A '2011 Recruitment Plan' email with a booby-trapped Excel file breached RSA in 2011. SecurID data was stolen and later used against Lockheed Martin, RSA said.
Social Engineering Examples·18 sources
In March 2011, attackers broke into RSA, the company behind SecurID two-factor login tokens, with an email titled "2011 Recruitment Plan". An employee opened the attached Excel file, which used an unpatched Flash flaw to install a remote-access trojan. The attackers worked their way to systems holding SecurID data and copied it out. RSA later said the stolen information was used in an attempted attack on Lockheed Martin. Status: Documented incident.
Over two days, attackers sent two phishing emails to two small groups of RSA employees. RSA's Uri Rivner later described them as not particularly high profile. The subject line was "2011 Recruitment Plan".
F-Secure later found a likely copy. It was spoofed to look like it came from a recruiting site that had listed EMC jobs, and its whole message read: "I forward this file to you for review. Please open and view it." Attached was "2011 Recruitment plan.xls", with a hidden Flash object that exploited a flaw Adobe hadn't yet fixed. RSA never confirmed this was the exact email that got in.
Tip: a vague "please review this file" from a sender you don't deal with is a red flag, even when the topic sounds like normal work.
| Stage | What happened |
|---|---|
| Open | An employee, reportedly in Australia, retrieved the email from junk and opened the attachment |
| Install | The Flash exploit dropped a Poison Ivy remote-access trojan |
| Climb | The attackers stole credentials and moved from ordinary users to administrators |
| Collect | Data was gathered on internal servers and packed into encrypted archives |
| Steal | Files were sent by FTP to a hacked outside server |
An admin spotted an odd login on 8 March, and RSA disclosed the breach on 17 March. In 2021, after non-disclosure agreements ran out, the RSA analyst who led the hunt told WIRED he watched the intruders spend nine hours copying SecurID "seed" values, the secrets behind the tokens. F-Secure's analyst said the exploit wouldn't have worked on newer versions of Windows or Office, or for a user without rights to install software.
On 21 May 2011, Lockheed Martin detected what it called "a significant and tenacious attack" on its network and said no customer, program, or employee data was compromised. It sent new tokens to 45,000 employees. RSA said on 2 June that information taken in March had been used in that attempt.
RSA then offered replacement tokens to customers using SecurID to protect networks and intellectual property, and extra monitoring to the rest. EMC recorded a $66.3 million charge for this in the second quarter of 2011, against an $81.3 million reserve. Earlier investigation costs were never broken out.
The story isn't settled. In 2021, RSA's former executive chairman and three other former executives argued it was never confirmed that the attackers got the full seed list in usable form, or the customer list needed to exploit it. See also supply-chain social engineering.
RSA called it an advanced persistent threat. In 2012, the head of the NSA told a Senate committee the RSA hack led to at least one US defense contractor being targeted, and pointed to China. Mandiant and The New York Times later linked it to APT1, believed to be a unit of China's People's Liberation Army. No one has been charged.
See also spear phishing.
Other spear phishing breaches: Anthem, Target, and Sony Pictures.
An employee opened a spear-phishing email called "2011 Recruitment Plan" with an Excel file that exploited a Flash flaw and installed remote-access malware.
Information related to SecurID tokens. An RSA analyst later said he watched attackers copy SecurID seed values, though former executives dispute that the data was usable.
RSA said information stolen from it was used in an attempted attack on Lockheed in May 2011. Lockheed said no customer, program, or employee data was compromised.
EMC recorded a $66.3 million charge in mid-2011 for replacing tokens and monitoring customers. Other costs were not disclosed.
Social Engineering Examples. “RSA SecurID breach (2011): the '2011 Recruitment Plan' email”. Accessed 22 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/rsa-securid-spearphish-2011
the attacker(s) likely researched RSA/EMC's organizational structure and business rhythms well enough to pick a pretext, a routine-sounding "recruitment plan" spreadsheet, and to target small groups of ordinary, non-executive employees (consistent with RSA's own account that recipients were not high-profile or high-value individuals) rather than a random blast, reducing suspicion and detection risk.
