Case Library / Phishing / RSA SecurID breach (2011): the '2011 Recruitment Plan' email
Phishing Documented incident

RSA SecurID breach (2011): the '2011 Recruitment Plan' email

A '2011 Recruitment Plan' email with a booby-trapped Excel file breached RSA in 2011. SecurID data was stolen and later used against Lockheed Martin, RSA said.

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Social Engineering Examples·18 sources

In March 2011, attackers broke into RSA, the company behind SecurID two-factor login tokens, with an email titled "2011 Recruitment Plan". An employee opened the attached Excel file, which used an unpatched Flash flaw to install a remote-access trojan. The attackers worked their way to systems holding SecurID data and copied it out. RSA later said the stolen information was used in an attempted attack on Lockheed Martin. Status: Documented incident.

Key takeaways

  • A security company was breached by a dull-looking email sent to ordinary staff, not executives.
  • At least one copy landed in a junk folder. An employee fished it out and opened it.
  • EMC, RSA's parent, took a $66.3 million charge to replace tokens and monitor customers.
  • In 2021, RSA's former chairman disputed that the stolen data was enough to attack customers. Lockheed stands by the link.

The email

Over two days, attackers sent two phishing emails to two small groups of RSA employees. RSA's Uri Rivner later described them as not particularly high profile. The subject line was "2011 Recruitment Plan".

F-Secure later found a likely copy. It was spoofed to look like it came from a recruiting site that had listed EMC jobs, and its whole message read: "I forward this file to you for review. Please open and view it." Attached was "2011 Recruitment plan.xls", with a hidden Flash object that exploited a flaw Adobe hadn't yet fixed. RSA never confirmed this was the exact email that got in.

Tip: a vague "please review this file" from a sender you don't deal with is a red flag, even when the topic sounds like normal work.

How the attack spread

Stage What happened
Open An employee, reportedly in Australia, retrieved the email from junk and opened the attachment
Install The Flash exploit dropped a Poison Ivy remote-access trojan
Climb The attackers stole credentials and moved from ordinary users to administrators
Collect Data was gathered on internal servers and packed into encrypted archives
Steal Files were sent by FTP to a hacked outside server

An admin spotted an odd login on 8 March, and RSA disclosed the breach on 17 March. In 2021, after non-disclosure agreements ran out, the RSA analyst who led the hunt told WIRED he watched the intruders spend nine hours copying SecurID "seed" values, the secrets behind the tokens. F-Secure's analyst said the exploit wouldn't have worked on newer versions of Windows or Office, or for a user without rights to install software.

Lockheed Martin and the fallout

On 21 May 2011, Lockheed Martin detected what it called "a significant and tenacious attack" on its network and said no customer, program, or employee data was compromised. It sent new tokens to 45,000 employees. RSA said on 2 June that information taken in March had been used in that attempt.

RSA then offered replacement tokens to customers using SecurID to protect networks and intellectual property, and extra monitoring to the rest. EMC recorded a $66.3 million charge for this in the second quarter of 2011, against an $81.3 million reserve. Earlier investigation costs were never broken out.

The story isn't settled. In 2021, RSA's former executive chairman and three other former executives argued it was never confirmed that the attackers got the full seed list in usable form, or the customer list needed to exploit it. See also supply-chain social engineering.

Who did it

RSA called it an advanced persistent threat. In 2012, the head of the NSA told a Senate committee the RSA hack led to at least one US defense contractor being targeted, and pointed to China. Mandiant and The New York Times later linked it to APT1, believed to be a unit of China's People's Liberation Army. No one has been charged.

What would have stopped it

  • Leave junk alone. Filters caught at least one copy. Staff need to know why it's there.
  • Remove admin rights from everyday users, so attachments can't install software.
  • Keep Office and Windows current. Newer versions would have blocked this exploit.
  • Protect the crown jewels. Systems holding authentication secrets should be walled off and watched closely.
  • Report odd files rather than opening them to see what they are.

See also spear phishing.

Other spear phishing breaches: Anthem, Target, and Sony Pictures.

Common questions

How was RSA hacked in 2011?

An employee opened a spear-phishing email called "2011 Recruitment Plan" with an Excel file that exploited a Flash flaw and installed remote-access malware.

What was stolen from RSA?

Information related to SecurID tokens. An RSA analyst later said he watched attackers copy SecurID seed values, though former executives dispute that the data was usable.

