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FBI IC3 tracks AI fraud for the first time: $893M in 2025 losses

The FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report tracked AI fraud for the first time: 22,364 complaints and $893M lost. What the number means and what it doesn't.

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Social Engineering Examples·4 sources

Want hard AI fraud statistics? The FBI finally has some. Its Internet Crime Report for 2025, out on 6 April 2026, carries a section on AI for the first time. Count: 22,364 complaints. Losses: $893,346,472. Each one mentioned AI somewhere, whether a cloned voice, a deepfake video, a fake profile or a forged ID. Big number? Sure. Yet it's a sliver of the whole pie: 1,008,597 complaints and roughly $20.877 billion lost across everything IC3 heard about that year. Status: Official statistics; no single case.

Key takeaways

  • "AI related" is a tag stuck onto a crime type, say investment fraud or BEC. Not its own bucket.
  • Adding the $893 million to other totals counts the same money twice. Don't.
  • Mention AI in your complaint and it gets tagged. That's not proof AI was used.
  • FBI advice, in three words: "Take a Beat".

The numbers

Measure 2025
Complaints tagged AI related 22,364
Losses on those (adjusted) $893,346,472
Every complaint IC3 got 1,008,597
Every reported loss Roughly $20.877 billion

The FBI's press release headline: "Cryptocurrency and AI Scams Bilk Americans of Billions".

What these scams look like

Scam The AI bit
Family emergency Grandkid, spouse or boss on the phone, panicking, needing cash. The voice is cloned
Investment A celebrity or CEO "backing" some scheme on video. Deepfaked
Romance Months of sweet talk from a persona an AI keeps going, then the money ask
Business email Polished, on-tone emails, no typos to give them away
Identity Fake IDs good enough for a background check or loan form

Spot the pattern? Hurry. Pay now. Don't check. And since the fake looks and sounds spot on, trusting your gut won't cut it.

Tip: faces and voices are the easy part to fake now. Got a money request from someone familiar? Ring them back yourself, on the number you've always used.

How to read the figure

A word on method. If a complaint brings up artificial intelligence, IC3 tags it. Analysts may layer on extra detail, numbers shift once investigators dig in, and duplicate losses get stripped out where they can be. Bottom line: $893 million is a snapshot built from complaints. Nobody audited it.

Separately, federal and Ohio prosecutors charged nine people over more than $42 million in fraud around then, one scheme reportedly using AI video. Different announcement. It doesn't back up the IC3 number.

Related reading: the Ohio twins AI romance case and the FBI's 2024 generative AI warning.

What stops it

  • Check first, pay later. Use contact details you already had, never ones in the message.
  • Hurry is a red flag. Pause.
  • Tell your bank and IC3.gov quickly. Fast reports make frozen money more likely.

More on deepfake examples and voice cloning.

Common questions

How much did AI fraud cost Americans in 2025?

$893,346,472, says IC3, spread over 22,364 complaints that brought up AI.

Is the $893 million on top of other fraud losses?

No. It sits inside crime types like investment fraud and BEC. Stack it on top and you double count.

Is this the first time the FBI tracked AI fraud?

Yes, in the sense that 2025's report is IC3's first annual report with its own AI section.

How much was lost to all internet crime in 2025?

Close to $20.877 billion, from 1,008,597 complaints.

Sources
  • 1 2025 IC3 Annual Report. FBI / Internet Crime Complaint Center (primary). Source document containing the AI-fraud section, the 22,364-complaint/$893,346,472-loss figures, and total 2025 loss figures. Verified by direct fetch: the report's 'Descriptors' table lists 'AI Related' complaints = 22,364 and 'AI Related' losses = $893,346,472, an exact match.
  • Cryptocurrency and AI Scams Bilk Americans of Billions. FBI (primary). April 6, 2026 FBI press release announcing the 2025 IC3 report; confirms this is the first AI-dedicated section in IC3's ~25-year history, cites the 22,364 complaints / nearly $893 million figure, total ~$21 billion 2025 losses, and 1,008,597 total complaints. Verified by direct fetch.
  • FBI Releases Annual Internet Crime Report. FBI (primary). Prior-year (2024) IC3 report press release; used for the $16.6 billion 2024 total-loss comparison figure (no dedicated AI category that year). Verified by direct fetch (dated April 23, 2025; reports 859,532 complaints and losses exceeding $16 billion).
  • Fraud Division Announces Federal-State Partnership in Ohio to Prosecute Fraud. United States Department of Justice (primary). June 4, 2026 DOJ press release on the separate Ohio fraud task force/rollout; provides contemporaneous context (references AI-driven video platforms in an unrelated romance-fraud case) but is not the source of the $893 million aggregate figure. Verified by direct fetch.
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “FBI IC3 tracks AI fraud for the first time: $893M in 2025 losses”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/fbi-ic3-ai-fraud-893m-2025

Attack Chain & Defense
1Reconnaissance and persona/target research
What happened

This is an aggregate statistic rather than a single incident, so IC3's report does not detail one recon method, but the scam types folded into the AI figure (romance scams, BEC, executive/official impersonation, investment fraud) typically require identifying both a plausible person to impersonate and a person to target, drawing on OSINT sources such as social media, company websites and org charts, dating-app profiles, and public records to learn names, relationships, and enough personal detail to make an AI-generated persona or cloned voice convincing.

