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PhishingDeepfake & Synthetic Media Corroborated research/advisory

FBI PSA241203: how criminals use generative AI in financial fraud (2024)

The FBI's December 2024 warning on AI-enabled fraud: AI text, fake IDs, cloned voices and deepfake video, and what the FBI says to do about each.

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Social Engineering Examples·4 sources

On 3 December 2024 the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center published PSA241203, a public warning titled "Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud". It isn't about one incident. It pulls together what the FBI was seeing across thousands of victim complaints: scammers using AI-written text, AI-made photos and ID cards, cloned voices and deepfake video to run the same old frauds faster and more convincingly. The advisory gives no loss figure. A year later, the 2025 IC3 annual report counted 22,364 complaints tagged as AI-related, with $893 million in adjusted losses. Status: an advisory, so no named victims and nobody charged.

Key takeaways

  • The FBI's core point: AI removes the tells. Bad grammar and inconsistent stories used to give scams away. Not anymore.
  • Text, pictures, voice, video. Each gets bolted onto a fraud that already existed, from romance scams to fake bank calls.
  • The fix the FBI leads with is almost quaint. Agree a secret word with your family.
  • The $893 million figure is from the 2025 annual report, not the advisory. Don't attribute it to this PSA.

The four ways AI shows up in fraud

Modality Examples the FBI lists
Text Phishing scripts, fake social media profiles, scam messages translated into fluent English, content for bogus investment sites, chatbots that keep victims talking
Images Profile photos for fake identities, forged IDs and law-enforcement or bank credentials, fake celebrity endorsements, invented disaster photos for charity scams, sextortion images
Audio Short cloned clips of a relative's voice used in staged crisis calls, and cloned voices used to impersonate account holders to their bank
Video Real-time deepfake calls posing as executives, police or other authority figures; video "proof" that an online contact is real; deepfakes in investment promos

None of this is a new crime. Romance scams, grandparent scams, CEO fraud, dodgy investments: all older than ChatGPT. What's changed is the friction. Less work per victim. More victims per scammer. And far fewer slip-ups for a target to spot.

Tip: if a message, photo or call feels unusually polished for the person it claims to come from, treat that polish as a warning, not reassurance.

Voice and video in particular

Two of the FBI's examples deserve a closer look because they turn up again and again in the cases on this site. The first is the crisis call. A scammer clones a loved one's voice from a few seconds of public audio and rings a relative claiming to be in trouble and needing money now. See the Quebec grandparent case for what that looks like in practice.

The second is the bank impersonation, in reverse: a cloned voice used to pose as the customer when calling the bank, to get into the account. The PSA doesn't name a product or describe how a voice-authentication system might be beaten, and this page doesn't either.

On video, the advisory points to live deepfake calls impersonating executives. The Arup case earlier in 2024 is the obvious reference point.

The numbers, and what they aren't

Figure (2025 IC3 annual report) Amount
Complaints tagged "AI related" 22,364
Adjusted losses, all AI-related $893,346,472
Of which: investment fraud $632,041,188
Of which: business email compromise $30,256,592
Of which: confidence/romance fraud $19,041,653
Of which: employment fraud $12,550,185

Three caveats. These come from the 2025 annual report, a year after the PSA, which itself gives no numbers. "AI related" is a descriptor attached to a complaint that already has a crime type, so these dollars sit inside the annual total rather than on top of it. And complaint data isn't measured loss. It's what victims reported. For the full breakdown, see the IC3 2025 AI fraud page.

What the FBI says to do

  • Agree a secret word or phrase with family so a crisis call can be checked in seconds.
  • Hang up and call back on a number you already had. Never the one that rang you.
  • Does it sound like them? Odd word choices or a flat tone are worth a pause.
  • Check the picture. Hands with too many fingers, teeth that don't line up, shadows going the wrong way, video that lags.
  • Limit your public voice and image. Private accounts and restricted followers mean less raw material for a clone.
  • Never send money, gift cards or crypto to someone you've only met online or by phone.
  • Report to IC3 with full details. Aggregate complaints are how advisories like this one get written.

