Case Library / Phishing / Contagious Interview / ClickFake: North Korea's fake crypto job interviews (2025)
Phishing Documented incident

Contagious Interview / ClickFake: North Korea's fake crypto job interviews (2025)

North Korea-linked hackers ran fake job interviews for crypto firms, then told applicants to paste a 'camera fix' that installed malware. How ClickFake works.

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Social Engineering Examples·12 sources

North Korea-linked operators built polished fake job-interview sites in the name of crypto companies such as Coinbase, Kraken and Circle. Applicants filled in forms, answered screening questions, then were asked to record a video introduction. When they turned on their camera, the site showed a fake driver error and told them to paste a "fix" into their computer's terminal. That command installed a backdoor called GolangGhost. Security firm Sekoia named this branch "ClickFake Interview" in early 2025. Status: Documented campaign, vendor research.

Key takeaways

  • The victim runs the malware themselves, believing they're fixing a camera problem. This is the ClickFix trick.
  • None of the advertised roles were developer jobs. They were business development, product and DeFi roles, aimed at people less likely to spot a bad command.
  • On Macs, a second fake pop-up asked for the system password.
  • No campaign-wide loss figure exists. The two reported losses are individual claims.

How the fake interview worked

Step What the candidate saw
Approach A recruiter, often on LinkedIn or a job board, offering a good role at a crypto firm
Application A professional-looking site with forms and screening questions
Video intro A request to turn on camera and microphone, which is normal in real hiring
Fake error A message blaming a camera driver fault
"Fix" Instructions to open Terminal (Mac) or Command Prompt (Windows) and paste a command, presented as an NVIDIA or FFMPEG driver update
Infection The command quietly downloaded and ran GolangGhost, a backdoor that also steals data

On Macs, a credential stealer called FrostyFerret ran first and put up a fake system dialog asking for the user's password. If the site detected the wrong kind of visitor, such as a security scanner, it served a harmless decoy instead.

Tip: no real website needs you to paste a command into your terminal to fix your camera. If a page asks, close it.

How the campaign changed

Period Targets Method
From December 2022 (Unit 42, "Contagious Interview") Developers Fake "take-home tests" with backdoored code on NPM or GitHub
From early 2025 (Sekoia, "ClickFake Interview") Non-technical crypto roles Fake interview sites and a paste-this-command fix

Sekoia found 184 invitations naming 14 companies, including Coinbase, KuCoin, Kraken, Circle, Securitize, BlockFi, Tether, Bybit, Robinhood and Archblock. None of these firms was involved; their names were used as bait. SentinelLABS and Validin later recovered logs naming more than 230 people who engaged with the lures in early 2025, from only a few servers, and said the true number is likely much higher.

Front companies

Silent Push found three fronts used to make the scheme look real: BlockNovas LLC, Angeloper Agency and SoftGlide LLC. Reuters reported that BlockNovas and SoftGlide were registered as real US companies using fake identities. The operators used AI image tools to make fake staff headshots. The FBI seized the BlockNovas domain in April 2025.

Two loss reports exist, both single claims. Reuters quoted an anonymous product manager who lost about $1,000 in crypto after recording a video intro for a fake Ripple recruiter. Silent Push mentioned a developer whose wallet was allegedly emptied, though that person's own account describes the older code-test method.

Who is behind it

Researchers tie the campaign to North Korea, though they describe it differently. Palo Alto's Unit 42 attributed it with moderate confidence to a North Korean state-sponsored group. Sekoia names Lazarus directly. Silent Push calls it a Lazarus subgroup also known as Famous Chollima. It's part of the same playbook as the Axie Infinity heist, where a fake job offer led to a $540 million theft.

What stops it

  • Never paste commands from a website into your terminal or Run box.
  • Check the employer through its official careers page before going further.
  • Use a separate device for job hunting, away from wallets and work systems.
  • Be wary of fast, generous offers from recruiters you didn't approach.
  • Companies: block or alert on terminal commands launched from the Run box or browser, and log PowerShell.

See also recruitment fraud and spear phishing.

Common questions

What is the Contagious Interview campaign?

A North Korea-linked operation that uses fake job interviews to get crypto-industry job seekers to install malware.

What is ClickFake Interview?