Was Lockheed Martin hacked because of RSA?

RSA said information stolen from it was used in an attempted attack on Lockheed in May 2011. Lockheed said no customer, program, or employee data was compromised.

How much did the RSA breach cost?

EMC recorded a $66.3 million charge in mid-2011 for replacing tokens and monitoring customers. Other costs were not disclosed.

Sources
  • Open Letter to RSA Customers (Art Coviello), Exhibit 99.1 to EMC Form 8-K. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EMC Corporation filing) (primary). First-party disclosure filed with the SEC on/around March 17, 2011; confirms APT intrusion and theft of SecurID-related information. Verified by direct fetch: exhibit header reads 'Exhibit 99.1 Open Letter to RSA Customers,' text matches quotes used in the case.
  • EMC Form 8-K (March 17, 2011) furnishing the open letter and SecurCare Online note. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EMC Corporation filing) (primary). Official 8-K referencing Exhibits 99.1 and 99.2; states EMC did not then expect a material financial impact. Verified by direct fetch; confirms March 17, 2011 filing date.
  • RSA SecurCare Online Note: Required Actions for SecurID Installations, Exhibit 99.2. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EMC Corporation filing) (primary). First-party customer advisory with remediation steps, filed as an SEC exhibit. Verified by direct fetch: exhibit header reads 'Exhibit 99.2 RSA SecurCare Online Note.'
  • EMC Corporation Form 10-Q, quarterly period ended June 30, 2011, Note 14 (Commitments and Contingencies), "RSA Special Charge". U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EMC Corporation filing) (primary). Filed August 5, 2011. Source of the $66.3 million second-quarter charge, the $81.3 million reserve at June 30, 2011, and EMC's description of the Lockheed Martin episode as 'an unsuccessful cyber attack on one of our defense sector customers.' Verified by direct fetch.
  • Anatomy of an Attack, and its appendix. Uri Rivner, RSA (the Security Division of EMC), 'Speaking of Security' blog (primary). Published April 1, 2011; the original URL is dead, read via the Internet Archive. First-party origin of the two-email account, the junk-folder retrieval, the Poison Ivy reverse-connect variant, the privilege escalation from non-administrative users, and the FTP and password-protected RAR exfiltration. Verified by direct fetch of the archived copy.
  • How We Found the File That Was Used to Hack RSA. Mikko Hypponen, F-Secure (primary). Published August 26, 2011; read via the Internet Archive. Origin of the recovered sample: sent March 3, uploaded to VirusTotal March 19, spoofed Beyond.com sender, one-line body, sent to one EMC employee and copied to three others. Verified by direct fetch of the archived copy.
  • Security Advisory for Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader and Acrobat, APSA11-01. Adobe Systems (primary). Released March 14, 2011, last updated March 21, 2011; read via the Internet Archive. Vendor advisory for CVE-2011-0609, confirming exploitation 'in the wild in targeted attacks via a Flash (.swf) file embedded in a Microsoft Excel (.xls) file delivered as an email attachment.' Verified by direct fetch of the archived copy.
  • CVE-2011-0609 Detail. National Vulnerability Database, NIST (primary). Confirms the Flash attribution and the exploitation route, 'as demonstrated by a .swf file embedded in an Excel spreadsheet, and as exploited in the wild in March 2011.' Verified by direct fetch.
  • Lockheed Martin Customer, Program and Employee Data Secure. Lockheed Martin (primary). Statement of May 28, 2011: attack detected May 21, systems remain secure, no customer, program or employee personal data compromised, work continuing to restore employee access. Contains no VPN or password-reset figure. Verified by direct fetch.
  • RSA: SecurID Attack Was Phishing Via an Excel Spreadsheet. Threatpost (secondary). Reports RSA's own Uri Rivner blog detailing the '2011 Recruitment Plan' emails, the .xls attachment, CVE-2011-0609 Flash zero-day, and Poison Ivy. Verified by direct fetch; quotes and details match.
  • Spearphishing + zero-day: RSA hack not 'extremely sophisticated'. Ars Technica (secondary). Kill-chain summary: junk-folder retrieval, embedded Flash exploit, Poison Ivy RAT, privilege escalation, lateral movement, exfiltration. Verified by direct fetch.
  • Was this the e-mail that took down RSA?. Computerworld (secondary). F-Secure's recovery of the candidate spear-phishing email (subject '2011 Recruitment plan', spoofed webmaster@beyond.com sender, one-line body). Verified by direct fetch, including the exact beyond.com spoofed-sender detail.
  • Lockheed Says Hacker Used Stolen SecurID Data. The New York Times (secondary). Confirms downstream use of RSA-stolen data against Lockheed Martin. Verified by direct fetch.
  • RSA finally comes clean: SecurID is compromised. Ars Technica (secondary). Documents RSA's June token-replacement offer and the Lockheed Martin link, plus Northrop Grumman/L-3 rumors. The ~40M tokens figure is an outside estimate, not RSA's; see the Bloomberg item below. Verified by direct fetch.
  • RSA SecurID Breach Cost $66 Million. Dark Reading (secondary). Reports EMC CFO David Goulden's Q2 2011 earnings-call disclosure of ~$66M remediation cost, excluding Q1 costs. Verified by direct fetch.
  • The Full Story of the Stunning RSA Hack Can Finally Be Told. WIRED, Andy Greenberg, May 20, 2021 (secondary). Written once the ten-year nondisclosure agreements expired. Source of the March 8 detection, the seed warehouse and Rackspace exfiltration account from RSA's own incident responder, the two-simultaneous-groups observation, the F-Secure analyst's point that a more recent Windows or Office build or an account without install rights would have blocked the exploit, the former executives' dispute of the Lockheed Martin link, Lockheed's reaffirmation, and the NSA director's Senate Armed Services Committee briefing. The live URL is paywalled; verified quote by quote against the Internet Archive capture of wired.com dated June 1, 2021.
  • RSA Says Lockheed Attack Not a New Threat to SecurID, But Will Replace Users' Tokens. Threatpost (secondary). Quotes RSA's June open letter, including the June 2, 2011 confirmation date and the offer to replace tokens for customers 'typically focused on protecting intellectual property and corporate networks.' Verified by direct fetch.
  • EMC's security breach may cost customers $100m. Bloomberg, carried by The Times of India, June 9, 2011 (secondary). Source of the 40 million tokens estimate attributed to Gartner analyst Avivah Litan, RSA's on-record statement that it did not foresee replacing anywhere near 30 to 40 million, and Lockheed Martin's statement that it had mailed new tokens to 45,000 employees by June 4. Verified by direct fetch.
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “RSA SecurID breach (2011): the '2011 Recruitment Plan' email”. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/rsa-securid-spearphish-2011

