impersonation Documented incident

iSpoof Caller-ID Spoofing (2022): How a £150-a-Month Website Fueled £43 Million in UK Fraud

iSpoof was a UK-run, Bitcoin-paid website that let fraudsters display a real bank's number and capture the codes victims keyed in. In the UK alone, prosecutors traced £43 million in fraud to the site. The judge put the worldwide figure nearer £100 million. Police took the server down on November 8, 2022. Six months later its administrator, Tejay Fletcher, got 13 years and 4 months.

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Social Engineering Examples·17 sources

Key takeaways

  • For £150 to £5,000 a month, paid in Bitcoin, a subscriber could borrow a bank's caller ID. Add-on tools grabbed whatever codes the victim then typed into their own phone.
  • Prosecutors identified £43 million of UK frauds, treated as a floor. The sentencing judge called the global estimate of about £100 million conservative.
  • The figure of 200,000 often quoted as "victims" counts people reached by calls lasting over a minute, not confirmed losses.
  • Calling the bank back only works on a number taken from the card or the bank's app, because iSpoof could divert calls to numbers the fraudsters ran.

What iSpoof sold to its 59,000 registered users

iSpoof.cc was a subscription website that sold fraud tools as a service. The Metropolitan Police date its creation to December 2020. Subscribers paid in Bitcoin, from £150 a month up to £5,000 for power users, and the site held 59,000 registered user accounts when it closed.

The Court of Appeal listed what the software did. It made calls appear to come from trusted sources such as a bank or HMRC, the UK tax authority. It also recorded calls, captured data entered on the victim's keypad, and diverted call recipients to numbers or websites the fraudsters ran.

In court, prosecuting counsel John Ojakovoh described an interactive voice response (IVR) feature, meaning automated phone prompts, and a PIN-capture facility. He said one tool let subscribers "intercept OTP (one-time password) which banks ironically introduced to try and improve security." A second tool claimed the victim's card details were out of date and asked them to key in new ones.

The site carried tutorials, and a Telegram channel called "iSpoof club" handled marketing and technical support. Tejay Fletcher co-founded the site with another man and ran it alone once that co-founder was removed in mid-2021. The Court of Appeal records that registered users then grew from 6,433 to 44,459.

How iSpoof's caller-ID spoofing emptied bank accounts

The frauds ran to a script, and it had five steps. iSpoof handled steps 2 and 3. Everything else, from the script to moving the money, was down to the subscriber. The pattern is vishing (voice phishing) built on bank-impersonation pretexting.

  1. Targeting: subscribers dialed at volume, calling people at random rather than researching them, according to the BBC.
  2. Pretext: the call showed the real name and number of a bank such as Barclays or HSBC. The caller then claimed to be from the bank's fraud team, with an alert that supposedly could not wait.
  3. Capture: while the caller talked the victim through a bogus security check, automated prompts logged every PIN and one-time passcode they keyed in.
  4. Access: the subscriber used those codes at once to log in to the victim's real online banking.
  5. Cash-out: money left the account, usually before the victim realized the call was fake. The end result was account takeover.

The capture step is the detail most write-ups miss. The platform did not intercept a text message from the bank. It recorded what victims typed into their own handsets during the call.

Around 10 million calls went through iSpoof worldwide in the 12 months to August 2022, and 3.5 million of them were in the UK. Those are Metropolitan Police figures, as quoted by Sophos. The police described almost 20 people a minute being contacted.

iSpoof fraud investigation timeline, 2020 to 2026

Date Event Source
Nov 30, 2020 Start of the indictment period Fletcher was charged over BBC News
Dec 2020 iSpoof.cc created, per the Metropolitan Police Police Professional
Jun 2021 The Met's Cyber Crime Unit opens Operation Elaborate Computer Weekly
Mid-2021 Co-founder removed; Fletcher runs the site alone Court of Appeal
Oct 2021 Case opened at Eurojust at the request of UK authorities Eurojust
Aug 2021 to Aug 2022 About 10 million calls made through iSpoof worldwide Eurojust
Nov 6, 2022 Fletcher arrested at an address in east London Eurojust
Nov 8, 2022 US and Ukrainian authorities seize the server, by then hosted in Kyiv, and take the site offline Eurojust
Nov 24, 2022 142 arrests announced worldwide, 120 of them in the UK Police Professional
Apr 20, 2023 Fletcher pleads guilty to four offenses, about a month before trial Court of Appeal
May 19, 2023 Sentenced to 13 years and 4 months at Southwark Crown Court; arrests reach 169 CPS, Sky News
Aug 4, 2023 Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal against sentence Court of Appeal
May 18, 2026 Confiscation order of £404,331 made against Fletcher Daily Mail court report

What each iSpoof loss figure measures

iSpoof's figures measure different things, so they should not be added together. The table separates losses to victims, income to the platform, and money recovered.

