Case Library / Agentic AI Attacks (AI-Powered Social Engineering) / GTG-5004: ransomware built with Claude and sold as a service (2025)

GTG-5004: ransomware built with Claude and sold as a service (2025)

Anthropic says a UK cybercriminal used Claude to build ransomware they couldn't write alone, then sold kits for $400 to $1,200 on dark web forums.

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Social Engineering Examples·3 sources

This is AI-generated ransomware sold as a product. Anthropic reported in August 2025 that a UK-based cybercriminal it tracks as GTG-5004 used Claude to build ransomware and then sold it on dark web forums for $400 to $1,200. In Anthropic's assessment, the operator didn't seem able to write the hard parts alone: the encryption, the anti-analysis tricks, the Windows internals. Sales posts date back to at least 17 January 2025. Anthropic banned the account. Status: Vendor report; actor unnamed, no arrest.

Key takeaways

  • The buyers were other criminals. No end victim is named in Anthropic's report.
  • The kits were marketed as "for educational and research use only" while being sold on criminal forums.
  • Anthropic hasn't published the prompts, so how the operator got Claude to help isn't public.
  • The case rests on Anthropic's own account. Press coverage repeated it without adding independent evidence.

What was for sale

Tier Price What it included
1 $400 A ransomware DLL or executable
2 $800 A full ransomware-as-a-service kit, with a PHP console and command-and-control tools
3 $1,200 A "fully undetectable" crypter for Windows 10 and 11

Sold through Dread, CryptBB and Nulled, a .onion site and a ProtonMail address. No total revenue, buyer count or downstream ransom figure has been disclosed.

Technically, the ransomware used ChaCha20 encryption with RSA key handling, direct-syscall tricks (FreshyCalls and RecycledGate) to dodge endpoint tools, reflective DLL injection, string obfuscation, anti-debugging, and deletion of Windows shadow copies so victims couldn't restore files. It also hunted for fixed drives and network shares.

Tip: keep offline, tested backups. Ransomware like this deletes the built-in Windows restore points.

How Claude was used

Anthropic describes steady, directed prompting as the malware grew more capable. First basic encryption and evasion, then anti-analysis and anti-recovery features, then delivery and control infrastructure. Its key finding: without Claude, the operator could not implement or troubleshoot the encryption, the anti-analysis work or the Windows internals. Yet working malware still reached other criminals.

That's the worrying part. Skill used to be a barrier to entry. Here, according to Anthropic, it wasn't.

What isn't known

  • The prompts. Anthropic didn't publish them, so there's no evidence of any specific trick used to get past Claude's safeguards.
  • The "educational use" line. It appears in the sales listings. The sources don't show it was used as a pretext in prompts to Claude.
  • The victims. No organisation hit by these kits has been identified.
  • The actor. No name, no arrest, no takedown of the sales sites reported.

What stops it

  • AI providers: Anthropic banned the account, alerted partners and added new ways to detect malware being uploaded, modified or generated.
  • Look at requests over time, not one at a time. A single coding question can look harmless. A month of them may not.
  • Defenders: watch for shadow copy deletion and direct-syscall evasion, and keep offline backups.

See also AI-generated malware, GTG-2002 vibe hacking and FraudGPT.

Common questions

What is GTG-5004?

Anthropic's tracking name for a UK-based cybercriminal who used Claude to build ransomware and sold it on dark web forums in 2025.

How much was the ransomware sold for?

$400 for the ransomware itself, $800 for a full kit with a console and control tools, and $1,200 for a crypter.

Could the actor have built it without AI?

Anthropic assessed that the operator appeared unable to implement the encryption, anti-analysis and Windows internals work without Claude's help.

Was anyone arrested?

No arrest or takedown has been reported. Anthropic banned the account and alerted partners.

Sources
  • Threat Intelligence Report: August 2025. Anthropic (primary). Full first-party report; 'No-code malware: selling AI-generated ransomware-as-a-service' section (p.15) contains the GTG-5004 designation, UK attribution, dates, pricing tiers, and full technical breakdown.
  • Detecting and countering misuse of AI: August 2025. Anthropic (primary). Anthropic's summary blog post accompanying the report, published Aug 27, 2025, with the condensed 'No-code malware' case study and stated response/ban.
  • Malware devs abuse Anthropic's Claude AI to build ransomware. BleepingComputer (secondary). Reporting based on Anthropic's report, including quotations about GTG-5004, technical capabilities, and pricing. This is not independent corroboration of the underlying operation.
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “GTG-5004: ransomware built with Claude and sold as a service (2025)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/gtg-5004-ai-generated-ransomware-as-a-service-2025

Attack Chain & Defense
1Reported capability gap
What happened

Anthropic assessed that the operator appeared unable to implement encryption, anti-analysis, or Windows-internals components without Claude's help.

The control that would have stopped it

Proposed control: Review related malware-development requests together; an isolated technical question may not reveal the purpose of the account's activity.

2AI-assisted development
What happened

The operator used Claude to develop ransomware. The cited report does not disclose the prompts or establish that an educational pretext was used on the model.

The control that would have stopped it

Evidence limit: No prompt-specific defense can be derived from this case because Anthropic did not publish the elicitation method.

3Development history
What happened

Anthropic describes continued directional prompting and increasing sophistication over time. It does not document a separate-session or below-refusal-threshold strategy.

The control that would have stopped it

Proposed control: Review an account's development history for accumulating malware capabilities. This is an editorial recommendation, not a claim about how this account evaded detection.

4Capability progression
What happened

Anthropic describes basic encryption and evasion, followed by anti-analysis and recovery prevention, then advanced delivery and command-and-control infrastructure.

The control that would have stopped it

Reported response: Anthropic banned the account and implemented detection methods for malware upload, modification, and generation.

5Commercial packaging
What happened

The reported offerings were a $400 ransomware executable, an $800 RaaS kit with PHP console and C2 tools, and a $1,200 Windows crypter.

The control that would have stopped it

Proposed control: Compare observed malware artifacts and commercial offerings when investigating whether related builds share an origin.

6Marketing
What happened

The operator advertised on criminal forums and claimed the products were for educational and research use. Anthropic places that claim in the distribution strategy, not in the prompts used to obtain code.

The control that would have stopped it

Reported response: Anthropic's accompanying blog says it alerted partners. A tailored classifier is described for the separate GTG-2002 case, not GTG-5004.

Quick Facts
Victim
Diffuse: other cybercriminals who purchased the ransomware builds on dark web forums
(buyers), and by extension any downstream organizations later hit by ransomware built from the kits; no specific named end-victim organization is documented in Anthropic's report
Location
United Kingdom (threat actor); distribution via dark web forums with global buyer reach
Date
2025-01 (active since at least Jan 17, 2025) through 2025-08-27 (Anthropic disclosure/ban)
Impact
Ransomware packages sold for $400-$1,200 USD per Anthropic's three-tier pricing: (1) ransomware DLL/executable - $400, (2) full RaaS kit with PHP console and C2 tooling - $800, (3) Windows 10/11 FUD (fully undetectable) crypter for native binaries - $1,200.
Basisnot-a-lossSale prices for the packages, not victim losses
No aggregate revenue, victim count, or downstream ransom-payment total is disclosed by Anthropic.
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Technology & Software
Threat Actor
Unaffiliated Individual
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