See also voice cloning, deepfake examples and pig butchering.

Common questions

What is FBI PSA241203?

A public service announcement from the FBI's IC3, published 3 December 2024, describing how criminals use generative AI text, images, voice cloning and deepfake video to make financial fraud more scalable and believable.

How much money has been lost to AI-enabled fraud?

The PSA gives no figure. The FBI's 2025 annual report later recorded 22,364 AI-related complaints and $893 million in adjusted losses, most of it investment fraud.

What does the FBI recommend?

A family secret word, calling back on known numbers, listening for inconsistencies, checking images for artefacts, limiting public exposure of your voice and face, and reporting to IC3.

Does the advisory name any victims or criminals?

No. It synthesises patterns across many complaints rather than describing a single case.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “FBI PSA241203: how criminals use generative AI in financial fraud (2024)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/fbi-ic3-psa241203-generative-ai-financial-fraud-2024

Attack Chain & Defense
1Impersonation material
What happened

the PSA describes criminals using synthetic profiles, images, identification documents, audio and video; it does not reconstruct one target-selection process.

The control that would have stopped it

Public voice and image exposure (such as social media content) is very hard to eliminate at the scale the PSA describes; the FBI's own realistic recommendation is to limit how much voice and image content of yourself or your family is posted publicly and to restrict social accounts and followers, shrinking the raw material available to clone rather than assuming it can be hidden entirely.

2Synthetic content
What happened

generative AI can create believable text, images, audio and video and reduce the effort needed to deceive targets, according to the PSA.

The control that would have stopped it

Generation of the synthetic audio or video happens outside the victim's or institution's view, so there is no direct control at this stage; the realistic defense is the human verification built into Stage 4, training people and call-handling staff to treat any single piece of audio or video as unverified by default.

3Pretext
What happened

the PSA lists separate examples such as fictitious social profiles, forged credentials and loved-one crisis calls. It does not establish that every scheme combined all modalities.

The control that would have stopped it

use independent identity checks before relying on a synthetic-looking credential or an unexpected audio/video request. This is general advice, not a named bank control documented as defeated by the PSA.

4Contact
What happened

examples include short audio clips impersonating a loved one in crisis and real-time video chats purporting to show executives or authority figures.

The control that would have stopped it

the FBI recommends a family secret word or phrase and independently verifying a caller by contacting the purported bank or organization directly. These checks reduce reliance on the incoming voice; they are not a guarantee against every fraud.

5Objective
What happened

the PSA describes demands for immediate financial assistance or ransom and fraudulent bank-account access through AI-generated audio impersonation. It does not identify a specific bank authentication control being defeated.

The control that would have stopped it

the PSA advises against sending money, gift cards, cryptocurrency or other assets to people known only online or by phone, and against sharing sensitive information with them.

6Reporting
What happened

the PSA asks victims of financial fraud to submit an IC3 report with relevant transaction and interaction details; it provides no measured cash-out or recovery result.

The control that would have stopped it

report suspected financial fraud to IC3 with available transaction and interaction details. The PSA does not promise recovery.

Quick Facts
Victim
General public and financial institutions in the United States
(advisory synthesizes aggregated IC3 victim-complaint patterns rather than naming specific victims)
Location
United States (nationwide advisory; IC3 complaints are filed by U.S. victims, though perpetrators may be foreign-based)
Date
2024-12-03
Impact
The December 2024 PSA gives no loss figure or complaint count.
BasisreportedLater IC3 complaint-based adjusted losses used only as context; the PSA itself quantifies no loss.
Separately, the 2025 IC3 Annual Report records 22,364 AI-related complaints and $893,346,472 in adjusted losses, including $632,041,188 for investment fraud, $30,256,592 for BEC, $19,041,653 for confidence/romance fraud and $12,550,185 for employment fraud. These are later complaint statistics, not losses caused by the advisory. AI Related is a descriptor alongside a crime type, not an additional amount to add to the annual total.
Status
Corroborated research/advisory
Case Type
Research / Advisory
Sector
Consumer / General Public, Cross-Sector / Multiple Industries, Financial Services & Insurance
Threat Actor
unknown
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