Figure Meaning Basis
£43 million UK frauds the prosecution identified as carried out through iSpoof Measured; a floor
About £100 million Global losses to victims Judge's estimate, called conservative
£10,000 Average loss among the 4,785 people who reported being targeted to Action Fraud Reported
112.6 BTC Subscription income over about 16 months, approximately £3.2 million per the CPS CPS figure; the Court of Appeal says over £3 million
£1.7 million to £1.9 million Fletcher's own share, the figure the sentence was built on Court finding; the CPS gives at least £1.3 million
Over £360,000 A Lamborghini, two Range Rovers, and a Rolex found by police Combined value, against no known legitimate income
£404,331 Confiscation order, the amount investigators could trace Court order; not money returned to victims

Eurojust gives the platform's income as over EUR 3.7 million. That is its own figure, not a conversion of the sterling total, so the two should not be compared. Sources: Court of Appeal, CPS, BBC News, and Daily Mail.

Three iSpoof facts that are often misreported

200,000 people were contacted, not confirmed as victims

Several pages, including Wikipedia's entry, describe 200,000 UK victims. The Metropolitan Police figure came from the 350,000 UK calls that lasted longer than a minute, which reached about 200,000 people, as iNews reported.

That number measures contact, not loss. Action Fraud received reports from 4,785 people who said they had been targeted.

Fletcher was sentenced on May 19, 2023

Eurojust's press release says May 18, 2023, and a few later reports copied that date. The CPS, the BBC, and the Court of Appeal judgment all say May 19.

The guilty plea came late

The CPS press release says Fletcher pleaded guilty early. The Court of Appeal records that he first pleaded not guilty. He changed his plea about a month before the trial date, which earned him credit of 18 percent.

Why calling the bank back was not enough

The control that failed was trust in caller ID. A displayed number proved nothing, because iSpoof let any subscriber rent a bank's real number.

The usual advice to hang up and call back needed a qualification. iSpoof could divert call recipients to numbers the fraudsters operated. Hitting redial from the call log, or ringing a number the scammer read out, could put the victim straight back through to the fraudsters.

Calling back works only if you take the number from the back of the card, a statement, or the bank's app.

Stage Control that would have broken it
Pretext: spoofed bank number Carrier-level caller authentication (the STIR/SHAKEN approach), so a borrowed bank number fails the check
Capture: keyed-in PINs and passcodes A bank rule, stated plainly to customers, that it never asks for a full PIN or passcode on a call it placed
Access: immediate login In-app approval instead of codes read out or keyed in over the phone
Cash-out: fast transfer Step-up checks on new payees, plus monitoring that flags a login followed at once by a large transfer
Supply: the platform itself Takedown of the service and arrests of its users, which is what ended iSpoof

The same caller-ID trust failure drives the Phantom Hacker bank impersonation case, where the caller's number matched the one printed on the victim's card. For a step-by-step guide, see how to prevent vishing.

What banks, carriers, and fraud teams can learn from iSpoof

  • Banks: move verification out of the phone call and into the app, so there is no code for a caller to collect.
  • Phone carriers: authenticate inbound calls that display a bank's number before they reach the customer.
  • Fraud and security teams: watch for fraud-as-a-service storefronts, since iSpoof marketed itself openly on Telegram.
  • Trainers: teach caller ID as a display, not an identity check, and teach the callback rule with its qualification.
  • Investigators: pursuing the user base as well as the operator produced 169 arrests by May 2023.

Other bank fraud-team impersonation calls in this library include the RBS impersonation against Hamilton Academical FC and the Barclays impersonation of a UK jeweller.

What remains unknown

Police and prosecutors have published arrest counts for iSpoof's users, but no conviction count was found in the sources reviewed. An arrest count is not a conviction count.

Reports of the May 2026 confiscation hearing also disagree on how much Fletcher benefited. This page therefore uses the Court of Appeal's finding of £1.7 million to £1.9 million.

iSpoof: common questions

What was iSpoof?

iSpoof was a caller-ID spoofing website, run from the UK, that fraudsters paid to use from December 2020 until police shut it down in November 2022. It also sold tools for capturing codes. Subscribers used it to call people while displaying a real bank's number. UK authorities described the investigation behind its takedown, Operation Elaborate, as the country's largest-ever fraud investigation.

Who ran iSpoof, and what sentence did he get?

Tejay Fletcher, the site's main administrator, pleaded guilty in April 2023 to four offenses, including making or supplying articles for use in fraud. Southwark Crown Court jailed him for 13 years and 4 months on May 19, 2023. The judge started from 16 years and 6 months before the reduction for his plea, and the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence.