Attack Chain & Defense
1Reconnaissance and pretext selection
What happened

the attacker(s) likely researched RSA/EMC's organizational structure and business rhythms well enough to pick a pretext, a routine-sounding "recruitment plan" spreadsheet, and to target small groups of ordinary, non-executive employees (consistent with RSA's own account that recipients were not high-profile or high-value individuals) rather than a random blast, reducing suspicion and detection risk.

The control that would have stopped it

employee-facing organizational and personnel details (team structures, plausible HR/recruiting workflows) are very hard to fully hide from a determined attacker at enterprise scale; the realistic control assumes attackers can identify a plausible internal audience and hardens the process (email handling, attachment policy) that gets used against it, rather than trying to eliminate the recon opportunity itself.

2Infrastructure and tooling setup
What happened

the attacker spoofed the sender address to resemble a known recruiting service (the recovered candidate sample was spoofed to look like it came from webmaster@beyond.com, though F-Secure found the message was not sent from Beyond.com servers), and separately obtained or developed a then-unknown Adobe Flash zero-day (CVE-2011-0609) along with a customized variant of the commodity Poison Ivy remote-access trojan, plus command-and-control infrastructure for it to call home to.

The control that would have stopped it

an organization cannot prevent an attacker from acquiring or building an unknown (zero-day) exploit; the nearest practical control is reducing the attack surface those exploits land on, for example disabling or restricting risky embedded active content (Flash, macros, OLE objects) by default in office document viewers so a working exploit still has less to trigger.

3Weaponization
What happened

the Flash zero-day exploit and the Poison Ivy payload were embedded inside a legitimate-looking Microsoft Excel file ("2011 Recruitment plan.xls") so that opening an ordinary business document would silently trigger code execution.

The control that would have stopped it

because the payload rode inside an ordinary-looking Office file, application allow-listing and endpoint detection that flag anomalous document behavior (rather than relying on signature-based antivirus for a brand-new payload) are the relevant backstop; this control clusters with Stage 2's active-content hardening.