Sekoia's name for a 2025 branch of the campaign that uses fake interview websites and a "paste this command to fix your camera" trick.

Were Coinbase or Kraken hacked?

No. Their names were used on fake interview sites to attract applicants.

How much money was stolen?

No campaign-wide figure exists. Individual reported losses include about $1,000 in crypto from one victim quoted by Reuters.

Sources
Cite this case

Social Engineering Examples. “Contagious Interview / ClickFake: North Korea's fake crypto job interviews (2025)”. Accessed 3 November 2026. https://socialengineeringexamples.com/contagious-interview-clickfake-crypto-2025

Attack Chain & Defense
1Front-company and persona setup
What happened

DPRK operators stood up three front companies, documented by Silent Push as BlockNovas LLC, Angeloper Agency and SoftGlide LLC. Two of them were genuine US registrations obtained with fake personas and addresses: Reuters reviewed the documents and places BlockNovas in New Mexico and SoftGlide in New York, while Angeloper Agency "does not appear to be registered in the United States." The operators then built fake recruiter and employee profiles on LinkedIn and other platforms, using AI image-generation services, Silent Push names "Remaker AI", to manufacture employee headshots.

The control that would have stopped it

Front-company registration fraud is hard for an individual job seeker to spot at the point of contact; the realistic control sits at the state and platform level, business-registration verification, sanctions screening, and domain/hosting KYC, which is how Reuters and Silent Push traced BlockNovas' and SoftGlide's fabricated U.S. addresses after the fact.

2Interview-site and payload infrastructure build
What happened

Operators built professional ReactJS-based fake job-application and interview websites branded to resemble well-known crypto and fintech employers, and pre-staged the OS-specific ClickFix payload chains (curl/PowerShell/VBS/NodeJS for Windows, Bash/LaunchAgents for macOS) on the hosting infrastructure before outreach began.

The control that would have stopped it

Security researchers and job platforms can hunt for and take down known ClickFix interview-site infrastructure and payload patterns using published indicators of compromise and YARA rules (as Sekoia did); job seekers should independently verify that a hiring company's interview platform and domain match the employer's real, published channels before proceeding.

3Targeted outreach
What happened

Fake recruiter personas contacted crypto-industry job seekers through LinkedIn, X, and job or freelance platforms, typically referencing a specific open role to appear legitimate. In the ClickFake branch the roles offered were deliberately non-technical: Sekoia found that every position was a business development, asset management, product or DeFi specialist job rather than a software development one. The earlier repository vector, documented by Unit 42, targeted software developers instead.

The control that would have stopped it

Treat unsolicited recruiter contact, especially from accounts with little history, with baseline skepticism, and verify the recruiter's identity through the employer's official careers page or HR contact rather than trusting the inbound message alone.

4Application funnel and trust-building
What happened

Candidates were walked through a multi-step, realistic application process, forms, screening questions, and scheduling, that built sunk-cost investment and normalized the process before any technical request was made.

The control that would have stopped it

Recognize that a long, realistic multi-step application process is not proof of legitimacy on its own; sunk-cost investment in the funnel should not lower scrutiny when an unusual technical request appears later.

5ClickFix trigger
What happened

The candidate was asked to enable their camera or microphone for a required video introduction, then shown a fabricated error, "Access to your camera or microphone is currently blocked," blamed on a race condition in the camera driver discoverer. The remedy on offer was dressed as an NVIDIA driver update on Windows and an FFMPEG driver update on macOS. On Windows the instruction came in two parts, open the Run dialog and type cmd.exe first, then paste a curl command that fetched nvidiadrivers.zip; on macOS, open Terminal through Spotlight, then paste a curl command that fetched coremedia.sh. Sekoia records that a request carrying the wrong User-Agent was served a decoy instead, an image for macOS and an archive containing a real driver for Windows.

The control that would have stopped it

The single highest-leverage control in this chain: never copy-paste and execute terminal, PowerShell, or command-prompt instructions supplied by a website or recruiter to fix a driver, camera, or permissions error, no matter how legitimate the surrounding process looks.