How many iSpoof users were arrested?

The coordinated action announced on November 24, 2022, produced 142 arrests worldwide, 120 of them in the UK and 103 in London. By May 2023 the Met's Cyber Crime Unit put the total at 169. Police first focused on UK users who had paid at least £100 in Bitcoin, working from 70 million rows of data on the seized server.

Is iSpoof the same as iSpoofer?

No source connects them: this case concerns iSpoof.cc, the caller-ID spoofing website that sold bank-impersonation tools to fraudsters and was taken offline on November 8, 2022. Searches for "iSpoof" also return unrelated location-spoofing apps used with mobile games. None of the court, police, or prosecutor sources for this case mention those apps.

Can a scammer make a call show my bank's real number?

Yes. iSpoof subscribers made calls that showed the genuine names and numbers of banks including Barclays, HSBC, NatWest, Santander, Lloyds, Halifax, First Direct, Nationwide, and TSB. A matching number is not proof of identity. End the call and dial the number printed on your card or shown in your bank's app, never one the caller gives you.

Did iSpoof victims get their money back?

Not through the criminal case against Fletcher. The confiscation order of £404,331, made on May 18, 2026, is the amount investigators could trace, payable within three months with 12 months' imprisonment in default. A confiscation order recovers money from the offender; it is not compensation paid to the victims of the frauds.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “iSpoof Caller-ID Spoofing (2022): How a £150-a-Month Website Fueled £43 Million in UK Fraud”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/ispoof-caller-id-spoofing-fletcher-2022

Attack Chain & Defense
1Platform build and tooling development
What happened

Fletcher co-founded iSpoof.cc with another man in December 2020 and ran it alone once that co-founder was removed in mid-2021, building it as a self-service website. Per the Court of Appeal the software let subscribers make calls that appeared to come from trusted sources such as a bank or HMRC, record calls, intercept passwords and other sensitive data entered via the keypad of the victim's phone, and divert call recipients to fraudulent websites or telephone numbers operated by the fraudsters; the site also carried tutorials on getting the most out of the tools. All of it was packaged as a monthly Bitcoin-paid subscription, a pattern consistent with a commercial crime-as-a-service model rather than a one-off tool built for personal use.

The control that would have stopped it

Building and hosting spoofing and keypad-capture tooling happens entirely outside any single victim organization's visibility; the realistic control is legal and infrastructure-level, meaning law enforcement and hosting/domain takedown action against the platform itself, which is what ultimately ended iSpoof rather than any bank-side defense.

2Marketing and subscriber acquisition
What happened

iSpoof was promoted openly through a Telegram channel called 'iSpoof club,' which per the Court of Appeal served to resolve technical issues as well as to market the service. The site reached 59,000 registered user accounts by the time it closed, with subscriptions running from £150 to £5,000 a month, showing how a closed messaging app was used as a low-friction storefront and help desk for criminal customers at scale.

The control that would have stopped it

Platform marketing via closed channels like Telegram is hard for outsiders to police proactively, but messaging platforms and payment processors can monitor for known crime-as-a-service marketing patterns and cooperate with law enforcement takedown requests once identified, as happened here.

3Target list building
What happened

Subscriber-fraudsters worked at volume rather than researching individuals, calling people at random per the BBC's account of the method, consistent with mass, opportunistic vishing rather than the individualized OSINT profiling seen in targeted business email compromise or executive-impersonation schemes.

The control that would have stopped it

Mass volume-dialed targeting cannot be prevented by any single potential victim; the realistic control shifts to Stage 4, where the actual contact with a real person can be authenticated or challenged.

4Caller-ID spoofing and pretext call
What happened

Using the platform, a subscriber placed a call that displayed the genuine name and number of a real bank, tax authority, or retailer, then opened with a fabricated urgent security alert while posing as fraud-department or government staff, relying on the victim's trust in caller ID as a legitimate identity signal.

The control that would have stopped it

Because caller ID can be spoofed, it should never be treated as proof of identity. Banks and telecoms can adopt caller-authentication standards such as STIR/SHAKEN, and customers can be trained to call the institution back rather than trusting the displayed name or number. That advice needs one qualification this case supplies: iSpoof could divert call recipients to telephone numbers and websites the fraudsters operated, so hanging up is not by itself proof that the next voice on the line is the bank. The number has to come from an independent source, a bank card, a statement, or the bank's own app, never from the call log, a number the caller reads out, or a redial on the same connection.