employee-facing organizational and personnel details (team structures, plausible HR/recruiting workflows) are very hard to fully hide from a determined attacker at enterprise scale; the realistic control assumes attackers can identify a plausible internal audience and hardens the process (email handling, attachment policy) that gets used against it, rather than trying to eliminate the recon opportunity itself.
the attacker spoofed the sender address to resemble a known recruiting service (the recovered candidate sample was spoofed to look like it came from webmaster@beyond.com, though F-Secure found the message was not sent from Beyond.com servers), and separately obtained or developed a then-unknown Adobe Flash zero-day (CVE-2011-0609) along with a customized variant of the commodity Poison Ivy remote-access trojan, plus command-and-control infrastructure for it to call home to.
an organization cannot prevent an attacker from acquiring or building an unknown (zero-day) exploit; the nearest practical control is reducing the attack surface those exploits land on, for example disabling or restricting risky embedded active content (Flash, macros, OLE objects) by default in office document viewers so a working exploit still has less to trigger.
the Flash zero-day exploit and the Poison Ivy payload were embedded inside a legitimate-looking Microsoft Excel file ("2011 Recruitment plan.xls") so that opening an ordinary business document would silently trigger code execution.
because the payload rode inside an ordinary-looking Office file, application allow-listing and endpoint detection that flag anomalous document behavior (rather than relying on signature-based antivirus for a brand-new payload) are the relevant backstop; this control clusters with Stage 2's active-content hardening.
over a two-day period, two spear-phishing emails carrying the "2011 Recruitment Plan" subject line were sent to two small groups of employees, per RSA's own account. F-Secure later recovered from VirusTotal a candidate sample it believed was one of the two, sent to one EMC employee and copied to three others, carrying a terse one-line body ("I forward this file to you for review. Please open and view it."); RSA declined to confirm it was the message that got the attackers in, so everything below the subject line rests on that recovered sample.
email authentication and anti-spoofing controls (SPF/DKIM/DMARC), stronger spam filtering, and, critically, not letting users trivially retrieve and act on messages already quarantined as spam without added friction or verification, would have raised the bar on delivery succeeding at all.
although at least one message was auto-routed to a junk/spam folder, an employee retrieved it and opened the attachment, triggering the embedded zero-day and installing the Poison Ivy backdoor, giving the attacker an initial foothold and remote access to that machine.
user awareness training that treats an unsolicited, contextless "please open and view this file" request, especially one pulled out of a spam folder, as a phishing indicator to verify out-of-band rather than act on. The Flash flaw was unknown and unpatched, so patching it was not available as a defense, but the human decision was not the only control that failed: the F-Secure analyst who reverse-engineered the sample said the exploit would not have run against a more recent build of Windows or Microsoft Office, or against a user without rights to install programs, which is the same hardening Stages 2 and 3 call for.
from the compromised host, the attacker harvested credentials, escalated from a non-administrative account, and pivoted across the network to reach administrators and the higher-value systems holding SecurID-related data.
least-privilege access, strong credential hygiene, network segmentation, and endpoint/network monitoring tuned to detect anomalous privilege escalation and lateral movement toward administrative and high-value systems would have slowed or exposed the attacker before they reached SecurID-related data.
stolen data was aggregated on internal staging servers, compressed and encrypted into password-protected RAR archives, and transferred out via FTP to an external compromised host, consistent with typical APT data-collection tradecraft of the era.
data-loss-prevention monitoring for unusual internal data aggregation and large encrypted-archive creation, egress filtering to block unexpected outbound FTP to unknown external hosts, and strict, separately access-controlled protection (segmentation, hardware security modules) of the authentication seed material itself, so that a single compromised account could never reach the crown-jewel data, are the matched controls here.
RSA said on June 2, 2011 that information taken from RSA in March had been used as an element of an attempted broader attack on Lockheed Martin, turning the initial vendor compromise into a supply-chain attack on RSA's own customers. That causal chain is contested: Lockheed stands by its forensic finding and the NSA director told the Senate Armed Services Committee the RSA hack led to a defense contractor being victimized, while RSA's own former executive chairman and three other former executives said in 2021 the link was never proven.
prompt, specific customer disclosure of exactly what categories of data were stolen (rather than the vague initial guidance RSA gave) would have let downstream customers like Lockheed Martin add compensating controls or extra authentication factors before, rather than after, attackers attempted to use the stolen SecurID data against them.
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