6Self-installed payload execution, and a second social-engineering step
What happened

The victim ran the supplied command themselves, triggering a multi-stage, OS-specific download-and-execute chain. Both operating systems ended at GolangGhost, an interpreted Go implant Sekoia describes as a backdoor and stealer. On macOS the chain first ran FrostyFerret, which is a credential stealer rather than a backdoor: it presented a counterfeit macOS dialog carrying the Chrome icon, claimed Chrome needed camera or microphone access, and asked for the system password. Whatever was typed was rejected as invalid, and the password was exfiltrated to Dropbox, likely for keychain access. The original Contagious Interview vector instead delivered BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret through a backdoored repository.

The control that would have stopped it

Run any employer-supplied code, installer, or "assessment" step in an isolated or sandboxed environment rather than a primary machine, and use endpoint protection capable of flagging unusual curl, PowerShell, VBS, or LaunchAgent execution chains. Treat a system password prompt that appears just after such a step as part of the attack: a browser asking for camera or microphone access never needs the macOS login password, so a dialog that demands it and then calls it invalid is the second half of the same lure.

7Credential and wallet theft with persistent access
What happened

The installed backdoor exfiltrated browser data, cryptocurrency wallet extension data (such as MetaMask), and stored credentials, while giving the attackers ongoing remote access to the compromised machine, per Sekoia's and Silent Push's technical analysis.

The control that would have stopped it

Keep cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive credentials off the general-purpose machine used for job applications where possible, prefer hardware wallets, and monitor for anomalous browser-extension or credential-store access.

8Monetization and objective completion
What happened

Attackers drained accessible cryptocurrency wallets and/or retained credentials and remote access for further intrusions, cryptocurrency theft, or espionage in support of DPRK revenue-generation goals, the campaign's ultimate payout step.

The control that would have stopped it

Once funds are drained or access is monetized, recovery is very difficult; the realistic control is upstream, infrastructure takedown, exchange-side fraud monitoring, and law-enforcement action such as the FBI's April 2025 seizure of the BlockNovas domain, rather than after-the-fact reversal.

Quick Facts
Victim
Job seekers in the cryptocurrency industry worldwide, in the ClickFake branch mainly in non-technical roles.
Sekoia counted 14 impersonated company names across 184 retrieved invitations and named 10 of them in its prose: Coinbase, KuCoin, Kraken, Circle, Securitize, BlockFi, Tether, Bybit, Robinhood and Archblock. SecurityWeek, reporting on the same Sekoia research on April 2, 2025, reads Ripple and Chainalysis off the report's chart. SentinelLABS, September 4, 2025, adds eToro from a later set of lures
Location
Global.
The people reached in the ClickFake branch were crypto-industry job seekers in business development, asset management, product and DeFi specialist roles rather than software developers, contacted through job platforms, LinkedIn and X. SentinelLABS found the affected individuals worked mainly in marketing and finance and were distributed worldwide. The earlier repository vector did target software developers
Date
2025
(Sekoia identified the 'ClickFake Interview' branch in February 2025, notified customers March 21, 2025, and published its report March 31, 2025; it is a continuation of the broader 'Contagious Interview' campaign that Unit 42 first documented in November 2023 as active since at least December 2022)
Impact
No campaign-wide dollar loss figure exists in public reporting, and none of the vendors cited here publishes one.
BasisclaimedBoth individual amounts are self-reported by the people affected
Two individual amounts exist, and both are claims rather than measured figures. Silent Push, April 24, 2025, identified two developers approached through BlockNovas and wrote that one of them "allegedly" had a MetaMask wallet compromised; that person's own account, dated September 18, 2024, describes running a client's backend code from a GitLab project, which is the earlier repository vector rather than the ClickFix branch, and says "I didn't lose much money." Reuters, September 4, 2025, quotes an anonymous product manager at a US cryptocurrency firm who recorded a video introduction for a purported Ripple Labs recruiter and found $1,000 worth of ether and Solana missing from a wallet held on his computer; that is a single self-reported loss on the ClickFix vector. (Note: it is Sekoia's own report that raises the unrelated $1.5 billion Bybit theft, as scene-setting in its introduction, and Bybit is separately one of the impersonated employer brands here. It is a different incident and not a loss figure for this campaign.)
Status
Documented incident
Case Type
Real-World Incident
Sector
Cryptocurrency & Digital Assets, Financial Services & Insurance, Technology & Software
Threat Actor
nation-state
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