4Delivery
What happened

over a two-day period, two spear-phishing emails carrying the "2011 Recruitment Plan" subject line were sent to two small groups of employees, per RSA's own account. F-Secure later recovered from VirusTotal a candidate sample it believed was one of the two, sent to one EMC employee and copied to three others, carrying a terse one-line body ("I forward this file to you for review. Please open and view it."); RSA declined to confirm it was the message that got the attackers in, so everything below the subject line rests on that recovered sample.

The control that would have stopped it

email authentication and anti-spoofing controls (SPF/DKIM/DMARC), stronger spam filtering, and, critically, not letting users trivially retrieve and act on messages already quarantined as spam without added friction or verification, would have raised the bar on delivery succeeding at all.

5Exploitation and initial access
What happened

although at least one message was auto-routed to a junk/spam folder, an employee retrieved it and opened the attachment, triggering the embedded zero-day and installing the Poison Ivy backdoor, giving the attacker an initial foothold and remote access to that machine.

The control that would have stopped it

user awareness training that treats an unsolicited, contextless "please open and view this file" request, especially one pulled out of a spam folder, as a phishing indicator to verify out-of-band rather than act on. The Flash flaw was unknown and unpatched, so patching it was not available as a defense, but the human decision was not the only control that failed: the F-Secure analyst who reverse-engineered the sample said the exploit would not have run against a more recent build of Windows or Microsoft Office, or against a user without rights to install programs, which is the same hardening Stages 2 and 3 call for.

6Privilege escalation and lateral movement
What happened

from the compromised host, the attacker harvested credentials, escalated from a non-administrative account, and pivoted across the network to reach administrators and the higher-value systems holding SecurID-related data.

The control that would have stopped it

least-privilege access, strong credential hygiene, network segmentation, and endpoint/network monitoring tuned to detect anomalous privilege escalation and lateral movement toward administrative and high-value systems would have slowed or exposed the attacker before they reached SecurID-related data.

7Internal staging and exfiltration
What happened

stolen data was aggregated on internal staging servers, compressed and encrypted into password-protected RAR archives, and transferred out via FTP to an external compromised host, consistent with typical APT data-collection tradecraft of the era.

The control that would have stopped it

data-loss-prevention monitoring for unusual internal data aggregation and large encrypted-archive creation, egress filtering to block unexpected outbound FTP to unknown external hosts, and strict, separately access-controlled protection (segmentation, hardware security modules) of the authentication seed material itself, so that a single compromised account could never reach the crown-jewel data, are the matched controls here.

8Downstream objective completion
What happened

RSA said on June 2, 2011 that information taken from RSA in March had been used as an element of an attempted broader attack on Lockheed Martin, turning the initial vendor compromise into a supply-chain attack on RSA's own customers. That causal chain is contested: Lockheed stands by its forensic finding and the NSA director told the Senate Armed Services Committee the RSA hack led to a defense contractor being victimized, while RSA's own former executive chairman and three other former executives said in 2021 the link was never proven.

The control that would have stopped it

prompt, specific customer disclosure of exactly what categories of data were stolen (rather than the vague initial guidance RSA gave) would have let downstream customers like Lockheed Martin add compensating controls or extra authentication factors before, rather than after, attackers attempted to use the stolen SecurID data against them.

Quick Facts
Victim
RSA Security
(RSA, the Security Division of EMC Corporation), maker of the SecurID two-factor authentication tokens; downstream target Lockheed Martin, whose SecurID link RSA asserted in 2011 and RSA's own former executives disputed in 2021, with Northrop Grumman and L-3 Communications alleged but unconfirmed.
Company
RSA Security
Location
Bedford, Massachusetts, USA
(RSA headquarters; parent EMC Corporation headquartered in Hopkinton, Massachusetts); attack conducted remotely
Date
2011-03
Impact
$66.3M USD charge recorded in Q2 2011 against an $81.3M reserve at June 30, 2011 (measured; EMC Corporation Form 10-Q, filed August 5, 2011).
BasismeasuredCharge recorded in EMC's Form 10-Q
The charge covers the expansion of customer remediation programs only; Q1 2011 investigation and system-hardening costs were accrued separately and never broken out. Excludes downstream victim losses.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Defense & Aerospace, Technology & Software
Threat Actor
nation-state
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