5Live social engineering and keypad capture
What happened

The caller talked the victim through a bogus 'security verification' process. Prosecuting counsel described the tooling as interactive voice response prompts plus a telephone PIN-capture facility, one that let subscribers intercept the one-time passwords banks had introduced to improve security; the Court of Appeal described capture of passwords and other sensitive data entered via the keypad of the victim's phone. A further tool tricked victims into entering new card details on the pretext that the details a trusted organization held were out of date. The victim keyed their own codes into their own handset while believing they were confirming their account's safety.

The control that would have stopped it

No legitimate bank, tax authority, or retailer will ever ask a customer to read out or key in a full PIN or one-time passcode on a call it placed to them; consumer education and in-app fraud warnings that state this plainly, plus bank staff scripts that reinforce it, directly counter the live social-engineering step.

6Account takeover and fund extraction
What happened

The captured credentials and passcodes were used immediately to log into the victim's real online banking session and transfer or withdraw funds, completing the theft before most victims realized the original call had been fraudulent.

The control that would have stopped it

Banks can add out-of-band transaction confirmation (e.g., in-app push approval rather than a code read or keyed over the phone), step-up authentication for new payees, and behavioral/velocity fraud monitoring that flags a login and immediate large transfer following a passcode entry as high risk.

7Objective completion, monetization, and reinvestment
What happened

Subscription fees flowed back to the platform in Bitcoin, 112.6 BTC in total, with Fletcher taking the largest share, between £1.7 million and £1.9 million on the Court of Appeal's figure, which he spent on luxury vehicles and watches, illustrating the platform's own profit motive layered on top of each individual subscriber's fraud proceeds.

The control that would have stopped it

Removing the financial incentive requires proceeds-of-crime and confiscation action against platform operators, which the CPS pursued against Fletcher to a confiscation order of £404,331 in May 2026, combined with arresting the subscriber base itself, 142 arrests in the November 2022 action and 169 by the time of sentencing in May 2023, so that demand for the service, not only its supply, is disrupted.

Quick Facts
Victim
UK and global bank customers.
The Metropolitan Police put more than 200,000 people in the UK in contact with iSpoof-enabled calls, a figure inferred from the 350,000 UK calls that lasted longer than a minute rather than a count of confirmed victims; 70,000 UK numbers linked to an identified suspect were texted by police in November 2022; 4,785 people reported being targeted to Action Fraud and lost an average of £10,000 each. Per the Metropolitan Police, the banks impersonated included Barclays, HSBC, NatWest, Santander, Lloyds, Halifax, First Direct, Nationwide and TSB, alongside government tax offices and, per Eurojust, retail companies.
Location
United Kingdom
(Metropolitan Police-led "Operation Elaborate," Southwark Crown Court prosecution); iSpoof's infrastructure was hosted in the Netherlands then Kyiv, Ukraine, and its user base and victims spanned the US, UK, Netherlands, Australia, France and Ireland among other countries
Date
Indictment period 30 November 2020 to 8 November 2022
; site created December 2020 per the Metropolitan Police; Met "Operation Elaborate" investigation began June 2021; international takedown and server seizure 8 November 2022; Fletcher arrested 6 November 2022, pleaded guilty 20 April 2023, sentenced 19 May 2023, appeal against sentence dismissed 4 August 2023, confiscation order made 18 May 2026
Impact
UK losses of £43 million: the value of the frauds the prosecution identified in the UK, measured, and treated by the CPS as a floor.
BasismeasuredGBP 43 million identified by the prosecution and treated as a floor; the GBP 100 million global figure is the judge's estimate
Global losses of about £100 million: an estimate the sentencing judge called conservative. Of the more than 200,000 people contacted in the UK, 4,785 reported being targeted to Action Fraud and lost an average of £10,000 each; the largest single reported loss was £3 million. Subscription income to iSpoof came to 112.6 BTC, approximately £3.2 million per the CPS, over about 16 months, and the Court of Appeal put the subscription payments at over £3 million; Eurojust separately gives over EUR 3.7 million, which is its own figure rather than a conversion of the sterling one, and no source publishes a rate or date, so the two are not a conversion pair. Fletcher's own share was between £1.7 million and £1.9 million per the Court of Appeal, which is the figure the sentence was built on; the CPS puts it at at least £1.3 million, expressly a floor, and prosecuting counsel told the sentencing court it was about £2 million. Police found a Lamborghini, two Range Rovers and a Rolex with a combined value of over £360,000, against no known legitimate income. On 18 May 2026 Southwark Crown Court made a confiscation order of £404,331, the amount investigators could trace, payable within three months with 12 months' imprisonment in default. A confiscation order is not money returned to victims.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Financial Services & Insurance, Government & Public Sector, Retail & E-commerce
Threat Actor
Organized Crime
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