The control that would have stopped it

Employee, family, and public OSINT exposure (LinkedIn roles, org charts, social media, dating-app profiles) is very hard to eliminate at the individual or enterprise level; the realistic control assumes an attacker can already learn this and instead limits what a stranger can achieve through a single channel, rather than trying to hide the underlying information.

2AI tooling acquisition and synthetic-asset creation
What happened

Per IC3's description of the techniques inside the $893 million figure, scammers typically source commercially available voice-cloning services, deepfake video generation tools, AI-generated or forged identification-document templates, and AI chat/LLM tools to produce the synthetic voice sample, video clip, fake social profile, or forged ID used in the scheme.

The control that would have stopped it

There is no practical way to block private acquisition of commercial voice-cloning or deepfake tools before contact occurs; the nearest realistic control sits downstream, treating any voice or video 'proof' received unexpectedly as unverified by default rather than trying to prevent the tooling's existence.

3Initial contact and pretext delivery
What happened

The scammer reaches the victim through a channel matching the scam type, a phone or video call for a cloned voice claiming to be a family member, executive, or government official, a dating app or social media message for a fake AI-generated profile, or a job/loan application flow for a forged ID, opening with a scenario (distress, opportunity, or an official demand) built to feel urgent from first contact.

The control that would have stopped it

Unsolicited contact making an urgent claim, a distress call, an investment tip, a romantic overture, or an official demand should trigger independent verification through a channel the recipient controls, not one the caller or messenger provides, before any further engagement.

4Trust-building and synthetic-credibility reinforcement
What happened

For longer-running schemes (romance, investment), IC3 notes AI-generated conversational scripts let scammers sustain a believable, personalized relationship over weeks or months at a scale that would previously have required more manual effort per victim; for shorter schemes, a deepfake video or cloned voice is used as one-time 'proof' (a celebrity or CEO endorsing an investment, a loved one's panicked voice) standing in for the identity verification a victim would otherwise seek.

The control that would have stopped it

Skepticism toward 'proof' delivered only through the same channel as the ask is the core defense here; verifying a loved one's, executive's, or official's claim through a separately initiated call to a known number, or an established in-person channel, neutralizes synthetic credibility regardless of how convincing it sounds or looks.

5Pressure and urgency to bypass verification
What happened

IC3's report frames this as the throughline across the AI-enabled scam types it tracked, pairing the synthetic 'proof' built up in earlier stages with classic pressure tactics, urgency, secrecy, and emotional appeals, specifically to get the victim to act before they can independently verify what they are seeing or hearing.

The control that would have stopped it

pause before acting on an urgent financial request and verify the claimed identity through an independent contact. This is a general recommendation; the aggregate does not measure the effectiveness of a particular control.

6Payment or credential extraction
What happened

The victim wires money, buys and sends cryptocurrency, purchases gift cards, or hands over identity/financial credentials (in employment or loan-fraud variants using forged IDs), completing the transaction the earlier stages built toward.

The control that would have stopped it

independently verify high-risk payment instructions and alert the financial institution promptly if fraud is suspected. These are general safeguards, not a proved prevention rate for the AI-related complaint set.

7Complaint recording
What happened

IC3 applies an AI-related descriptor when reported information references AI. Its appendix says analysts may apply crime-type and adjusted-loss data, and statistics can evolve with investigative or analytical proceedings.

The control that would have stopped it

report suspected fraud to IC3 and the relevant financial institution. The complaint aggregate does not establish the probability of recovery for an individual payment.

Quick Facts
Victim
US consumers nationally who filed complaints with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center
(IC3) in which AI was identified as involved in the fraud, 22,364 complaints in aggregate, drawn from IC3's broader 2025 intake of over 1 million total complaints.
Location
United States (nationwide, aggregate of IC3 complaints from consumers across all states)
Date
Calendar year 2025 (figure published in FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report, released April 6, 2026)
Impact
IC3 recorded 22,364 AI-related complaints and $893,346,472 in adjusted losses for calendar 2025.
BasisreportedComplaint-based IC3 statistics, with analyst classification and loss adjustments; a point-in-time assessment.
The AI descriptor overlaps underlying crime types, including investment, BEC and confidence/romance fraud; it is not an additional loss to add to those categories. Across all complaints, IC3 reported 1,008,597 complaints and approximately $20.877 billion in losses.
Status
Corroborated research/advisory
Case Type
Research / Advisory
Sector
Cross-Sector / Multiple Industries, Cryptocurrency & Digital Assets, Financial Services & Insurance
Threat Actor
unknown
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